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Abstract 
 
The scandal surrounding R.D. Laing’s work concerns both his life and his 
theories. Given that there is sufficient biographical material on Laing already in 
existence, this thesis focuses upon his theoretical contributions. No substantial 
review and critique of the criticism of Laing is currently in existence. The main 
objectives of this thesis are to evaluate the critiques of Laing, and to examine 
these in the light of his contributions to social theory. The critiques of Laing fall 
into three main categories: conservative critiques by psychiatrists, feminist 
critiques, and left-wing criticism. 
                                                    The methodological problems involved in the 
production of a critique are highlighted within each category of criticism. Some 
of the critiques of Laing constitute little other than criticism of the critic’s own 
misreading and misinterpretation of his work, which omit the lack of textual 
evidence to support the critic’s claims. The lines of development of key concepts 
within Laing’s work, and his intentions for his projects, may be ignored. Laing’s 
feminist critics view his work as prejudiced against women. This thesis examines 
the lack of validity within this assertion, and provides an original reading of 
Laing’s work as of benefit to women, through Laing’s central concern of making 
‘madness’ intelligible. 
                                  The importance of certain of Laing’s ignored texts, such as 
Reason and Violence, (1964) is highlighted through their centrality to his 
theoretical contributions. This thesis aims to debunk some of the myths 
surrounding Laing’s work, such as that it glorifies psychosis. Sedgwick, in 
particular, has been responsible for the promotion of some of these myths. The 
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poverty of his critique is replicated by other critics, as is a similar poor approach 
to the production of criticism. Critiques of elements of Laing’s work which lie 
outside of the standardised criticism are provided, in which the attempt to avoid 
reproducing the same errors as the other critiques is made. The principles 
required for a coherent critique of an author’s work are elucidated. 
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1) Introduction 
 
The key objective of this thesis is to examine and analyse the validity of the main 
theoretical critiques of Laing’s work. The criticism of Laing falls into three broad 
categories: conservative critiques by psychiatrists, feminist critiques, and left-
wing critiques. A key part of assessing the validity of the critiques of Laing 
involves looking at the assumptions that the critic may be operating upon. These 
assumptions and values held by the critic may or may not limit the extent of their 
actual engagement with Laing’s work. A further important consideration here is 
the matter of how Laing’s work should be read and interpreted. Some of the 
criticism of Laing is unfortunately the product of a poor reading and 
interpretation of his work, which weakens the criticism severely. Examples of 
this will be explored by exposing the critic’s misreading, misunderstandings, or 
misconceptions regarding Laing’s texts. I will be using examples from Laing’s 
work itself as a response to his critics, if appropriate. The lines of development of 
concepts within Laing’s work may also be ignored, or misrepresented by the 
critic. Some critics omit aspects of Laing’s work that do not fit into their 
representation of his texts. 
                                           At this point, I feel that it is worth making clear that I 
am not denying that there are problems with Laing’s work. Since I am aware of 
this, I am including a section on my own criticism of Laing, which will follow 
my review of the existing ones. However, many of the critiques of Laing fail in 
their aims, due to the above issues. Why look at the criticism of Laing? I feel that 
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it is important to assess which criticisms are valid, and which are not. Kotowicz1 
does deal with some of the criticism of Laing, as well as making his own 
criticisms. However, his review of the critiques could be more comprehensive. 
He deals implicitly with the psychiatric establishment’s problems with Laing’s 
work, rather than giving its exponents a good examination. I think there is a need 
for a thorough review of the criticism of Laing, in order to determine which of 
the critiques have some weight, and which do not. My aim is then to productively 
engage with the critiques, in order to advance Laing’s contribution to social 
theory. This forms the other main objective of this thesis – to examine Laing’s 
work as social theory. 
                                    Any attempts to criticise Laing’s theory via his biography 
will be treated with suspicion. It is a well-known fact that Laing was an 
alcoholic, and that his personal life was fairly chaotic. Laing ‘is typically referred 
to because of personal excesses rather than his scholarship.’2 However, Laing’s 
theories cannot be simplistically written off because of his life story. His theory  
is of a sufficient quality, in my view, that it has to be met on its own terms, and 
any valid critique must do this. As Burston puts it: ‘a theory has to stand or fall 
on its own merits – not whether the author was drunk or so forth.’3 To critique 
Laing’s theory via his biography is a very low form of criticism. Doing this may 
even suggest that the critic was intellectually incapable of criticising Laing at the 
level of his theory. Also, since my focus in this thesis is on Laing’s theory, and 
                                               
1
 Kotowicz, Z, (1997), R.D. Laing and the Paths of Anti-Psychiatry, London, Routledge, 
pp.90-105 
2
 Jones, A, (2001), Absurdity and being-in-itself. The third phase of phenomenology: Jean-Paul 
Sartre and existential psychoanalysis, Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, 
No.8, pp.369-370 
3
 Burston, D, (1996), The Wing of Madness: The Life and Work of R.D. Laing, USA, Harvard 
University Press, p.78 
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not his biography, I want to engage with the criticism which is most relevant in 
terms of my project. There is quite enough material existing already on Laing’s 
biography. Indeed, in recent years there have been more biographies appearing of 
Laing than theoretical texts. Therefore, no biography of Laing is provided here. 
There may be a sense in which the scandal surrounding Laing has contributed to 
a climate of poor scholarship with regard to his work. I think that a good way to 
descandalize Laing’s theory is to offer a thorough reading and interpretation of 
his work, which may be enabled by the following review of his critics.  
                                                                                                                The next 
short chapter lists what I perceive as Laing’s main contributions. Chapter Three 
examines the critiques of Laing’s work that have been produced by conservative 
psychiatric critics. Reznek’s attempt at criticising Laing constitutes more of a 
critique of his (poor) interpretation of Laing’s texts, as opposed to Laing’s actual 
work. Clare, by and large, reproduces the same methodological errors as Reznek, 
in terms of criticising his (i.e. Clare’s) own assumptions about Laing’s texts. 
However, Clare introduces the problematic approach of labelling Laing as an 
‘anti-psychiatrist’, something which Laing himself denied. Clare also contributes 
to the misleading line of critique which proposes that Laing romanticised 
madness. This chapter additionally makes use of interviews with Laing, where he 
provides responses to this strand of criticism. It is noted in these interviews that 
attempts to criticise Laing’s work by claiming that he was himself psychotic 
were made by the psychiatric establishment. 
                                                                      Chapter Four investigates Deleuze 
and Guattari’s comments on Laing. They provide both praise and criticism of 
Laing’s work. The first section of this chapter demonstrates how Deleuze and 
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Guattari develop, and commend, the idea of the schizophrenic voyage. They 
perceive the voyage as containing insights into the experience of the 
schizophrenic. This section draws upon Laing’s critique of psychoanalysis in 
order to demonstrate the difficulties involved within the psychoanalytic approach 
to forms of psychosis. The next section of this chapter evaluates Deleuze and 
Guattari’s direct criticisms of Laing’s work. They criticise Laing for not 
politicizing the voyage sufficiently, for not making an adequate distinction 
between social and mental alienation, and for an excessive focus upon 
familialism within his work. My responses to these aspects highlight problems 
within Deleuze and Guattari’s arguments in relation to Laing’s texts and the 
overall focus of his work. Nevertheless, they raise some productive points with 
regard to omissions within theoretical discourse. The third section of the chapter 
compares the theories of groups provided by Deleuze and Guattari and by Laing 
in his summary of Sartre’s late thought (Reason and Violence), and provides an 
example of the critique of psychoanalysis from Sartre’s work, which is referred 
to by Deleuze and Guattari. It also provides some of Laing’s responses to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of his work.  
                                                                     Chapter Five examines Mitchell’s 
lengthy critique and assessment of Laing’s work. She provides overall some of 
the most valid criticisms of Laing’s work which are reviewed in this thesis. The 
production of such a critique is aided by the approach to Laing’s texts taken by 
Mitchell. Her chapters on Laing benefit from a reading of all of Laing’s texts, 
and from the extent of her engagement with Laing’s work. However, despite her 
efforts to discuss the lines of development within Laing’s work, these do, at 
times, go astray. Mitchell’s discussion suffers from a lack of comprehension of 
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the aims of phenomenology. She has a tendency to lapse into what I have termed 
the Procrustean critique, where elements of Laing’s theories that do not fit into 
her account of them are ignored. She additionally tends to impose views on to 
Laing’s work, such as the psychoanalytic perspective, which she is sympathetic 
to. This chapter criticises Mitchell’s claims that Laing’s work demonstrates a 
prejudiced view of women. It includes some examination of Object Relations 
Theory, and Winnicott in particular, which is used as a comparison to Mitchell’s 
allegations that Laing blames the mothers for their children’s distress to an unfair 
extent, within his case studies. However, Mitchell does make some substantial 
contributions in terms of her identification of certain aspects of Laing’s ‘science 
of persons’. She attempts to make use of a fairly sophisticated method of 
critique, where she tries to apply Laing’s development of Sartrean concepts to 
Laing’s own aims. This is, unfortunately, not as successful as it could, 
potentially, have been. Nevertheless, Mitchell’s assessment of Laing provides 
arguably the best review of his work that is evaluated in this thesis. 
                                              Chapter Six examines Showalter’s attempted 
critique of Laing. However, most of her criticism is more accurately viewed as 
directed at Cooper and the anti-psychiatric movement than Laing himself. Little 
distinction is made between Laing and Cooper. Showalter’s chapter simply 
describes aspects of Laing’s theories and life, as opposed to offering any real 
analysis or engaging with Laing’s concepts. Showalter’s poor approach involves 
moralising over Laing’s biography. She essentially produces a character 
assassination of Laing. Her assertions are unsupported by textual evidence, and 
make use of other claims which are either inaccurate or unsubstantiated. Her 
attempt to portray Laing as a misogynist is flawed due to the above issues. 
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Showalter provides arguably the worst ‘critique’ of Laing out of those reviewed 
in this thesis. 
                 In Chapter Seven, I provide my own arguments for a feminist reading 
of Laing. This chapter is intended to provide counter-arguments to those made by 
Mitchell and Showalter. My central premise is that Laing’s main project of 
demystifying madness can actually be seen as of benefit to women. I also aim to 
challenge the assumption made by the feminist critics that Laing’s work is 
prejudiced against women. The first section of this chapter examines empirical 
evidence regarding levels of mental illness, and schizophrenia, in particular, in 
terms of gender. Up to the age of sixteen, more boys than girls tend to receive a 
diagnosis of mental illness. However, statistics on schizophrenia in adults 
suggest that it affects both genders in roughly equal proportions. The empirical 
evidence regarding the social circumstances of those diagnosed as psychotic 
suggests that men may fare slightly worse in living with such a diagnosis. This 
section is intended to demonstrate the problematic nature of the assumptions 
made by Mitchell and Showalter that schizophrenia is a ‘female malady.’ It 
includes some discussion of Laing’s desire to investigate the relation between 
biology and the social, in the light of recent research which is moving towards 
the notion that extremely traumatic and stressful experiences may be a factor in 
the experience of forms of psychotic distress. 
                                                                       The next section of this chapter 
draws upon the evidence from the previous section in order to present my 
arguments for a feminist reading of Laing. Laing’s case studies, and other 
relevant examples from his work, are utilised in order to present my arguments. 
Instances of Laing’s defence of women within his texts are cited. A large part of 
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the analysis in this section is devoted to Sanity, Madness and the Family, (1964) 
where I identify key themes and features of the treatment of the daughters within 
that text. The featured families appear to expect total conformity to their wishes 
from their daughters. They will not let them go, nor be their own individuals. 
Autonomy tends to be mistaken for a symptom of mental illness. The families 
experience an excessive level of anxiety about what they see as a threatening 
outer world, which is then used to attempt to control their daughters. However, 
within some of Laing’s case studies, the parents appear to be living in a world of 
their own constructions, as opposed to any approximation to reality. My reading 
of these case studies suggests that they highlight the gendering of socialisation, 
and of the abuse of female children by their families. My interpretation also 
draws upon some of the concepts in Reason and Violence. 
                                                                                            Following this is a 
section on Laing’s defence of women within his reinterpretations of past clinical 
descriptions. The first example of the latter aspect of Laing’s work that I examine 
is his re-evaluation of an unpleasant clinical examination conducted by 
Kraepelin. The second concerns Laing’s critique of Binswanger’s account of the 
life and death of ‘Ellen West’. This is a harrowing, tragic account of a woman, 
where Laing provides some resounding criticism of Binswanger’s failure to 
conduct a proper existential analysis of the material. The final section draws 
upon Laingian theory in relation to a recent feminist text, in order to further 
advance my development of Laing’s ideas along feminist lines. This section 
critiques the cultural prescriptions placed upon women to focus upon the outer 
realm, particularly in terms of appearance, and a focus upon the other’s 
expectations. 
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                                                        Chapter Eight examines the left-wing 
critiques of Laing. Jacoby’s critique of Laing is problematic, despite there being 
some limited validity to some of his criticisms. Some of the issues are produced 
by Jacoby’s intention to view Laing’s work as constituting a form of ‘conformist 
psychology’. Laing and Cooper’s work are examined as though they were 
practically identical. Jacoby criticises Laing for ignoring wider social forces, 
such as class. He claims that Laing’s work is lacking in social criticism, and that 
reification is present within it. Jacoby furthermore suggests that Laing’s work 
consists of little other than a form of bourgeois positivism. I have critiqued 
Jacoby’s criticism in this chapter, by noting that much of it is predicated upon 
profound misunderstandings and misinterpretations of Laing’s work. Jacoby has 
a tendency to engage in a selective reading and identification of elements of 
Laing’s work to criticise (the Procrustean critique). The Frankfurt School critique 
of existentialism is examined in the light of Jacoby’s criticism of Laing. It is 
apparent that Jacoby has transposed Marcuse and Adorno’s critiques onto 
Laing’s work, without sufficient adaptation. However, Marcuse’s critical essay 
on Sartre neglects Sartre’s later work, which is highly influential upon Laing. 
This may explain some of Jacoby’s misinterpretations of Laing’s work. 
Nevertheless, Jacoby’s critique of Laing is disappointing. 
                                                                                           The next section of this 
chapter examines Sedgwick’s criticism of Laing. Despite Sedgwick’s efforts to 
present himself as left-wing, very little of his criticism of Laing actually operates 
from within that perspective. Sedgwick replicates some aspects of Jacoby’s 
critique of Laing. He criticises Laing for not maintaining the ‘correct’ Marxist 
line. The poverty of Sedgwick’s critique of Laing is considerable, despite him 
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being one of Laing’s most quoted critics. Sedgwick is happy to use second-hand 
evidence, such as gossip, as means of critique. The vast majority of his criticism 
involves critiquing his own misreading and misinterpretations of Laing’s texts. 
Sedgwick’s ‘scientific’ criticisms of Laing have more in common with those 
produced by the conservative psychiatric critics, than with those of Jacoby and 
Deleuze and Guattari. In this respect, Sedgwick has produced a template for the 
poor criticism of Laing, since his erroneous critique is reproduced by others, as is 
the same sloppy approach to Laing’s texts. Sedgwick is happy to contribute to 
the myth of an anti-psychiatric movement, or Laingian school. He clearly was a 
source of some irritation to Laing, whose responses and identification of errors 
within Sedgwick’s critique are noted. 
                                                          In Chapter Nine, I endeavour to produce 
some of my own criticism of Laing. The aspects of his work that I examine are 
the use of mapping and notational sets within his work, and Laing’s comments 
on birth and pre-birth experience within his later texts. In seeking to criticise 
these aspects of Laing’s work, I attempt to avoid the errors that I have identified 
in the poor critiques of Laing. I examine the lines of development of these 
concepts within Laing’s work, how they are deployed, and check my criticisms 
against the texts, in order to assess the validity of my arguments. Through 
applying these principles, Laing’s use of mapping and notational sets is rendered 
more intelligible than I had previously assumed it may be. These elements are 
used by Laing to examine different modes of experience, and operations, such as 
projection, that are performed upon experience. Therefore, it is consistent with 
Laing’s aims for a science of persons. With regard to Laing’s discussions of birth 
and pre-birth experiences, it is noted that these comments can be related to 
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Laing’s considerations that a form of ‘existential rebirth’ may occur after the 
schizophrenic voyage, in The Politics of Experience (1967). However, I argue 
that this aspect of Laing’s late work can be considered as problematic, since it 
could be interpreted as suggesting that an unpleasant birth causes an unhappy 
individual in later life. This element of Laing’s work appears to sit uneasily with 
his other main contributions. In this section, I draw upon an interview with Laing 
by Taylor, where the latter provides some criticism of this strand of Laing’s 
work. Nevertheless, my critique of this element of Laing’s work is itself 
problematic in some respects, which is discussed at the end of the chapter. 
                                                                                            Chapter Ten provides 
the conclusion to this thesis. In this chapter, I summarise the key methodological 
problems involved in the poor critiques of Laing. Some of Lodziak’s work in this 
area is drawn upon in order to highlight aspects of my argument. Adorno and 
Lodziak’s conceptions of the immanent critique (the best possible form) are 
discussed in terms of how these notions advance the principles for a coherent 
critique of an author’s work. 
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2) A Summary of Laing’s Main Contributions 
 
This short chapter is intended to provide a general overview and summary of 
Laing’s main lasting contributions to social theory. Laing’s central contribution, 
and the one which is referred to most frequently in this thesis, is that of making 
forms of mental distress intelligible. This occurs through demystifying and 
explaining the situation of the individual within their wider social context, such 
as the family. The other aspects mentioned here all relate in some ways to this 
core element of Laing’s theory. Examples from Laing’s texts are not provided in 
this chapter, since they are cited within the main body of this thesis. 
                                                                                                            Laing’s 
methodology and approach to the study of the person is of importance here. 
Laing endeavours to produce a ‘science of persons’, which can be viewed as a 
strand which is developed throughout all of his theoretical texts. It is not intended 
to constitute another form of conventional science. Laing suggests that an 
appropriate method should be used for what is being studied – the personal 
should be studied in personal terms. His ‘existential-phenomenological’ method 
involves the attempt to enter into the individual’s world, without preconceptions 
as to the nature of their experience. For Laing, a phenomenological science of the 
person enables far greater objectivity than positivist science, simply because the 
object of the study (the person) can speak for her/himself, i.e. the object is a 
subject. 
           It must be emphasised here that Laing’s development of concepts from 
Sartre’s late work is a key element that enables his main project of demystifying 
mental distress. This conceptual development produces a means of examining the 
 18 
individual and family context without conservative preconceptions. Laing 
endeavours to deploy philosophical concepts as means of explanation for the 
experiences of individuals and the apparent inertia of groups. This can be 
considered in a similar manner to the efforts of Marcuse, who presented a paper 
at the Dialectics of Liberation conference in 1967, which Laing helped to 
organise.1 Laing’s work is highly original in terms of his creation of an 
alternative (and ignored) theoretical psychology. This suspension of conventional 
viewpoints enables Laing to produce critical material on the family as a social 
formation. There are occasions where Laing explicitly criticises the family. 
However, the reader, particularly within Sanity, Madness and the Family (1964), 
is enabled to make up their own mind with regard to this element of Laing’s 
work. This, in many ways, produces a more damning verdict on the families 
concerned, and highlights the benefits of Laing’s phenomenological approach. 
This criticism of the family is, in particular, my favourite aspect of Laing’s work. 
Much of psychology simply reinforces common assumptions about the nuclear 
family, whereas Laing’s work dissects this social arrangement through its effect 
upon the individual who comes to be seen as ‘insane’. 
                                                                                      Far from the families 
concerned ‘knowing what is best’ for their children, the families that feature in 
Laing’s case studies are highly claustrophobic and will not permit their children 
to become their own individuals. The confusion of the young person’s growing 
sense of autonomy with a mental illness is a common theme. It is to Laing’s 
credit that he is able to demonstrate how conservative psychiatry colludes with 
the parent’s perspective. This specific aspect of Laing’s work is rather dark and 
                                               
1
 See particularly: Marcuse, H, (1956), Eros and Civilisation – A Philosophical Inquiry Into 
Freud, London, Ark 
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unpleasant. This may provide some of the reason for the unfortunate current 
neglect of Laing’s work. It speaks a truth that society does not wish to hear 
through its challenge to the institution of the family. 
                                                                                   Further elements of Laing’s 
approach involve examining the relation between behaviour and experience. The 
focus upon the experience of the individual within their wider social environment 
forms another of Laing’s main preoccupations. He argues that the omission 
within forms of psychology of the consideration of a person’s behaviour as a 
consequence of their experience has led to forms of study which may examine 
the individual in isolation, and lack power as tools for rendering ‘madness’ 
intelligible. The importance of Laing’s work lies in his questioning of some of 
the fundamental assumptions upon which psychology is based. Laing’s method 
of study avoids causal relations and explanations, since simplistic determinism 
ignores the complexity of human experience. His approach is apparent within the 
large numbers of case studies, or psychobiographies, which feature in his texts. 
Laing is happy to let the patients who have been diagnosed as schizophrenic 
speak for themselves, and to make the effort to consider what life events actually 
meant for them. In this way, the patient is put at the centre of the process. 
Laing’s theory maintains a relevance to lived experience through this approach. 
Laing enables the reader to step into the person’s world. His work is like nothing 
else that I am aware of in this respect. All of the other psychological theorists 
that I have researched at some stage produce case studies where the reader is at 
least one step removed due to the theoretical constraints placed upon the account. 
Laing demonstrates considerable skill in this respect, in terms of avoiding forcing 
his view on to the material, and thus distorting it. 
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                                                                             Laing attempts to provide an 
alternative theoretical psychology which radically opposes the prevailing 
orthodoxies of the day. His critique of psychiatry, and of psychoanalysis are key 
elements within this aspect of his work. Laing criticises psychiatry because he 
sees it as an inhumane approach to mental distress, for example, with regard to 
the use of electro-shock ‘therapy’, and other invasive procedures. Laing 
considers psychiatry’s mimicking of the methodology of the natural sciences as 
inappropriate for the study of the person. The individual is viewed simply as a 
diseased object, as opposed to a subject whose experiences may be intelligible 
within their social context. Laing’s work serves to expose the conservative 
assumptions at the core of conventional psychiatric approaches. Laing argues 
that the principles of general medicine are imported into psychology without 
being modified sufficiently to take into account the very different nature of 
mental distress, which may not be adequately explained by reference to bodily 
ailments alone. One of Laing’s best criticisms of psychiatry appears in an 
interview from 1983 where Laing suggests that: ‘…the people who have 
benefited humanity most in recent times have been opticians and dentists.’2 
                       Laing’s critique of psychoanalysis also raises the problematic 
nature of its attempt to present itself as a form of natural science. He takes issue 
with this approach because it splits the individual up into parts, such as the ego, 
id, and super-ego, and has little means of conceptualising the relations between 
persons. Laing views psychoanalysis as a closed system, consisting of jargon 
which has little relevance to human existence. In making psychoanalytic 
interpretations, the analyst may be placing unnecessary constructions upon the 
                                               
2
 Taylor, L, (1983), Revisiting the explorer of experience: The Times Profile: R.D. Laing, The 
Times, 31st January, p.8 
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person’s experience, which may have no relevance to their view of the situation 
being considered. Freud never created an adequate theory of psychosis, which, 
since the majority of Laing’s work investigates what is viewed as schizophrenia, 
may explain some of Laing’s dissatisfaction with this method of study. 
Nevertheless, Laing criticises Freud’s work in a respectful manner – Laing 
recognises the contribution that Freud made as a pioneer of psychology, whilst 
producing arguments for moving beyond Freud. In this way, Laing’s criticism of 
Freud provides an example of the immanent critique which I refer to in Chapters 
Four and Ten of this thesis. The critical elements of Laing’s work, in terms of 
examining the validity of the methodology behind psychiatry and 
psychoanalysis, are well-honed and highly significant for any future research into 
this area. 
             My consideration of Laing’s work as social theory is based upon the 
ways in which Laing’s theories can be used as explanatory tools – to explain the 
intelligibility of allegedly ‘insane’ individuals’ actions within their social 
context, and to explain the deficiencies of other theoretical paradigms. These 
aspects are what I perceive to be Laing’s main contributions, which are referred 
to within the more substantial chapters of this thesis. Before I finish this chapter, 
however, I wish to note some considerations as to why Laing’s work is currently 
neglected. Kotowicz suggests that: ‘…the relative silence around Laing is more 
of a reflection of the times today than of the value of his work.’3 I agree in some 
respects with this quotation, but consider there to be additional aspects which 
need to be taken into account. The above quotation is valid in terms of the fact 
that funding for psychological research has, in contemporary times, been 
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focussed upon biological explanations for mental distress, such as a potential 
genetic cause. However, in Chapter Seven, where I examine empirical evidence 
regarding mental distress, it is noted that some recent research is moving towards 
an examination of traumatic life events in relation to psychosis. This strand of 
research moves closer to Laing’s position. The fact that psychosis is relatively 
rare may mean that Laing’s work is only sought out by those with a specific 
interest in this topic. 
.                               Earlier in this chapter I have referred to Laing’s criticism of 
the family, and that this is one of the main aspects that I read Laing’s work for. 
Nevertheless, it may well be the case that what I find so engaging about Laing’s 
work is precisely what others do not. Questioning the institution of the family 
may not be a task that everyone is willing to undertake. Laing’s work may still be 
considered highly controversial in this respect. However, it is the true realm of 
critical theory to examine that which some may hold beyond criticism. This 
thesis seeks to debunk received notions regarding Laing’s work, such as the idea 
that he romanticised madness. There is the potential that the standard reception 
of Laing’s work has become so ingrained that it is neglected for this reason. The 
fact that Laing was an alcoholic could be used as an excuse to dismiss his work. 
Clearly neither of the above are valid reasons for ignoring Laing’s work, but 
nevertheless this could be the case. 
                                                       In a similar vein, neither age nor obsolescence 
can be used to justify the neglect of Laing. One finds it amazing how Freud’s 
work is still approached with such reverence, even in contemporary times. This is 
not to say that Freud’s work is lacking in any form of insight which is of 
continuing relevance. However, that the concept of the unconscious is still 
 23 
deployed uncritically, despite the lack of evidence to support its existence, 
suggests that Laing’s critique of this element becomes all the more necessary. 
Freud and Laing can both be considered to be ground-breaking in their own, very 
different, ways. As I have mentioned previously, Freud was one of the first to 
create conceptual, theoretical psychology. Laing progresses from Freud in terms 
of moving the level of analysis beyond the individual to their wider social 
context. Since Freud remained in the arena of examining neurosis whereas Laing 
did so for psychosis, given that the latter presents with allegedly more 
incomprehensible ‘symptoms’, Laing’s achievement in making this intelligible is 
rendered all the more remarkable. Laing’s case studies recognise that human 
beings are all unique in some ways, whereas the weight of Freud’s conceptual 
framework squeezes out some of this awareness. 
                                                                             In all honesty, the neglect of 
Laing is something that I find utterly baffling. I find that Laing’s work is of 
continued relevance. However, processes of detraditionalisation could eventually 
produce less controlling, closed families. This could lessen the impact of Laing’s 
critique of the family, but not that of his criticism of psychiatry, psychoanalysis, 
and of the coldness of Western medical practice. What remains to be done in 
psychology is to find the links between the family and the wider social 
organisation without simplistically reading one off from the other. The fact that 
Laing does not do this is not (contrary to some of his critics) a matter for 
critiquing Laing. This was not Laing’s project. Nevertheless, the concept of 
privatism, the idea that the public arena is shrinking and that individuals are 
becoming increasingly powerless to change anything beyond the private sphere 
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could produce a link between Laing’s work on the family and a critical analysis 
of wider social phenomena. 
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3) Conservative Critiques by Psychiatrists 
 
This section will examine the critiques of Laing’s theories by Lawrie Reznek in 
The Philosophical Defence of Psychiatry (1991), and by Anthony Clare in 
Psychiatry in Dissent (1980). Both of these authors are or were psychiatrists 
themselves, and demonstrate a conservative point of view in their writings. There 
are also some criticisms from the psychiatric establishment which feature in 
interviews with Laing, which will also be dealt with here. A chapter concerning 
Deleuze and Guattari’s comments on Laing’s ideas in Anti-Oedipus (1972) will 
follow this one to show how some aspects of Laing’s theories which come in for 
criticism from conventional psychiatrists are instead praised and taken on by 
Deleuze and Guattari. However, criticism of Laing is also found within Anti-
Oedipus, which will also be examined in the next chapter. 
Reznek’s Critique of Laing 
 
The chapter of Reznek’s book which contains his critique of Laing is entitled 
‘Ronald Laing and the Rationalizing of Madness’. Reznek claims that: 
Laing attacks the disease model of schizophrenia. Instead of 
seeing the behaviour of schizophrenics as the symptom of 
some disease, Laing sees it as rational – i.e. as intentional 
behaviour performed for reasons. Where an orthodox 
psychiatrist sees a disease causing a symptom like thought 
disorder, Laing explains the behaviour in terms of the desire 
to avoid being understood and the belief that by talking mad 
one will achieve this goal.1 
Reznek then proceeds to illustrate his interpretation of Laing’s theories by two 
quotations from The Divided Self (1960), and one from The Politics of 
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Experience (1967). I will assess the validity of Reznek’s interpretation of these 
quotations later. Reznek’s main criticism of Laing is that he views both madness 
itself, and schizophrenic behaviour as rational. This criticism of Laing is found 
throughout this chapter in slightly different forms. It is represented well by the 
following example: 
From the conceptual premise that if behaviour is explicable in 
terms of reasons (desires and beliefs), then it is not caused by 
a disease, and the factual premise that the behaviour of 
schizophrenics is explicable in terms of reasons, [Laing] 
concludes that the behaviour of schizophrenics is not caused 
by a disease – i.e. the disease schizophrenia does not exist. 
Laing argues that the so-called signs of schizophrenia such as 
incoherent speech are not symptoms of disease but are instead 
motivated by reasons.2 
Reznek then proceeds to criticise his own interpretation of Laing’s work as given 
in the above quotation. He uses various examples to support his criticism that 
simply because behaviour may be motivated by ‘reasons (desires and beliefs)’ 
this does not therefore mean that the behaviour is not caused by a disease such as 
schizophrenia. I will return to these examples after setting out the rest of 
Reznek’s criticism of Laing.  
                                           Reznek suggests that this argument that he claims 
Laing puts forward ‘fails’, and that ‘this interpretation appears to turn Laing’s 
argument into a straw man.’3 Reznek continues: ‘however, I include it because 
Laing invents bizarre reasons that purport to make schizophrenic behaviour 
rational but produces no evidence that schizophrenics actually possess these.’4 
Reznek argues that: 
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There is nothing to stop us identifying the acquisition of 
schizophrenic ideas and beliefs as a unique disease process… 
If schizophrenic behaviour is caused by the desire to appear 
unintelligible to others and the belief that by adopting 
schizophrenic behaviour this desire can be satisfied, we can 
still identify the processes leading to the formation of such 
desires and beliefs as the disease process of schizophrenia.5 
                          Reznek poses the question: ‘how do we gain access to someone’s 
desires and beliefs if all we have access to is their behaviour?’6 He then moves 
on to critique Laing’s case study of Julie in the last chapter of The Divided Self – 
‘The Ghost of the Weed Garden: A Study of a Chronic Schizophrenic.’ Reznek 
notes that ‘the difficulty of interpreting speech is especially relevant here because 
the talk of schizophrenics often seems unintelligible.’7 His criticism of Laing’s 
interpretation of Julie’s speech is similar to the point noted by Reznek earlier 
where he accuses Laing of inventing bizarre reasons to try and make 
schizophrenic behaviour intelligible.  
Laing argues that Julie speaks in a roundabout way that she is 
a ‘told belle’ ( a girl told what to do and be), that she is an 
‘accidental son’ (because her mother had wanted a boy), and 
‘tailor-made by her parents’ (because she had no identity of 
her own). If we attribute non-standard meanings to the words 
being used, we can turn apparently incoherent babble into 
intelligible talk. But the fact that meaning can be invented for 
schizophrenic babble does not mean that it actually has this 
meaning. Our problem is to specify how we can have 
evidence that the dialogue actually has some meaning and is 
not simply a Laingian invention.8 
                                                                    In the second part of his critique of 
Laing, Reznek turns his attention to Laing’s theory that the families of those 
people who end up being seen as schizophrenic may have treated that person 
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very badly, and this may have played a part in them suffering extreme mental 
distress. Reznek claims that: 
…Laing fails to show that the schizophrenic behaviour is 
caused by unlivable family situations (Sedgwick, 1982). To 
show this, he needs to show that schizophrenic behaviour 
occurs more commonly in such families than others, but he 
fails to produce any control groups. In addition, he needs a 
longitudinal study to show that it is the abnormal family set-
up that produces the schizophrenic behaviour rather than the 
reverse. For it is quite possible that it is trying to cope with the 
abnormal behaviour of the schizophrenic that makes the 
families abnormal. But he fails to do this.9 
Reznek insists that ‘even if we discover that schizophrenic behaviour is caused 
by certain abnormal family situations, this does not mean that we cannot say that 
such abnormal family situations cause the disease of schizophrenia. To think 
otherwise is to commit the essentialist fallacy.’10 
                                                                         The last section of Reznek’s 
critique of Laing concerns Laing’s ideas that normal existence may be a state of 
alienation, and that the person who comes to be labelled as insane has really 
broken through this state of alienation, and may have more insight than normal 
people. Reznek is somewhat more accepting of this view than Laing’s theory that 
schizophrenia is not a disease in the conventional bio-medical sense. However, 
Reznek takes issue with Laing’s views on the position of psychiatrists in this. 
…Laing assumes that psychiatrists judge people to be deluded 
if they do not hold the majority view about reality. But this is 
false. If the person can produce good evidence for his beliefs, 
psychiatrists will not judge him to be deluded. To be deluded 
one must believe something tenaciously in the face of obvious 
evidence to the contrary… But simply adopting socially 
sanctioned facts is not harmful and is unworthy of the title 
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‘pathological’… Hence Laing’s account of how psychiatrists 
judge delusions is wrong…11 
Reznek finishes his critique of Laing with a consideration of Laing’s much-
maligned comments in the later chapters of The Politics of Experience that 
‘going mad’ may be an attempt at a healing process. Reznek’s reading of this is 
that Laing is suggesting that ‘schizophrenia has valuable consequences’,12 which 
Reznek suggests is not the case. He concludes his critique of Laing with the 
following summary. 
…Laing has failed to show that schizophrenics are rational 
and are in touch with ‘true’ reality rather than ill. He has also 
failed to show that schizophrenia is an intelligible response to 
intolerable circumstances, or that it is society that is mad. 13 
                                                    A significant problem with Reznek’s critique of 
Laing is that his interpretation of Laing’s theories is incorrect. In order to 
criticise an author’s work, an understanding of that work must first be achieved 
prior to any criticism. The basis of the criticism must also take into account what 
the author most probably meant in their writing. I find these methodological 
points to be lacking in Reznek’s critique of Laing. With regard to Reznek’s main 
criticism of Laing – that Laing sees the behaviour of schizophrenics as rational – 
at no point in any of Laing’s theoretical texts is this point actually made. Reznek 
is labouring under some confusion about what Laing was most probably trying to 
say. This confusion centres on Reznek having taken Laing’s project of making 
madness and schizophrenia ‘comprehensible’,14 or ‘socially intelligible’,15 as 
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actually meaning that Laing thinks that schizophrenics are rational. This gross 
misreading of Laing is achieved by Reznek taking a very partial view of Laing’s 
work. The quotations that Reznek uses to support his criticism are taken out of 
the wider context of the text they are located in. This is a problem found 
throughout his critique. With regard to Reznek’s claims that Laing explains 
schizophrenic behaviour ‘in terms of the desire to avoid being understood and the 
belief that by talking mad one will achieve this goal,’16 Reznek jumps from a few 
instances where Laing makes these sorts of remarks to this being what the 
entirety of Laing’s work is actually about. This shows a very poor reading of 
Laing’s work on Reznek’s behalf.  
                                                    To illustrate this problem, I will set out these 
first two quotations from Laing that Reznek uses, and show how they are 
abstracted from their wider context in the book they are taken from. The first 
quotation that Reznek uses is taken from The Divided Self (1960): 
A good deal of schizophrenia is simply nonsense, red-herring 
speech, prolonged filibustering designed to throw dangerous 
people off the scent, to create boredom and futility in others. 
The schizophrenic is often making a fool of himself and the 
doctor. He is playing mad to avoid at all costs the possibility 
of being held responsible for a single coherent idea, or 
intention.17 
This quotation is from Chapter 10 of The Divided Self, called ‘The Self and the 
False Self in a Schizophrenic.’ Rather than the above quotation being 
representative of a comprehensive statement by Laing on his views on 
schizophrenia, it is part of a discussion of how the schizophrenic seeks a measure 
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of safety by attempting to be very difficult to understand. ‘Any form of 
understanding threatens his whole defensive system… The schizophrenic is not 
going to reveal himself for casual inspection and examination to any 
philandering passer-by. If the self is not known it is safe.’18 Reznek demonstrates 
no awareness of this wider context of the quotation. He takes it as more 
representative of Laing’s work as a whole than it truly is. This quotation that 
Reznek uses is not even representative of Laing’s position in The Divided Self. 
Also lost upon Reznek is the fact that this quotation suggests that schizophrenics 
find psychiatrists rather irritating, and so are uncooperative. Reznek instead 
interprets this as all schizophrenics do not want to be understood by anyone. A 
closer reading of this chapter may have enabled Reznek to clear up his confusion 
regarding his idea that Laing thinks that schizophrenics are rational. Laing’s 
point is rather that: ‘…if we look at the extraordinary behaviour of the psychotic 
from his own point of view, much of it will become understandable.’19 It is an 
extremely cheap form of criticism to simply lift out parts of a text, abstracted 
from the wider discussion of the book, and criticise them as it suits the critic. 
Little engagement with a text is needed to do this. 
                                                                             This also applies with the second 
quotation from Laing that Reznek uses, from The Politics of Experience.  
To regard the gambits of Smith and Jones [schizophrenics] as 
due primarily to some psychological deficit is rather like 
supposing that a man doing a handstand on a bicycle on a 
tightrope 100 feet up with no safety net is suffering from an 
inability to stand on his own two feet. We may well ask why 
these people have to be, often brilliantly, so devious, elusive, 
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so adept at making themselves unremittingly 
incomprehensible.20  
This quotation and the previous one from The Divided Self are rather ‘thrown in’ 
by Reznek. No further discussion of these quotations is offered, as would be 
expected in good scholarship. These quotations are simply presented to bolster 
Reznek’s incorrect version of what Laing’s theory is about. The above quotation 
from The Politics of Experience particularly suffers from being chopped off the 
end of a ‘conversation between two persons diagnosed as schizophrenic.’21 
Without this conversation being included the quotation used by Reznek is taken 
completely out of context, with his intention perhaps being to present a quotation 
from Laing which looks rather daft. I think particularly this would be easy to do 
with The Politics of Experience, to lift out a small section of this book, take it out 
of context, and criticise Laing based upon that. This may be a problem that 
occurs again with criticism of this book.  
                                                              Reznek’s criticism of Laing also suffers 
from Reznek’s use of very poor examples to try and support his argument. 
Reznek offers the following example to attempt to criticise his notion that Laing 
claims madness is ‘explicable in terms of reasons.’22 
Suppose we are trying to understand a man who builds a 
tower of bottle-tops and then proceeds to dance around them, 
screaming ‘Yobbol toddol tu’. We might suppose that he 
believes that dancing around a tower of bottle-tops screaming 
‘Yobbol toddol tu’, which we translate as ‘God is Great’, will 
keep him healthy, and that he wants to be healthy. In this way, 
his behaviour is explicable in terms of reasons (desires and 
beliefs)… To explain any piece of behaviour B, all we have to 
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do is attribute to the agent any desire D, and the belief that by 
doing B, he will achieve D.23 
It is this example that leads Reznek to then conclude that this turns ‘Laing’s 
argument into a straw man’, and that ‘Laing invents bizarre reasons that purport 
to make schizophrenic behaviour rational.’24 With regard to the above quotation, 
it seems to have been created by Reznek to illustrate his argument, rather than 
being a direct criticism of Laing’s work. Reznek offers no concrete examples 
from Laing’s actual work to support his idea that Laing invents reasons for 
schizophrenic behaviour being understandable. This greatly undermines 
Reznek’s critique of Laing. He cannot demonstrate that his argument has any 
validity by reference to Laing’s actual work. This means that Reznek’s criticism 
here is rather tangential and arbitrary. In a good critique, examples from the 
author’s work which is being criticised must be offered to show that the critic is 
not just inventing criticisms. Since Reznek cannot do this (as mentioned above, 
he lifts quotations from Laing out of context), it would be better on Reznek’s 
behalf not to accuse Laing of being a straw man, when that description more 
accurately fits his attempted critique.  
                                                           Reznek also supplies various examples of a 
bio-medical nature to show that individuals can have unusual desires and beliefs 
which are caused by diseases. These examples are intended to support Reznek’s 
view that schizophrenia is a disease whether it is intelligible or not. Much of this 
chapter by Reznek requires further explanation than he provides. When he claims 
that ‘there is nothing to stop us identifying the acquisition of schizophrenic ideas 
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and beliefs as a unique disease process’,25 I would like to know why exactly he 
makes that claim. The status of schizophrenia as a biological disease is contested. 
Laing contributed greatly to that debate, so one would expect some engagement 
with this. Instead, Reznek simply asserts throughout this chapter that 
schizophrenia is a disease, and leaves it at that. Reznek shows little reflexive 
awareness in his argument. 
                                          Reznek’s critique of Laing suffers from the impression 
created by this chapter that Reznek either has not read any Laing, or that his 
reading of Laing was so poor that he did not understand any of Laing’s work. 
Alternatively, Reznek only read Laing in order to find snippets of Laing’s work 
to use as quotations to be criticised. When Reznek asks ‘how do we gain access 
to someone’s desires and beliefs if all we have access to is their behaviour?’,26 he 
has completely missed and ignored Laing’s investigation of the experience of the 
individual through phenomenology. The problem is that Reznek’s critique 
operates on such a shallow level that he cannot engage with the deeper levels of 
analysis in Laing’s theory. This leads him into making cheap criticisms of Laing. 
It also means that some of his criticism may be found to be offensive by the 
serious scholar of Laing. I write this with Reznek’s criticism of the case study of 
Julie in the last chapter of The Divided Self particularly in mind. As I have 
mentioned earlier, Reznek assumes that Laing simply has invented the 
interpretations that Laing made of Julie’s speech.27 This is a further example of 
Reznek leaving me with the impression that he has not done his reading properly. 
His criticism here would be fair if he at least acknowledged the lengthy 
preceding psychobiography of Julie and her family context that appears before 
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Laing makes these interpretations of Julie’s speech, and noted that he did not find 
it convincing, or that there were problems with it. However, Reznek does not 
show any respect for this case study. It is written off simplistically in one 
paragraph, picking on Laing’s interpretations of Julie’s speech which Reznek 
assumes Laing has merely invented. He makes this assumption against the 
evidence provided in Laing’s case study of Julie which suggests that these 
interpretations may have been correct. There is no evidence in ‘The Ghost of the 
Weed Garden’ to suggest that Laing has invented his interpretations of Julie’s 
speech. Reznek here provides an example of the psychiatric attitude that Laing 
has criticised – that all schizophrenic speech is nothing but jibberish, and does 
not deserve a close examination.  
                                                    There are points in Reznek’s critique of Laing 
where Reznek states that he is in agreement with some aspects of Laing’s ideas. 
Reznek notes that ‘there is some evidence that schizophrenics intentionally put 
on their symptoms to achieve various ends…’28 However, as I have mentioned 
earlier, this is a misinterpretation of Laing’s actual ideas regarding schizophrenia. 
So Reznek is rather agreeing with his interpretation of Laing, than with Laing 
himself. Reznek also agrees with Laing that ‘a whole culture can be deluded.’29 
However, Reznek still takes issue with Laing’s position on this matter.  
Thus Laing is right to think that a whole culture can be mad, 
but he is right for the wrong reason – only if beliefs are 
adopted in a particular way are they delusions. They are not 
delusions simply because they are false.30 
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Reznek is keen to defend psychiatrists against Laing’s view that they are quick to 
judge individuals as deluded, when the person may not be. This is not the place 
to engage in a debate over views of what may or may not be classified as a 
‘delusion’. Reznek takes a rather naïve view of how psychiatrists judge whether 
someone is deluded or not. He assumes that psychiatrists will give people the 
benefit of the doubt ‘if the person can produce good evidence for his beliefs…’31 
However, doing this in real life may not be as simple as Reznek assumes. This is 
particularly the case with families.  
                                                    One of the brilliant aspects of Laing’s case 
studies is how he demonstrates that the ‘mad’ accusations that the child has made 
against his or her parents actually have more validity than what the parents have 
said. Laing also points out that frequently psychiatrists believe the parents’ 
version of events more than those of the child. This comes across especially well 
in Sanity, Madness and the Family (1964). A good example is in the second 
chapter on ‘The Blairs’. Here Laing and Esterson note that: 
…the Blair family had been recognized as offering an 
unfavourable environment for their daughter Lucie before this 
investigation started. However, none of the numerous 
psychiatrists in whose care she had been for twelve years had 
ever suggested that the ‘schizophrenia’ from which she 
‘suffered’ was in any way intelligible. The view held was that 
Lucie… was ‘suffering from chronic schizophrenia’, and that 
her family unfortunately aggravated her condition.32 
From the case studies in Laing’s work, it seems as though the powerful 
psychiatrists and relatively powerful (in relation to the child) parents collude 
with each other.  
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                            Reznek himself shows a view similar to that presumably held 
by the previous psychiatrists of Lucie when he claims that ‘it is quite possible 
that it is trying to cope with the abnormal behaviour of the schizophrenic that 
makes the families abnormal.’33 Here Reznek is giving the benefit of the doubt to 
the families rather than the individual who is seen as mad. In doing this, he rather 
undermines his own argument that psychiatrists are neutral and impartial, and 
will approach a possibly delusional person in such a manner. He also gives a 
further illustration of the cold, conservative psychiatric attitude that Laing 
criticises. Laing and Esterson counter this form of criticism in Sanity, Madness 
and the Family, in the chapter on ‘The Abbotts’. 
It might be argued… that [Maya’s] parents might have been 
reacting in an abnormal way to the presence of an abnormal 
child. The data hardly support this thesis. [sic] Her mother and 
father reveal plainly… that what they regard most as 
symptoms of illness are what we regard as developing… 
autonomy,… etc.34  
                                              The fact that Maya’s parents thought that she had 
psychic powers, and experimented with her along those lines demonstrates 
further evidence that her family were not merely reacting in an unusual way to an 
insane child.35 Additionally, Reznek suggests that no control groups were 
produced to support Laing’s idea that what comes to be viewed as schizophrenia 
may be the product of awful family situations.36 Reznek mentions that this 
criticism originates from Sedgwick’s 1982 critique of Laing. I will look at 
Sedgwick’s critique later in this thesis. However, I feel that it is worth making 
clear now that it is a little-known fact that studies of normal families (the control 
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group) were actually done for Sanity, Madness and the Family.’37 This is why the 
full title of Sanity, Madness and the Family in its original editions contains the 
ending Volume One – The Families of Schizophrenics. Laing said that he found 
the normal families so boring that he could not bear to write up this second 
volume.38 To be fair to Reznek, Mullan’s book of conversations with Laing was 
not published until a few years after Reznek’s critique.  
                                                                                     The final aspect of 
Reznek’s critique of Laing that I want to look at is another which I feel is worth 
dealing with early on. This is Reznek’s reading of the last three chapters of The 
Politics of Experience as containing the argument that ‘schizophrenia has 
valuable consequences.’39 This is far too strong a statement of Laing’s views in 
these chapters. This is possibly the most misinterpreted and misunderstood part 
of Laing’s work, and the most heavily criticised. What Laing is really saying is 
that the ‘voyage’ through madness that a person may go on, could be of benefit 
to the person provided that the conditions were provided for them to do this. 
However, Laing argues that this is not likely to be the case ‘because we are so 
busy ‘treating’ the patient…’40 There are frequent caveats that appear in these 
chapters regarding madness as a journey that have been missed by Laing’s 
critics. Here the criticism again can be reduced to a selective reading of Laing. 
Laing notes that the person may encounter ‘grotesque presences’41 on this 
journey, and that ‘not everyone comes back to us again.’42 There are also many 
occasions in the last chapter of The Politics of Experience – ‘A Ten-Day 
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Voyage’ - where the account of madness by Jesse Watkins suggests that it was 
anything but a pleasant experience for him. Laing has not sanitised Watkin’s 
account by removing Watkin’s statements that ‘it was an appalling sort of 
experience’,43 which he would be afraid of going through again.44 These points 
are significantly omitted in critics such as Reznek’s view of these chapters of The 
Politics of Experience. 
                                  Ultimately, Reznek’s critique is more a critique of his 
interpretation of Laing, rather than a critique of Laing’s actual work. Since 
Reznek’s interpretation of Laing is severely flawed, due to poor reading, this 
means that his critique is also severely flawed. In order to produce a coherent 
critique, the totality of a theoretician’s work needs to be read, and not simply a 
couple of passages taken out of context from only two books. Reznek does not 
engage with Laing’s work in any productive way. He operates on the same 
assumptions held by conservative psychiatrists that Laing himself criticises. This 
means that Reznek’s critique does not get anywhere. He cannot engage with the 
more radical elements of Laing’s theory. Reznek’s interpretation (or rather 
misinterpretation) of Laing over-simplifies Laing’s arguments, and in doing so, 
tends to miss the point of what Laing was most probably trying to say. His 
approach to the various issues raised by Laing’s work is also extremely 
simplistic. 
               Reznek’s argument covers the same ground repeatedly, as though 
repeating a criticism will make it more valid. His argument is also very unclear. 
It requires further explanation, particularly with regard to his insistence that 
schizophrenia is a disease, even if it may be the product of disturbed social 
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relations, with no concrete biological basis. Reznek assumes that his argument is 
self-validated by his bio-medical perspective and examples. The fact that 
Reznek’s argument is so unclear may be a product of his misunderstanding of 
Laing’s work. The question may be asked: why have I bothered to spend this 
time reviewing Reznek’s critique of Laing, when it is so poor? I have felt that 
Reznek’s critique was worth a critical review because the problems with it may 
be reproduced by other critics. If this does occur, then I feel that this is worth 
noting, as there may be common mistakes in the criticism of Laing. Reviewing 
Reznek’s critique has also given me the chance to clarify what I feel are some 
big misunderstandings regarding Laing’s work early on in this thesis. Instead of 
Reznek’s critique writing off Laing’s work, as Reznek assumes, this critique 
highlights one of the qualities of Laing’s work – the absence of a blind 
conservative attitude. There is the danger that poor critiques and ‘interpretations’ 
of Laing, such as Reznek’s, become the received wisdom about Laing’s work. 
Clare’s Critique of Laing 
 
Anthony Clare’s criticisms of Laing in Psychiatry in Dissent are found 
throughout various chapters of this book. There is no single chapter on his 
critique of Laing. It will be necessary for me to use some lengthy quotations 
from Clare to set out his critique. In his second chapter, ‘Models of Mental 
Illness’, Clare offers some discussion of various conceptions of mental illness. 
His first criticism of Laing (and of The Politics of Experience) appears in this 
chapter. 
There is also the psychedelic model in which mental illness is 
viewed as a metaphorical ‘trip’, the patient proceeding 
through a state of ‘super-sanity’ and, if properly guided , 
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emerging on the far side in a more enlightened and sensitive 
condition. This last view, popularized by the imaginative 
writings of Ronald Laing (Laing 1967), bears remarkable 
similarities to the highly romanticized view of tuberculosis 
which held sway during parts of the last century and which 
has recently been examined by Sontag (1979).45  
                                                                                       What is the validity of 
Clare’s criticism here of Laing? With Clare’s first criticism of Laing – that Laing 
romanticizes mental illness in The Politics of Experience – I have already dealt 
with this sort of criticism in my previous section on Reznek’s critique of Laing. 
The central issue here is how romanticized really is Laing’s account of mental 
illness in this book? Only a highly selective reading of the last three chapters of 
The Politics of Experience, which misses out Laing’s warnings in these chapters, 
can produce these sorts of criticisms. Clare does not supply any quotations from 
The Politics of Experience to support his interpretation of this book as presenting 
a romanticized view of mental illness. As a comparison alone, I find Clare’s use 
of the old myths surrounding TB to be acceptable. However, it needs to be tied 
more concretely to Laing’s work, for the criticism to have some weight. Clare 
also needs to explain his criticism further. 
Those afflicted with TB were often portrayed as highly 
imaginative, sensitive, and artistic individuals, too cultured 
and cultivated to bear the horrors of a vulgar, coarse, and 
brutal world… It is worth noting that Sontag dates the 
destruction of the TB myth from the time when proper 
treatment for the condition was developed… The implications 
for the romantic metaphor of mental illness and its eventual 
decline are obvious.46 
                                               
45
 Clare, A, (1980), Psychiatry in Dissent: Controversial Issues in Thought and Practice, (2nd 
ed), London, Routledge, p.42 
46
 ibid, pp.42-43 
 42 
                                             The last sentence of the criticism above does seem 
rather ‘stuck on’. What Clare appears to be saying is that the romantic idea of 
mental illness will disappear when real treatment for it is discovered. However, 
at present, this does not appear to be very likely, given the disputed nature of 
both mental illness and forms of treatment for it. Clare seems to have just 
accepted the standard reception of The Politics of Experience, which is that it 
contains a highly romanticized view of mental illness. This view of this book is a 
misrepresentation, based upon misreading. Laing himself in his last published 
book, the autobiographical Wisdom, Madness and Folly (1985), provides his own 
response to this sort of criticism.  
I have never idealized mental suffering, or romanticized 
despair, dissolution, torture or terror. I have never said that 
parents or families or society ‘cause’ mental illness, 
genetically or environmentally. I have never denied the 
existence of patterns of mind and conduct that are 
excruciating.47 
To be fair to Clare, Wisdom, Madness and Folly was published a few years after 
Clare’s second edition of Psychiatry in Dissent. However, the evidence against 
his reading of The Politics of Experience can be found within that text itself, had 
Clare taken more notice of Laing’s warnings. Clare is criticising the received 
‘wisdom’ regarding The Politics of Experience, rather than giving a concrete 
criticism of that text itself.  
                                         Clare demonstrates a better interpretation of Laing for 
the most part in his assessment of Laing’s re-evaluation of Kraepelin’s account 
of one of his patients in The Divided Self. 48 This occurs in a chapter on ‘The 
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Diagnostic Process.’ Here Clare agrees with Laing’s critique of Kraepelin’s 
approach to some extent. However, Clare takes issue with Laing’s explanation of 
Kraepelin’s patient’s behaviour.  
In the case described above, it is not because the patient 
resents and does not understand what is happening (Laing’s 
suggested ‘explanation’ for his behaviour) that he is 
diagnosed a schizophrenic. It is because he exhibits certain 
psychological and behavioural phenomena…that his condition 
is so classified.49 
Clare’s criticism of Laing’s explanation of Kraepelin’s patient’s behaviour is 
problematic. There is evidence to suggest that Kraepelin does take his patient’s 
resentment and lack of understanding of the situation as the basis for a diagnosis 
of schizophrenia. Laing interprets Kraepelin’s patient’s behaviour in the 
following way. 
What does this patient seem to be doing? Surely he is carrying 
on a dialogue between his own parodied version of Kraepelin, 
and his own defiant rebelling self… Presumably he deeply 
resents this form of interrogation which is being carried out 
before a lecture-room of students. He probably does not see 
what it has to do with the things that must be deeply 
distressing him. But these things would not be ‘useful 
information’ to Kraepelin except as further ‘signs’ of a 
‘disease’.50 
                                 Clare has missed Laing’s point with his criticism. Laing is 
suggesting that Kraepelin does take his patient’s distress as symptoms of 
schizophrenia, when the patient’s distress is really an intelligible reaction to the 
unpleasant situation that he is being put in by Kraepelin. It is interesting that 
Clare chose to look at Laing’s critique of Kraepelin in The Divided Self, and not 
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his critique of Kraepelin in The Politics of Experience 51, which is equally as 
incisive. In a radio interview that Clare conducted with Laing, Clare admits that 
he was ‘enormously influenced’ as a young psychiatrist by The Divided Self, and 
its project of demystifying madness.52  
                                                            Clare seems to assume that The Divided 
Self is worthy of less criticism than the rest of Laing’s work. It is the book which, 
out of all those by Laing, attracts the most praise and the least criticism. 
However, it is worth noting that this criticism that Clare makes of this part of The 
Divided Self is only a minor criticism. Clare uses this section by Laing to show 
the problems involved with diagnosis in psychiatry, and makes the point that 
Laing’s critique of diagnosis here is ‘valid’.53 Laing himself offers the best 
criticism of The Divided Self. In the preface to the Pelican edition of this text, 
dated 1964, Laing states that: 
…even in focusing upon and attempting to delineate a certain 
type of schizoid existence, I was already partially falling into 
the trap I was seeking to avoid. I am still writing in this book 
too much about Them, and too little of Us.54 
 Laing criticises The Divided Self for retaining a certain level of distance from the 
patient. This maintenance of more conventional boundaries may provide one of 
the reasons for the praise of the text from conservative standpoints. 
                                                                                                         Later in his 
chapter on ‘The Diagnostic Process’, Clare presents some criticisms of Sanity, 
Madness and the Family.  
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But don’t define the concept [of schizophrenia] at all, say the 
critics. It is reductive, destructive, and dehumanizing. Such a 
view is implicit in much of Laing’s writings and indeed is 
explicitly stated in the introduction to the study of eleven 
families conducted by himself and Esterson (1964)…Yet their 
study is a clear case of having your classifying cake and 
eating it; they disagree with the whole idea of the concept of 
schizophrenia yet one crucial factor that is common to the 
families in question is that such a diagnosis has been applied 
to a family member.55 
Unfortunately he here returns to making criticisms of Laing which are somewhat 
unclear, and only tangentially related to the points that Laing and Esterson were 
attempting to make in this text. Offering a clear definition of schizophrenia was 
not Laing and Esterson’s task in Sanity, Madness and the Family. Indeed, a 
thorough reading and interpretation of this text should make this abundantly 
clear. 
        It may instead be more the case that Laing and Esterson are suggesting that 
the diagnosis of schizophrenia (however it is defined) does little to actually help 
the person so diagnosed. Again, Clare needs to provide further evidence in the 
form of quotations from the text to support his argument here. Since Clare does 
not do this, this may suggest that his interpretation could not be supported in this 
way, as there is a disparity between the actual text and Clare’s reading of it.  
‘We are concerned with persons, the relations between 
persons and the characteristics of the family as a system 
composed of a multiplicity of persons.’ This declaration 
appears to suggest that the deductions they make can be 
applied to family life in general, that they are not specific to 
families containing schizophrenic members. In which case, of 
course, any psychopathology they unearth in the family 
dynamics does not cast any helpful light on why some of the 
family members manifest their disturbance in the form of 
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hallucinations, persecutory delusions, obsessive-compulsive 
rituals, and ruminations, etc.56 
The only quotation that Clare uses from Sanity, Madness and the Family in the 
quotation above is, in a similar manner to Reznek, ‘lifted out’ of its wider context 
in the text it inhabits. ‘We are concerned with persons, the relations between 
persons, and the characteristics of the family as a system composed of a 
multiplicity of persons,’57 is not, as Clare takes it, a statement by Laing and 
Esterson meaning that their ideas in this book are applicable to all families in 
general. It is instead, a statement with which they begin setting out their method 
in this book. This means that Clare’s criticism here, again, is more a criticism of 
his interpretation of Sanity, Madness and the Family, rather than a criticism of 
the actual text. 
                      A good response to this sort of criticism can be found in Sanity, 
Madness and the Family itself. In the preface to the second edition of this book, 
Laing and Esterson state that: 
There have been many studies of mental illness and the 
family. This book is not of them, at least in our opinion. But it 
has been taken to be so by many people. The result is that 
much of the considerable controversy that the first edition of 
this book has occasioned is entirely irrelevant to our own 
stated aims and method.58 
Clare’s criticism does seem to be of this order. He does indeed ignore the central 
question of Sanity, Madness and the Family, which Laing and Esterson explain 
in the following quotation. 
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This is the position from which we start. Our question is: are 
the experience and behaviour that psychiatrists take as 
symptoms and signs of schizophrenia more socially 
intelligible than has come to be supposed? […]59 
 This severely undermines his criticism, because he is criticising Laing and 
Esterson for not doing things which were irrelevant to their project. They show 
an awareness of this problem with the reception of Sanity, Madness and the 
Family in the preface to the second edition. 
A common reaction has been to forget our question, and then 
to accuse us of not going about answering other questions 
adequately. Eleven cases, it is said, all women, prove nothing. 
There are no controls. How do you sample your data? What 
objective, reliable rating scales have you employed? And so 
on. Such criticism would be justified if we had set out to test 
the hypothesis that the family is a pathogenic variable in the 
genesis of schizophrenia. But we did not set out to do this, and 
we have not claimed to have done so.60 
 It could be argued that Clare used a first edition of this book, which did not 
contain this preface to the second edition. However, their central question is still 
clearly stated in the original introduction. 61  
                                                                      Clare’s ignorance of this shows poor 
scholarship on his behalf. Surely a critique of something must engage with what 
is being criticised in such a way that it properly takes into account the main point 
of what is being criticised. Not doing this produces criticism that is invalid, and 
irrelevant. Clare ignores Laing and Esterson’s clear explanation of the focus of 
their research within Sanity, Madness and the Family. 
We set out to illustrate by eleven examples that, if we look at 
some experience and behaviour without reference to family 
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interactions, they may appear comparatively socially 
senseless, but if we look at the same experience and behaviour 
in their original family context they are liable to make more 
sense.62 
 
                      There are also serious problems with Clare labelling Laing as an 
‘anti-psychiatrist’.  
At times, Laing and other self-styled anti-psychiatrists appear 
to be denying any valid basis to the diagnostic process in 
psychiatry.63 
Firstly, it is a gross over-simplification of Laing’s position to say that he is 
simply against psychiatry. Laing was concerned with showing the inhumanity of 
psychiatric treatment, and the problems involved in psychiatry, but this does not 
mean that he thought that psychiatry should be simply done away with. The 
labelling of Laing as an anti-psychiatrist is a recurrent problem, which shows a 
big misunderstanding of Laing. Kotowicz insists on using the term in the title of 
his book on Laing, despite the fact that he acknowledges that there are problems 
with this label.64 In Wisdom, Madness and Folly, Laing includes some responses 
to being called an ‘anti-psychiatrist’. In a footnote, Laing reminds the reader that: 
The term ‘anti-psychiatry’ was coined by the psychiatrist 
David Cooper because he felt that psychiatry as the theory and 
practice of medical psychiatry was and is predominantly 
repressive, anti-psychiatric in the sense of the science and art 
of mental healing.65 
                                               
62
 ibid, p.12 
63
 ibid, p.114 
64
 Kotowicz, Z, (1997), R.D. Laing and the Paths of Anti-Psychiatry, London, Routledge, 
pp.4-5 
65
 Wisdom, Madness and Folly, p.2 
 49 
There does seem to be some confusion between Laing’s work, and that of his 
colleague David Cooper. This confusion can be found within the criticism of 
Laing, with Clare calling Laing an ‘anti-psychiatrist’ as an example. Perhaps 
Laing became rather sick of this confusion, and included the following in 
Wisdom, Madness and Folly to try and clear this up. 
I have never called myself an anti-psychiatrist, and have 
disclaimed the term from when first my friend and colleague, 
David Cooper, introduced it. However, I agree with the anti-
psychiatric thesis that by and large psychiatry functions to 
exclude and repress those elements society wants excluded 
and repressed.66 
The confusion of Cooper and Laing’s work causes serious problems, when 
criticism directed at Laing should perhaps more appropriately be directed at 
Cooper’s work. No doubt there are substantial differences between their 
positions. However, this is not my main concern in this thesis. What is my 
concern is to take note of whether criticism directed at Laing is appropriate in 
terms of actually matching up with Laing’s position itself. So far, Clare’s 
criticism of Laing can be found lacking in this respect.  
                                                                                     However, Cooper’s work 
itself supports Laing’s account of it in the above quotations, and demonstrates 
differences from that of Laing, which I will summarise here. I wish to note some 
general distinctions first of all. Laing himself never directly published anything 
with the phrase ‘anti-psychiatry’ in the title, nor does this phrase actually feature 
in his texts. In my later section on Sedgwick’s critique of Laing, it is noted that 
Laing was extremely unhappy with the publication of the collection of essays 
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entitled R.D. Laing and Anti-Psychiatry (1974)67 precisely for this reason. The 
only directly co-authored piece by Laing and Cooper is the introduction to 
Reason and Violence. The other chapters of that text were written separately. The 
fact that Laing and Cooper address the same, or very similar themes, is not a 
sufficient justification for presenting these authors as identical, due to the key 
differences which I will now outline. 
                                                          Cooper presents his arguments in a much 
stronger manner than Laing. For example, Cooper is much more forceful in 
expressing his comments regarding the idea that normality is merely a form of 
conformity. Cooper argues in Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry (1967) that ‘most 
people are developmentally arrested in this state of normality.’68 He suggests that 
a minority are able to progress onto sanity, whereas others break down into 
madness.69 Cooper does not pull his punches in the manner that Laing does. 
Ironically, Cooper’s written style is arguably much clearer than Laing’s. It is 
more scholarly and less poetic. An important difference is the fact that Cooper is 
much quicker than Laing to move his discussions on to criticise the larger social 
scale. Society is Cooper’s target much more than Laing’s. 
…If one attempts to break out of the system of false 
rationality of the family, particularly when this system is 
reinforced by the collusion with the family of agents of the 
wider society, then one runs the risk of being called 
irrational… To a quite remarkable extent the “illness” or the 
illogicality of the schizophrenic has its origin in the illness of 
the logic of other people.70 
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The argument that families and psychiatrists collude is present in Laing. 
However, Cooper moves beyond this to include general practitioners and the 
police.71 
            Cooper’s work contains far more explicit social criticism than that of 
Laing. Cooper is happier than Laing to move from the family on to the larger 
social scale. An example of this is provided in the quotation below. 
One very obvious manifestation of the operation of unseen, or 
insufficiently seen, internalized family structures is in political 
demonstrations where the organizing group is lacking in 
vision of this sort of reality in themselves. So we find 
demonstrators getting unnecessarily hurt because they 
unknowingly project bits of their parents in their negative, 
punishing, powerful aspect onto the police.72 
Cooper’s argument here is rather bizarre. He appears to be claiming that the 
projection of negative aspects of individuals’ parents on to the police serves as an 
explanation for violence at protests. I am not convinced by this. This quotation 
appears in a chapter where Cooper is concerned with ‘…the power of the internal 
family…’73 Following the above discussion, Cooper proceeds to claim the 
following. 
If we are to regard paranoia as a morbid state of existence in 
any sense any more, I think that the only place in which we 
find this as a social problem is in the minds of policemen, 
administrators of the law, and the consensus politicians of the 
imperialist countries.74 
                                                 Cooper appears to have been less conscious of the 
difficulties involved in moving from the micro-social to the macro-social scale 
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than Laing. He describes both the family and psychiatry as ‘…imbued with the 
frightened archaeo-ideology of the bourgeois watchdog…’75 I am aware of 
nothing within Laing’s work that quite matches the venom of Cooper’s social 
criticism, even if it is misguided in some respects. It is vitally important for the 
reader to take note of this substantial difference between Laing and Cooper. This 
distinction is also apparent in Cooper’s arguments that madness has a 
revolutionary use, and that therapy could also serve such a purpose. He suggests, 
with regard to those suffering mental distress, that: 
…the people so stigmatized may find a social revolutionary 
use for their “aberrations” instead of letting them sink into a 
private neurosis which always confirms “the system” and 
plays endless, joyless games with it.76 
Cooper claims that such a revolutionary moment could occur through a radical 
‘…destructuring of the family…’77 There is some substance in this argument, 
since a significant change in the structure of the nuclear family would alter 
society. However, later in this chapter Cooper presents a rather more 
controversial line of thought in a discussion of the possibility of undoing 
repressive processes of socialisation through psychotherapy. ‘If this happens on a 
wide enough scale, therapy becomes dangerous to the bourgeois state and highly 
subversive because radically new forms of social life are indicated.’78 This latter 
argument is entirely that of Cooper and not Laing. This latter difference is highly 
relevant to Jacoby’s misguided criticisms of Laing in Chapter Eight, where 
Jacoby makes criticisms of Laing which more accurately pertain to Cooper. In 
summary, Cooper and Laing’s work should not be viewed as identical since 
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Cooper presents arguments which are either absent from Laing’s work, or are not 
developed by Laing in the more explicitly socially critical direction that Cooper’s 
work takes. 
                 Laing gives further clarification of his position on psychiatry in 
Wisdom, Madness and Folly. He states that he wanted to try and change the 
practice of psychiatry, not get rid of it, as would be suggested if he was indeed an 
‘anti-psychiatrist’.  
I wanted to clear a space where people, either defined as 
patients or not (that is a matter of etiquette), could be treated 
by me, if they wanted to be treated by me, in completely 
different ways, in many respects the opposite ways, from 
those in which I had been trained to treat them. Then we 
would see what happened. But, I was told, how can you? You 
are abdicating your medical responsibilities. It’s like refusing 
to give a diabetic insulin. To encourage a schizophrenic to 
talk to you is like encouraging a haemophiliac to bleed. I 
knew that eventually I would have to have the courage of my 
lack of psychiatric convictions. 79 
It is easy to understand how a simplistic reading of Laing’s work could produce 
the misunderstanding that he is actually ‘anti-psychiatry’. Those who are 
psychiatrists themselves may more easily jump to this conclusion, because of 
Laing’s fierce attack upon their profession. Clare’s mistake here is at least 
understandable, more so than those made by Reznek. 
                                                                                  Further misunderstandings 
that can be generated by allocating Laing the ‘anti-psychiatric’ label, are that 
Laing is completely against the use of psychiatric drugs, and that he thinks that a 
person should just be left alone if they are suffering from some sort of mental 
illness. Again, responses to this sort of comment are provided in Wisdom, 
Madness and Folly. Here Laing argues that: ‘Drugs can be a great boon in 
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psychiatry or any other style of mental healing. It all depends on how they are 
used or abused.’80 He also suggests that: ‘I would welcome intervention from 
others whether I liked it or not if I went into some of the hypermanic states I’ve 
seen in which I would die of exhaustion if I were not stopped.’81 Laing also gives 
voice to these lesser-known opinions of his in the radio interview that he gave 
with Clare. Laing must have felt that these sort of criticisms of his work required 
responses and further clarification on his behalf. However, Laing’s explicit 
statement that he is not an ‘anti-psychiatrist’ in Wisdom, Madness and Folly, was 
not published until five years after the second edition of Clare’s Psychiatry in 
Dissent. Nevertheless, I feel that this is an important matter to clear up early in 
this thesis.  
                A problem with Clare’s critique of Laing that occurs within the chapter 
entitled ‘Causal Factors in Schizophrenia’ is the very title of that chapter itself. 
Again, Laing deals with this sort of criticism in the first quotation that I have 
used in this section from Wisdom, Madness and Folly, where Laing states that he 
has never said that families, etc, cause schizophrenia. To the careful reader of 
Laing, it should be apparent that the language of cause and effect is absent from 
Laing’s work. This throws doubt upon the remainder of Clare’s critique which 
proceeds upon the lines that Laing does say that families cause schizophrenia. 
Clare argues that: 
If Laing claims that certain types of family communications 
can cause schizophrenia then this can only be tested by having 
some operational definition of what ‘schizophrenia’ is and 
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then looking for the allegedly pathological patterns in families 
with schizophrenic members and families without them.82 
Clare’s critique here is based upon a misinterpretation and misreading of Laing’s 
actual work. With Clare’s first criticism of Laing in this chapter, that Laing 
supposedly claims that families can cause schizophrenia, this criticism is based 
upon the idea that Laing is claiming something which he does not. This criticism 
by Clare is very similar to one made by Reznek, which I have evaluated in the 
previous section. It can be seen at this early stage of this thesis that mistakes in 
the criticism of Laing are indeed being reproduced by different critics. Laing and 
Esterson’s responses to these types of criticism which I have noted earlier are 
sufficient to address these criticisms. The point of Sanity, Madness and the 
Family, as they argued themselves, was not to say simplistically that families 
cause schizophrenia.  
                                Clare further reproduces mistakes committed by Reznek in 
his section on ‘Family Life and Schizophrenia’, where he attempts to criticise 
The Politics of Experience. Here Clare also lifts a quotation from this book out of 
its wider context, and takes it as more representative of Laing’s position on the 
family than it really is. 
Some analysts, such as Laing, do appear to hold the view that 
the contemporary family is a ‘pathogenic’ institution. Such a 
view hardly tells us much about what kind of family 
psychopathology ‘specifically’ predisposes its members to 
develop schizophrenia. ‘We are all prostitutes and murderers 
now’, Laing once declared passionately (1967).83 
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 Laing’s statement that: ‘We are all murderers and prostitutes…’84 does not even 
occur in one of the chapters of The Politics of Experience that deals with Laing’s 
views on the family. It occurs in the introduction to the book. This invalidates 
Clare’s criticism of this statement, which proceeds as follows. 
Such a judgement, stressing as it does our common innate 
potentialities to self and mutual despair and destruction, does 
not provide us with any helpful discriminating information as 
to what it might be inside the family which provokes, of all 
possible responses, the schizophrenic response.85 
                                                                                         This is a further example 
of the cheap, unproductive criticism of Laing produced by conservative 
psychiatrists. The Politics of Experience does seem to be particularly beyond 
their comprehension. The only way that conservative psychiatrists can attempt to 
criticise this book is on the basis of a complete lack of engagement with the ideas 
in this text. Clare does, at the very least, show some awareness that The Politics 
of Experience is a book about alienation and repression. However, this awareness 
does not broaden out to inform his critique of Laing. The remainder of Clare’s 
criticism suffers from very much the same problems that I have pointed out 
earlier in relation to his misunderstanding that Laing’s work is based upon a 
cause and effect relation.  
The other question which remains to be resolved concerns the 
difficulty of separating cause from effect. Confronted by 
evidence of serious family psychopathology and a member 
manifesting schizophrenic symptoms, one may be tempted to 
opt for a cause-and-effect model and ‘diagnose’ the family 
disturbance as the cause of the schizophrenia. But confronted 
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by any vicious cycle, the diagnostician has a thorny task in 
deciding which causes what!86 
It is too strong a reading of Laing to argue that his work contains a ‘gigantic 
insistence… that it is the family who has driven the schizophrenic mad…’87 As I 
have already argued, Laing’s work avoids the use of simplistic determinism. 
Clare’s criticism here may be the result of his efforts to impose a deterministic 
cause-and-effect relation onto Laing’s work. Clare also puts forward the 
argument that: 
…the family model of causation in schizophrenia labels, 
scapegoats, and stigmatizes every bit as much (and more?) as 
the much-maligned medical model. In the family model, 
however, the targets for blame tend to be the parents, the 
family, and to a lesser extent society whereas in the medical 
model the targets, in so far as there are any, are the largely 
impersonal ones of brain, biochemistry and blood levels.88 
This gives a further example of the problems with the conservative psychiatric 
view. I cannot see the worth in Clare’s idea here that it is better to ‘blame’ 
impersonal biological things for mental illness, rather than ‘blaming’ actual 
human beings. Clare shares our culture’s assumption that the family can only be 
a good thing, and that it deserves to be a cherished institution. This leaves him 
without enough of a critical position when it comes to evaluating Laing’s 
theories involving schizophrenia and the family. 
                                                                           Clare’s attempted critique of 
Laing is slightly better than that by Reznek. Earlier in Psychiatry in Dissent, 
Clare shows that he agrees with Laing’s argument in The Politics of Experience 
that living in a capitalist society may lead to people experiencing mental distress. 
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Clare notes that ‘it is a common belief that we are all a little mad.’89 He 
continues: 
A more spirited version of such a view is that provided by 
R.D. Laing in The Politics of Experience. ‘The madness that 
we encounter in “patients”’, he insists, ‘is a gross travesty, a 
mockery, a grotesque caricature of what the natural healing of 
that estranged integration we call sanity might be’ (1967: 
119). A number of epidemiological studies would seem to 
bear out such a vision of widespread madness.90 
The quotation from Laing that Clare uses here is from one of the heavily 
criticised last three chapters of The Politics of Experience. The fact that Clare is 
in agreement with this shows a further similarity with Reznek, who also agrees 
with this idea of Laing’s. Conservative psychiatrists seem to accept the notion 
that cultures can be pathological. However, this is as far as they appear to go 
with engaging with any critical arguments put forward by Laing. 
                                                                       Laing himself, in an interview from 
1978, offers a reason for the psychiatric establishment’s criticism of, and lack of 
agreement with his ideas. I will be reviewing further examples of criticism of 
Laing found in interviews with him in the next section.  
Putting himself in his ex-colleagues’ places, Laing can see 
why they remain silent even if they also deprecate the present 
state of psychiatry: “They’ve got to keep their mouths shut so 
they don’t lose their jobs or find themselves never getting 
promotion.”91 
There is the matter of conventional psychiatrists not wanting to end their careers 
at an earlier stage than they would like, and perhaps becoming unable to draw 
salaries to which they are accustomed. This lends these sorts of criticisms an aura 
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of expediency. This also may be why Laing’s theories that radically challenge 
the conventional bio-medical psychiatric view come in for such a great attack 
from these quarters. Conservative psychiatrists probably do not want their 
profession to be completely invalidated.  
                                                             Clare also states that his section on ‘Family 
Life and Schizophrenia’ is not intended to: 
…dismiss family approaches, for that way we return to 
ideological confrontation and polarization. Family studies 
have provided and are providing systematic insights into 
family communications and relationships which may yet have 
immense implications for psychiatry in the future.92 
Clare does at the very least show some respect for Laing, a feature which is 
completely absent from Reznek’s chapter. In the radio interview Clare conducted 
with Laing, Clare says that ‘everyone in contemporary psychiatry owes 
something to Ronnie Laing’, and that ‘even his many critics would admit he was 
one of the most controversial and influential psychiatrists of modern times.’93 
Clare does show some evidence of actual engagement with Laing’s work. 
Nevertheless, there are still massive problems with his critique of Laing. In a 
similar vein to Reznek, his critique is based upon a received idea of Laing’s 
work, rather than the critique proceeding through a demonstration of Laing’s 
actual work through a scholarly reading. The aforementioned radio interview 
between Laing and Clare was used as evidence against Laing by the General 
Medical Council. The GMC took Laing’s candid admissions of depression and 
alcoholism as evidence sufficient for him to be struck off the doctors’ register as 
unfit to practice. In a commentary on the original interview by Laing’s son 
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Adrian, he suggests that that interview ‘unwittingly contributed to [R.D.] Laing’s 
downfall.’94 
Criticism of Laing by the Psychiatric Establishment in Interviews 
 
Additional examples of the sort of criticism directed at Laing by the psychiatric 
establishment are found in interviews with Laing. In an interview from 1973 in 
Rolling Stone, Jonathan Cott argues that after reading Laing’s work, ‘…it 
became easy for [him] to understand why many psychiatrists were calling Laing 
himself a paranoid schizophrenic, for his books functioned in part as a kind of 
mirror that reflected the reader’s own delicate balance. I mean, if Laing’s 
thoughts were a product of a deluded mind, why get upset or hurl names?’95 Here 
Cott is suggesting that these types of criticism of Laing may have more to do 
with whoever is actually producing the criticism, rather than Laing himself. The 
psychiatric establishment have utilised almost any possible method to criticise 
Laing, including ad hominem attacks. Attacking the person rather than the theory 
is an even lower form of criticism than those attempts I have reviewed earlier. At 
the very least Reznek and Clare try to criticise Laing’s theory, rather than making 
personal attacks upon the man himself, even if their attempts are based upon 
profound misreadings. As Cott says, there would be no need for the psychiatric 
establishment to get so upset about Laing’s ideas if they were merely the result of 
a person in a state of mental distress. 
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                                                            In Wisdom, Madness and Folly, Laing puts 
forward the argument that many respected philosophers are also seen as mentally 
ill by the psychiatric establishment.  
I cajoled one of my psychiatric superiors to read 
Kierkegaard’s The Sickness Unto Death [sic]. He did. ‘Thank 
you. Very interesting. A very good example of early 
nineteenth-century schizoid psychopathology,’ he 
commented. At the same time, I dreaded much more than ever 
becoming like them and felt an enormous relief and sense of 
gratitude that I was not one of them. What was I to do, under 
these circumstances? Insofar as my mind was akin to 
Kierkegaard’s, it suffered from the same psychopathology, 
schizoid, or worse. My mind went along also with such 
diagnosed psychotics as Nietzsche, Joyce, even Artaud! 
Worse! Definitely. I had been trained to diagnose myself as 
schizophrenic… I had been trained to diagnose myself as 
psychotic.96 
In a footnote to this piece from Laing he includes the following: 
On reading this passage in the typescript Dr Leon Redler 
wrote me the following note: 
When I was a psychiatric resident at Metropolitan Hospital in 
New York City (1963-65) the consultant on ward rounds used 
as a criteria for diagnosing a man schizophrenic that he could 
not understand what he was talking about. A fellow resident, 
now on the faculty of the Harvard Psychiatry Dept., 
commented that he had real difficulty understanding what 
Hegel was talking about. Would the consultant, if he had 
similar difficulty and indeed could not fathom Hegel, thereby 
diagnose Hegel as schizophrenic? The consultant psychiatrist 
replied: ‘I certainly would.’97 
These examples suggest that the psychiatric establishment view as pathological 
anything that they do not understand. This may be an explanation for their view 
of Laing’s work as the creation of a distressed mind. This demonstrates a very 
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simplistic approach. Laing himself suggests that psychiatric training leads to a 
rather closed view of the world.  
                                                 A further example of criticism of Laing from the 
psychiatric establishment is found in an interview from 1978 in Gay News.  
R D Laing is no longer relevant to modern psychiatry. He 
knows so, because the British Journal of Psychiatry told him. 
“This book has nothing to say to psychiatry” pronounced the 
Journal’s reviewer, writing of Laing’s recent work, The Facts 
of Life. Other people still listen though. Even his own 
profession can’t dismiss him entirely. “Books like The 
Divided Self and The Self and Others they have to take 
account of. They teach them at the London School of 
Economics, you see,” Laing explains dryly, poker-faced. He 
continues to see patients, though two colleagues who applied 
for licenses to work with him were told licenses wouldn’t be 
necessary, “because their work with me would not involve 
practising psychiatry.”98 
Out of Laing’s ten published theoretical works, I find The Facts of Life (1976) to 
be arguably the weakest. I will offer some further discussion of this later in my 
critique of Laing. The most significant problem with The Facts of Life is that the 
book has no central focus. It jumps between Laing’s speculations on how birth 
may affect the later personality, autobiographical recollections, and the critique 
of science and psychiatry. No main thread through these disparate aspects of this 
book is provided to enable the reader to piece together these different views in 
any coherent way. As a result, the stronger and more critical parts of this text 
become submerged within the overall lack of structure. After reading the book, I 
was left with the impression that Laing had been rather sloppy with regard to 
organizing and editing this text. 
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                                                However, the issue here is whether it is relevant to 
psychiatry. The reviewer from the British Journal of Psychiatry mentioned in the 
above quotation seems to have missed Chapter Eleven of The Facts of Life – ‘A 
Lecture’. This is by far the strongest chapter of this book. It is relevant to 
psychiatry because in this chapter Laing continues his critique of psychiatry. The 
material on electro-shock ‘therapy’ and its origins is particularly gruesome. The 
fact that the reviewer thought that this book has ‘nothing to say to psychiatry’ 
does seem rather arbitrary given the quality of this chapter. Perhaps the reviewer 
had committed the same crime that I highlighted earlier with Reznek and Clare’s 
critiques, that of not doing their reading properly. 
                                                                               Nevertheless, this particular 
criticism of Laing may have been generated because Laing’s criticism of ECT 
within The Facts of Life was not making any original criticism about this method 
of treatment. In Clare’s critical but balanced assessment of ECT in Psychiatry in 
Dissent, a number of critiques of ECT which pre-date that in The Facts of Life 
are noted.99 A full evaluation of the history of the critique of ECT is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. However, it is clear that Laing’s critique of this form of 
treatment was not necessarily offering anything new to the psychiatric 
profession, who were fully aware of the problems with this treatment at the time 
that The Facts of Life was published. Therefore, this may offer a coherent reason 
for the above criticism. It is also possible to see why the people who applied for 
licenses to work with Laing did not have to acquire them because Laing ‘was not 
practising psychiatry’. I can see some validity in this, as Laing’s views on what 
may help a distressed person, and the psychiatric establishment’s views on what 
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help can be given, are very different. Perhaps it is almost some sort of 
backhanded compliment to Laing that he was not seen as practising conventional 
psychiatry. 
                  Laing himself hits back at the criticism mentioned in this interview. 
As far as Laing is concerned most of the ex-colleagues who 
have rusticated him aren’t practising psychiatry, either. 
“Institutional psychiatry in this country keeps people in 
prisons, drugs them, gives them electric shocks. It demeans 
them and subjects them to humiliating experiences. It puts 
them in situations which even those in their right minds would 
find shaking. If it does anything, it helps to drive people a 
little more crazy – and we call that ‘psychiatry’.”100 
A consistently bizarre aspect of the criticism of Laing from the psychiatric 
establishment is the lack of any reflexive awareness in their criticism. It is 
assumed that the conventional psychiatrist’s point of view is simply correct, and 
that no counter-argument can undermine their own views. It may be the case that 
accepting any radical challenge to psychiatry would be enough to shatter their 
framework of beliefs. I cannot help but feel that Laing’s comments at the end of 
this interview are indeed directed at the psychiatric establishment. 
“I hope to live long enough to get my revenge on those 
characters who say I’m finished by letting them have a bit 
more of the stuff they don’t like to hear and by writing stuff 
which, even if they don’t like it, other people find worth 
reading and listening to!”101 
                                                        This review of the critiques of Laing by 
conservative psychiatrists has shown that there are a number of problems with 
their criticism. It has been a relatively simple task, given my familiarity with 
Laing’s texts and ideas, to demonstrate the errors made by these critics. There are 
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a number of methodological principles required to produce a sound, scholarly 
critique which are lacking in the psychiatric critiques. Reznek and Clare have 
shown that their reading of Laing’s work is inadequate. This then leads to the 
production of poor interpretations of Laing’s ideas and theories. Their imprecise 
reading causes them to take quotations from Laing’s work out of context, and 
argue that these quotations are more representative of Laing’s position than they 
in fact are. Their arguments are not properly supported by reference to clear 
examples from Laing’s actual work. Additionally, misreading by these critics 
produces fundamental misunderstandings on their behalf with regard to Laing’s 
work. These inadequacies lead to these authors criticising either the standard 
reception of Laing’s work, or their own incorrect interpretation of his work, and 
not Laing’s specific texts themselves. Therefore these critiques are rather instead 
more like pseudo-critiques. All of the above strongly suggests that Reznek and 
Clare provide indirect criticism of Laing, because they do not engage with 
Laing’s theory properly on its own terms. A fair critique of an author must take 
into account the author’s intentions with regard to their work, the author’s own 
definitions of their projects, and interpret their position correctly. It must not 
claim that the author makes arguments which they do not. Clare and Reznek 
demonstrate only a limited or non-existent engagement with Laing’s theories in 
their critiques. A critique of an author’s work could be used to move a theory 
forward by acknowledging problems and suggesting solutions. However, Reznek 
and Clare’s critiques cannot be used in this way, since they are unproductive due 
to their poor scholarship. They only advance Laing’s contributions in a negative 
way, as Laing’s work has much greater quality and depth than is shown in these 
pseudo-critiques.
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4) Deleuze and Guattari’s Laingian Voyage 
 
This chapter will evaluate the commentary on Laing’s work provided by Deleuze 
and Guattari within their 1972 text Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
Some critiques of Laing’s theories are offered within this text. However, the 
reception of Laing within Anti-Oedipus is more positive overall than that 
provided by the conservative psychiatric establishment. Strictly speaking, this 
section should appear later in this thesis when I examine the left-wing critiques 
of Laing. Nevertheless, Deleuze and Guattari’s engagement with Laing’s work 
provides an interesting counterpoint to the conservative psychiatric critiques. 
Aspects of Laing’s theories which are critiqued by the latter group are praised 
and developed within Anti-Oedipus. The tension between these two opposing 
receptions of Laing’s work means that a more coherent discussion of these 
divergent views will be enabled by these chapters following each other. The 
discussion within this section is centred on the chapters of Anti-Oedipus which 
refer to Laing directly.  
Deleuze and Guattari’s Commentary on and Praise of Laing’s Work 
 
In addition to commending aspects of Laing’s ideas, Deleuze and Guattari also 
offer some general comments on his work. Their critique of Laing will be 
examined in the section following this one. Their comments and praise regarding 
Laing’s work are largely centred around Laing’s exposition of the schizophrenic 
journey or voyage within The Politics of Experience. This aspect of Laing’s ideas 
is viewed by Deleuze and Guattari in a positive light, in sharp contrast to the 
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severe criticism of this notion by conservative psychiatrists which was reviewed 
in the previous chapter. Deleuze and Guattari contend that: 
R.D. Laing is entirely right in defining the schizophrenic 
process as a voyage of initiation, a transcendental experience 
of the loss of the Ego, which causes a subject to remark: “I 
had existed since the very beginning…from the lowest form 
of life [the body without organs] to the present time,…I was 
looking …- not looking so much as just feeling – ahead of me 
was the most horrific journey.”1 
Instead of rejecting this concept outright without further consideration as Reznek 
does, for example, much of the material within the chapters of Anti-Oedipus that 
concern Laing’s work seeks to develop this idea of the schizophrenic journey or 
‘process’ as it is referred to within this text. 
                                                                    In this way, Deleuze and Guattari 
attempt to advance Laing’s ideas concerning the journey within The Politics of 
Experience. Reznek’s critique of this aspect of Laing’s work as making the claim 
that ‘schizophrenia has valuable consequences’2 is viewed from an alternative 
perspective by Deleuze and Guattari, who see the much-maligned last three 
chapters of The Politics of Experience as containing insights into the experience 
of the schizophrenic. Laing notes towards the end of the chapter entitled ‘A Ten-
Day Voyage’, which provides an account of a schizophrenic journey largely from 
the perspective of the person who went through it, that ‘there is a great deal that 
urgently needs to be written about this and similar experiences,’3 but that he has 
only covered a few ‘fundamental’ matters in relation to this subject.4 Deleuze 
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and Guattari’s discussion of this concept builds upon Laing’s comments in a 
manner which engages with Laing’s work on a higher level than the critiques 
provided by conservative psychiatrists.  
                                                            The above quotation from Deleuze and 
Guattari, and many of their additional comments, serve to unpick the line of 
thought behind the conservative psychiatric establishment’s rejection of the 
schizophrenic voyage. Deleuze and Guattari describe the schizophrenic journey 
as ‘a transcendental experience of the loss of the Ego’.5 Ego-loss tends to be 
viewed as pathological from a conservative psychiatric standpoint. The loss of 
the ego within forms of psychosis illustrates the limit that psychoanalysis reaches 
in terms of being an appropriate, useful form of analysis for the treatment of 
these forms of distress. Psychoanalysis requires an individual to be in possession 
of a ‘normally’ functioning ego in order for the analysis to occur. The 
psychoanalytic distinction between neurosis and psychosis points up this 
characterisation of psychosis as involving the loss or splitting of the ego. 
Laplanche and Pontalis explain the role of the loss of the ego in psychosis in 
Freud’s work.  
Whereas in neurosis the ego bows to the demands of reality 
(and of the super-ego) and represses instinctual claims, in the 
case of psychosis a rupture between ego and reality occurs 
straight away, leaving the ego under the sway of the id…6 
In Freud’s other conception of psychosis as involving the splitting of the ego, 
only a part of the ego loses its relation to reality.7 According to Laplanche and 
Pontalis, Freud never considered these explanations of psychosis to be 
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satisfactory. In his later work he attempted to uncover a ‘better’ explanation for 
psychosis by means of the disavowal of castration.8  
                                                                                However, both Laing and 
Deleuze and Guattari view these interpretations of psychosis as completely 
inadequate. The self-referential nature of psychoanalysis means that it cannot 
move beyond its own terminology, even when this jargon is limiting of its 
explanatory power, as in the case of psychosis. Laing argues that psychiatric and 
psychoanalytic jargon: 
…consists of words which split man up verbally in a way 
which is analogous to the existential splits we have to describe 
here. But we cannot give an adequate account of the 
existential splits unless we can begin from the concept of a 
unitary whole, and no such concept exists, nor can any such 
concept be expressed within the current language system of 
psychiatry or psycho-analysis.9 
Whilst Laing (at least in his earlier work) is happy to explain schizophrenia in 
terms of the splitting of the self, he is not content to limit his analysis to the 
closed framework of psychoanalysis. For Laing, the self cannot be adequately 
described within Freud’s topography of the id, the ego and the super-ego, nor can 
the splitting of the self that may occur within schizophrenia. Deleuze and 
Guattari share Laing’s discontent with psychoanalytic jargon in terms of its 
inadequacy to explain forms of psychosis. For the psychotic to be suffering from 
the disavowal of castration, psychosis must therefore be explicable in terms of 
the Oedipus complex. However, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that this is a ‘false 
criterion’10 with which to view psychosis. They note that psychoanalysis here 
follows ‘…an idea dear to traditional psychiatry: that madness is fundamentally 
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linked to a loss of reality.’11 They then proceed to question where and how this 
loss of reality occurs. 
 Could it be that the loss of reality is not the effect of the 
schizophrenic process, but the effect of its forced 
oedipalization, that is to say, its interruption? Must we… 
suppose that some tolerate oedipalization less well than 
others? [The schizophrenic] …is ill because of the 
oedipalization to which he is made to submit…and which he 
can no longer tolerate.12  
                                                      Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the psychotic 
loss of reality is not a symptom of an illness, but rather a reaction on behalf of 
the person to having a psychoanalytic frame of reference imposed upon their 
experience, which the person cannot cope with. Deleuze and Guattari utilise 
some of their analysis in Anti-Oedipus in expanding upon Laing’s idea in The 
Politics of Experience that the schizophrenic voyage is rarely or never allowed to 
proceed through its own course without being arrested in some manner.  
As Laing says, they are interrupted in their journey. They 
have lost reality. But when did they lose it? During the 
journey, or during the interruption of the journey?13 
Within The Politics of Experience, Laing offers some reasons as to why the 
voyage is interrupted. He refers to an introduction to an autobiographical account 
of schizophrenia written by Gregory Bateson, in which Bateson puts forward the 
idea of the schizophrenic journey as similar to an initiation ceremony found in 
other cultures. 
What needs to be explained is the failure of many who 
embark upon this voyage to return from it. Do these encounter 
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circumstances either in family life or in institutional care so 
grossly maladaptive that even the richest and best organized 
hallucinatory experience cannot save them?14 
Following this quotation from Bateson, Laing states that he is ‘in substantial 
agreement with this view.’15 Bateson’s quotation cleverly turns the focus away 
from the distressed person as the one suffering from a failure of adaptation to the 
wider social context around the person being the locus of maladaption. This is 
similar to a view I have heard expressed regarding disability, where rather than 
the person having the disability, it is instead the society that has the disability 
because it cannot adapt to a person who is ‘abnormal’. Here Laing, through 
Bateson’s quotation, suggests that the wider social context cannot support the 
self-healing of the individual who has embarked upon the voyage. It is noted in 
the above quotation, and within the chapter of The Politics of Experience entitled 
‘A Ten-Day Voyage’, that there are accounts of people who have been through 
the schizophrenic journey, and who have eventually returned to collective reality 
afterwards, with no outside interference in this process occurring.  
                                                                                                      With regard to 
the voyage, Laing argues the following: 
Sometimes (not always and not necessarily) these unusual 
experiences that are expressed by unusual behaviour appear to 
be part of a potentially orderly, natural sequence of 
experiences. 
        This sequence is very seldom allowed to occur because 
we are so busy ‘treating’ the patient…16 
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Laing suggests that the treatment that the person may receive has the effect of 
interrupting their journey, which then may serve to worsen their condition. No 
doubt psychiatry has a vested interest in stopping this voyage, because if it was 
found that schizophrenics, for example, may eventually ‘come round’ without 
any help (provided that they were in a safe environment) then psychiatry would 
be of little remaining use. The problem is that it is no doubt seen as an abdication 
of medical responsibility not to treat a person who is severely distressed, and the 
wider social context cannot support this. Jesse Watkins, whose experience of a 
schizophrenic journey forms most of ‘A Ten-Day Voyage’, states that in order 
for the voyage to be facilitated, the person requires ‘…some sort of sheet anchor 
which is holding on to the present – and to himself as he is…,’ with the addition 
of the person having other people there to look after them whom they trust.17  
                                                     Deleuze and Guattari also note that it is rare for 
a person to complete the voyage, as Watkins did. ‘Very few people accomplish 
what Laing calls the breakthrough of this schizophrenic wall or limit: “quite 
ordinary people,” nevertheless. But the majority draw near the wall and back 
away horrified.’18 The lack of support for such a journey outside of a medicalised 
environment cannot but make this more difficult for a person. The very culture 
that we inhabit, with its focus upon experience in the outer rather than the inner 
world, makes the likelihood of a person encountering a full completion of the 
journey into an impossibility. With regard to the voyage, Laing states that: 
I have listed very briefly little more than the headings for an 
extended study and understanding of a natural sequence of 
experiential stepping stones that, in some instances, is 
submerged, concealed, distorted and arrested by the label 
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‘schizophrenia’ with its connotations of an illness-to-be-
cured.19 
It is clear that, as I have mentioned earlier, Deleuze and Guattari saw a great deal 
of intrinsic merit in Laing’s work on the journey because (from my reading of the 
text) many of the chapters of Anti-Oedipus that cite Laing contain a fair amount 
of exposition which furthers Laing’s comments on this topic. ‘Laing’s 
importance lies in the fact that, starting from certain intuitions that remained 
ambiguous in Jaspers, he was able to indicate the incredible scope of this 
voyage.’20 In a direct juxtaposition to the psychiatric establishment’s criticism of 
this idea as ‘romanticising’ madness, Deleuze and Guattari view Laing’s sketch 
of the voyage as one of his major contributions. Unfortunately a full comparison 
of the ways in which they add to Laing’s discussion of this concept is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  
                               Deleuze and Guattari note that: 
In the whole of psychiatry only Jaspers, then Laing have 
grasped what process signified [sic], and its fulfillment – and 
so escaped the familialism that is the ordinary bed and board 
of psychoanalysis and psychiatry.21 
Following this comment, they proceed to give a long quotation from The Politics 
of Experience, taken from two of the last three chapters of that text.22 The above 
quotation from Anti-Oedipus illustrates why Deleuze and Guattari see so much 
importance in Laing’s setting out of the nature of the schizophrenic voyage. They 
view that particular concept as a way of moving beyond the focus on the family 
which is found within psychiatry and psychoanalysis. Since the voyage involves 
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the person moving into a state which transcends the individual’s typical 
perception of reality, the person experiencing the voyage (from the accounts 
given by Jaspers and Watkins in The Politics of Experience) shifts into a state 
beyond family-bound experience. 
                                                    Deleuze and Guattari are highly critical of the 
focus on the family within psychiatry and psychoanalysis, which they see as 
excluding wider social, political and historical factors which impact upon the 
individual and their experience of distress. The question of what really it is that 
makes the schizophrenic ill in some manner is a recurring one throughout Anti-
Oedipus. 
…What reduces the schizophrenic to his autistic, hospitalized 
profile, cut off from reality? Is it the process, or is it rather the 
interruption of the process, its aggravation, its continuation in 
the void? What forces the schizophrenic to withdraw to a 
body without organs that has become deaf, dumb and blind?23 
As I have noted earlier in this chapter, as Deleuze and Guattari’s argument 
progresses, they decide that it is not the process itself (the voyage) that makes the 
schizophrenic ill, but rather its interruption or ‘oedipalization’. They critique the 
focus on the family within psychiatry and psychoanalysis because ‘all delirium 
possesses a world-historical, political, and racial content,’24 which Deleuze and 
Guattari suggest is ignored within the familialism of psychiatry and 
psychoanalysis. They view it as an error to lead ‘…the historical and political 
content of the delirium back to an internal familial determination.’25 This is a key 
element of their critique of the Oedipal complex. They consider this Freudian 
concept as closing off the influence of wider factors upon the individual.  
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                As I have already noted, Deleuze and Guattari argue that only Laing 
and Jaspers have provided illustrations within their work of what the 
schizophrenic journey may consist of. Laing refers to the account of the voyage 
given by a patient of Jaspers’ in his General Psychopathology (1962) within The 
Politics of Experience.26 The process of ego-loss is described within this account 
which is provided in Jaspers’ work: it involves the loss of the ‘…protective and 
successful deceit of the feeling of personal existence.’27 In a similar nature to the 
account given by Watkins in ‘A Ten-Day Voyage’, the journey itself does not 
appear to be a pleasant experience, although this individual found some benefit 
from having experienced it, in the form of the achievement of a ‘higher self’.28 
However, Laing critiques the comments that Jaspers makes following the 
account of the journey that he cites.  
Jaspers still speaks of this experience as morbid, and tends to 
discount the patient’s own construction. Yet both the 
experience and construction may be valid in their own 
terms.29 
Jaspers views the account of the voyage provided by the patient as simply a 
delusory experience which is a symptom of schizophrenia. Unlike Laing, Jaspers 
is not happy to let the patient’s view of their experience stand on its own, without 
dismissals, interpretations or the imposition of a disease-entity upon the account. 
Laing’s willingness to let patients’ self-descriptions of their experiences stand 
without further interference is a theme that runs through all of his theoretical 
work. A parallel can be made here between the psychiatric action of stopping the 
journey (by drugs, for example), and between the psychiatric and psychoanalytic 
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tendency to act upon the other’s experience by making interpretations, imposing 
a disease categorisation upon the experience, and so forth. Again, the 
philosophical influence of phenomenology upon Laing’s work is apparent in this 
attempt to view the experience of the person without interpreting it in a 
classically psychiatric or psychoanalytic fashion. 
                                                                           There are occasions (particularly 
within The Divided Self and Self and Others (1961) ) where Laing provides 
psychoanalytic interpretations of patients’ experiences. Nevertheless, at other 
points in his discussions he notes that making interpretations in this manner is 
unnecessary, and may be unhelpful to the patient. Chapter Five of Self and 
Others contains a case-study of a woman who underwent the experience of ‘The 
Coldness of Death’30 (which is the title of this particular chapter). Following this 
case-study provided both in Laing’s and the woman’s own language, Laing 
argues that: ‘confronted with this woman’s experience, clinical psychiatric 
terminology… is completely inadequate.’31 He continues: 
One glimpses here the naked, intricate actuality of the 
complexity of experiences that those of us who do not deny 
what we cannot explain or even describe are struggling to 
understand. Theory can only legitimately be made on behalf 
of experience, not in order to deny experience which the 
theory ignores out of embarrassment.32 
With regard to the schizophrenic voyage, the negative reaction (or over-reaction) 
to this aspect of Laing’s work by the conservative psychiatric establishment may 
have been occasioned by Laing’s willingness to move beyond the closed systems 
of psychiatric classification and the jargon of psychoanalysis. 
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                                                     In The Divided Self, in a discussion following 
another case-study of a woman who experienced anxiety when she felt alone, 
Laing sets out a psychoanalytic interpretation of her complaint. However, he then 
proceeds to demonstrate the irrelevance of a psychoanalytic interpretation in 
terms of grasping and addressing the root of this individual’s distress. 
…The central or pivotal issue in this patient’s life is not to be 
discovered in her ‘unconscious’… 
The pivotal point around which all her life is centred is her 
lack of ontological autonomy. If she is not in the actual 
presence of another person who knows her, or if she cannot 
succeed in evoking this person’s presence in his absence, her 
sense of her own identity drains away from her.33 
Both Laing and Deleuze and Guattari can be seen as critics of Freud, although 
Laing is more sympathetic to Freud, in some respects, than Deleuze and Guattari. 
Despite their critique of Freud’s theory of the Oedipus complex, and of the focus 
on the family within psychiatry and psychoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari still 
retain the usage of such psychoanalytic terms as the unconscious and 
preconscious within Anti-Oedipus. I found their use of such terms to sit rather 
uneasily within their scathing critique of other aspects of Freudian theory. 
                                                   With regard to the schizophrenic voyage, it is not 
noted either by the conservative psychiatric critics of this concept, nor by 
Deleuze and Guattari that the idea of the journey and of schizophrenia as some 
form of ‘breakthrough’, have a history which runs from the very beginning of 
Laing’s work. These notions are not found within The Politics of Experience 
alone as tends to be assumed. They originate from The Divided Self and Self and 
Others, which tend to receive much less criticism than The Politics of Experience 
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itself. Within The Divided Self, Laing makes a statement that is akin to his 
arguments in the heavily-criticised last three chapters of The Politics of 
Experience. Laing suggests that it is paradoxical that there are many dangerous 
people within our society which are not regarded as psychotic, and puts forward 
the notion that he is: 
…aware that the man who is said to be deluded may be in his 
delusion telling me the truth, and this in no equivocal or 
metaphorical sense, but quite literally, and that the cracked 
mind of the schizophrenic may let in light which does not 
enter the intact minds of many sane people whose minds are 
closed.34 
                              In Self and Others, Laing refers to ‘…the possibility that what 
we call psychosis may be sometimes a natural process of healing…’35 There are 
lines of development of certain ideas which run throughout the majority of 
Laing’s theoretical work. These recurring concepts can only be identified by a 
careful reading of the entirety of his work. The fact that both the ideas that there 
is something of worth within the experience of madness, and the 
conceptualisation of this as a process or journey occur early on within Laing’s 
oeuvre renders the conservative psychiatric critiques of these ideas as even more 
groundless. Additionally, the cheap tactic of isolating fragments of text away 
from their context increases the likelihood of such critics missing these lines of 
development of concepts throughout Laing’s work. The next section will 
evaluate Deleuze and Guattari’s direct criticism of Laing, and will additionally 
contain some comments on their critique of anti-psychiatry, which is bound up 
with their criticism of Laing. 
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Deleuze and Guattari’s Direct Criticisms of Laing 
 
There are two main criticisms of Laing made by Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-
Oedipus. Their first criticism occurs within a section which criticises the anti-
psychiatric movement. 
Most of the modern endeavors – outpatient centers, inpatient 
hospitals, social clubs for the sick, family care, institutions, 
and even antipsychiatry – remain threatened by a common 
danger,… how does one avoid the institution’s re-forming an 
asylum structure, or constituting perverse and reformist 
artificial societies, or residual paternalistic or mothering 
pseudo-families?36 
Deleuze and Guattari here express the concern that alternative communities or 
housing for those experiencing mental distress, such as Kingsley Hall (which 
Laing was involved with) may only serve to replicate the same problems that are 
encountered by conventional asylums and institutions. They are also concerned 
that the structure of the social relations within such places may form another 
group which is similar to that of the family, with an individual or individuals 
taking the place of an authority over the rest of the group. From Laing’s own 
account of Kingsley Hall in Mad to be Normal (1995), Mullan’s collection of 
discussions with Laing, an attempt was made to try and run the household with 
all who were living there (whether they were seen as insane, or were therapists) 
having an equal say in how the place was to function. 
                                                                                  This avoidance of a 
traditional structure of authority in Kingsley Hall brought its own problems as 
Laing recounts.  
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The contradiction was that without an authoritative structure 
anyone could do almost anything. But everyone was so daft! 
[Laing then tells the story of how one resident would go round 
slamming doors as hard as he could between two and four 
o’clock in the morning, which greatly irritated a therapist 
called Noel Cobb.] …Noel said that he wanted to get a night’s 
sleep. So, this guy who was doing this was articulate enough 
to argue that ‘time and space’ belonged to everyone and why 
should he [i.e. Cobb] impose his silence rather than him 
having the right to make a noise…37 
One can clearly see here the profound issues that can occur without any system 
of authority functioning within a group. If all have an equal say, then no one has 
the right to tell another individual what they can or cannot do, and it is unlikely 
that people will always agree with one another. These sorts of problems form 
what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘impasses’ in terms of the structuration of a group 
within an alternative therapeutic household such as Kingsley Hall. 
                                                                                                       However, their 
critique of Laing, which follows this raising of the problematic nature of such 
households, occurs on a more theoretical level.  
The only thing that can save us from these impasses is an 
effective politicization of psychiatry. And doubtless, with 
R.D. Laing and David Cooper antipsychiatry went very far in 
this direction. But it seems to us that they still conceive of this 
politicalization in terms of the structure and the event, rather 
than the process itself.38 
I have critiqued the labelling of Laing as an anti-psychiatrist earlier in this thesis, 
in my section on Clare. The mistake made by other critics of conflating Laing 
and Cooper’s work is not as blatantly apparent within Anti-Oedipus, since they 
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do make a distinction between the two earlier within the text.39 Laing suggests 
that many French psychiatrists and theorists did confuse him with Cooper 
because Cooper spent some time living in France.40 In the above quotation, 
Deleuze and Guattari suggest that Laing and Cooper could have gone further 
than they did in terms of politicizing the schizophrenic journey, or process, itself 
rather than only politicizing the event of becoming mad or the structure of the 
experience. I consider it to perhaps be rather arbitrary to split off the voyage 
itself from its being viewed as an event, and from its structure. However, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s criticism here provides a reason for their own exploration 
of the journey, which does consider it in a political nature. 
                                                                                          Nevertheless, from my 
reading of Laing, I consider this criticism to be over-stated because Laing does 
place the voyage within a wider social and political context. The journey has to 
be a form of experience itself. Throughout the last three chapters of The Politics 
of Experience, Laing does consider the political implications of those within a 
culture who do not experience the world in the same, shared way as the other 
individuals within that culture.  
The person going through ego-loss or transcendental 
experiences may or may not become in different ways 
confused. Then he might legitimately be regarded as mad. But 
to be mad is not necessarily to be ill, notwithstanding that in 
our culture the two categories have become confused.41 
Laing argues that a person who is experiencing the world in a radically different 
way to other people tends to become labelled as ill, whether this experience is 
symptomatic of an illness or not. It would be of benefit if Deleuze and Guattari 
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had further explained this aspect of their critique of Laing, as it is somewhat 
incoherent. They move far beyond Laing’s considerations of the voyage in 
making claims that the voyage itself has revolutionary potential.  
The schizo is not revolutionary, but the schizophrenic process 
… is the potential for revolution.42 
Deleuze and Guattari view the voyage as a means of casting off the shackles of 
repression. In making such assertions they provide a bigger target than Laing in 
terms of claiming that ‘schizophrenia has valuable consequences’, to again twist 
Reznek’s phrase against itself.  
                                               Deleuze and Guattari’s next criticism of Laing 
immediately follows the above criticism where they suggest that Laing does not 
adequately politicize the process itself.  
Furthermore, they [i.e. Laing and Cooper] localize social and 
mental alienation on a single line, and tend to consider them 
as identical by showing how the familial agent extends the 
one into the other.43                                        
 For Deleuze and Guattari, Laing does not make a sufficient distinction between 
social and mental alienation, and they consider the family to be utilised within 
Laing’s work as a way of showing how these two forms of alienation are related. 
The above criticism is followed by a footnote to a piece of Cooper’s work.44 The 
problem of the differentiation between social and mental alienation, and between 
different social contexts, are sound points to raise. Laing provides a statement 
regarding this issue in his paper entitled ‘The Obvious’, which he presented at 
The Dialectics of Liberation conference in 1967, alongside Cooper and Marcuse.   
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We have a theoretical and practical problem of finding the 
mediations between the different levels of contexts: between 
the different systems and metasystems, extending all the way 
from the smallest micro- to the largest macro-social systems.45 
Laing clearly was aware that there is no simplistic, neat fit between social and 
mental alienation. The family’s role as a mediator between the social and 
individual levels can be contested. A family may not share the wider social 
norms of the culture that they live in. Deleuze and Guattari’s suggestion for a 
way of viewing this relation is that it is ‘an included disjunction.’46 This idea 
suggests that there is a relationship between social and mental alienation, but that 
this relation is a complex one. 
                                              The impression that social and mental alienation are 
considered in a linear relation, and are viewed as almost identical through the 
transmission of these forms of alienation by the family misses Laing’s critique of 
the educational system in The Politics of Experience, which is as fierce as his 
critique of the repressive nature of the family. Laing views schooling itself as a 
means of creating self-alienation.  
The condition of alienation…is the condition of the normal 
man. 
         Society highly values its normal man. It educates 
children to lose themselves and to become absurd, and thus to 
be normal.47  
Laing’s critique of schooling here contains a great deal of critical insight. The 
activities which children have to perform at school usually have little wider 
relevance to their own lived experience. With the length of the day spent at 
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school virtually replicating the length of the average working day in this country, 
and with both work and school usually entailing the performance of abstract 
tasks, the alienation produced by schooling can be seen as a preparation for the 
alienation that many people may experience whilst at work. Later in The Politics 
of Experience, Laing makes use of some quotations from Jules Henry which 
highlight the use of education for socialising children into a brutally competitive 
culture.48 The education system, like the family, is another mediating force 
between the individual and the wider society. 
                                                                      Here Deleuze and Guattari seem to 
have fallen slightly into the very trap that they identify – that of viewing the 
family as all-encompassing, and of transposing this view onto Laing’s work. 
Their above criticism adequately applies to the quotation from Cooper that they 
provide, but seems tangential in relation to Laing’s work. However, because their 
reading and interpretation of Laing’s work throughout Anti-Oedipus are 
considerable improvements upon those attempted by the conservative psychiatric 
critics, this criticism occurs on a more adequate overall level. The impression 
could remain with the reader that Laing is making a simplistic relation between 
social and mental alienation. Nevertheless, I would argue that this involves 
confronting a major theoretical problem of mediating between different levels of 
social contexts, which was not Laing’s primary concern in his work. As a result, 
he should not be critiqued on this basis. Laing also demonstrated his awareness 
of this issue in ‘The Obvious’, as I have earlier stated. However, despite the fact 
that Laing was aware of the macro-context, and its influence on mediating 
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agencies, such as the family and schooling, he does not closely analyse their 
relation. 
           Deleuze and Guattari’s next direct criticism of Laing also follows some 
criticism of anti-psychiatry, and of approaches to the family such as ‘…Bateson’s 
“double impasse” or double bind”.’49 After their criticisms of these perspectives, 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that: 
If there is a veritable impasse… it is the one into which the 
researcher himself is led, when he claims to assign 
schizophrenogenic social mechanisms, and at the same time to 
discover them within the order of the family, which both 
social production and the schizophrenic process escape.50 
This criticism of these theories relates to Deleuze and Guattari’s view, which I 
noted earlier, that the focus on the family within psychiatry and psychotherapy 
creates a form of reification where the focus on the family ignores the wider 
social and cultural context. In the above quotation, they suggest that 
‘schizophrenogenic social mechanisms’ cannot alone be found within the family 
because both social production and the schizophrenic process are not reducible to 
the familial order. 
                            Deleuze and Guattari then relate this argument to Laing’s work. 
 This contradiction is perhaps especially perceptible in Laing, 
because he is the most revolutionary of the antipsychiatrists. 
At the very moment he breaks with psychiatric practice, 
undertakes assigning a veritable social genesis to psychosis, 
and calls for a continuation of the “voyage” as a process and 
for a dissolution of the “normal ego,” he falls back into the 
worst familialist, personological, and egoic postulates, so that 
the remedies invoked are no more than a “sincere 
corroboration among parents,” a “recognition of the real 
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persons,” a discovery of the true ego or self as in Martin 
Buber.51           
This particular criticism, in the latter part of the above quotation, is of Self and 
Others, as is stated in their reference to this book at the end of this quotation. The 
parts placed in quotation marks are not directly taken from this text, but reflect a 
paraphrasing of Laing’s work within the parts of Self and Others that Deleuze 
and Guattari are here referring to. There are a number of problems with regard to 
this critique of Laing. Deleuze and Guattari are essentially criticising Self and 
Others for not being The Politics of Experience. The fact that these two texts are 
radically different in terms of their focus, content and tone is unfortunately not 
addressed here. It is highly inappropriate to lump these texts together in this 
fashion, which ignores the lines of development of certain concepts within the 
majority of Laing’s work. 
                                         As I have previously mentioned in this chapter, both 
the idea of schizophrenia as some form of enlightenment, and the idea of the 
voyage originate within The Divided Self and Self and Others, but do not receive 
a fully comprehensive treatment until The Politics of Experience. The 
chronology of the publications of Laing’s texts is ignored here by Deleuze and 
Guattari. However, the order of publication of these texts in France may have 
been different to that in this country. In the ‘reference notes’ section at the end of 
Anti-Oedipus, Self and Others is noted as having a later date of publication than 
The Politics of Experience. The latter text is given the publication date of 1967,52 
which is the original date of first publication in this country, whereas Self and 
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Others is given the date of publication of 1970,53 which is nine years later than 
its first publication in the United Kingdom. The above criticism may have 
originated from this different sequence of publication in France. Self and Others 
would no doubt be something of a deflation for theorists who have been so keen 
to engage with the more controversial and radical aspects of Laing’s thought. 
However, an original date of first publication is usually provided within books in 
the information about the publisher, so it seems sloppy for Deleuze and Guattari 
not to make this chronological distinction between these texts, and between the 
level of development of the ideas contained in them.  
                                                                                  A further issue with this 
particular criticism, and specifically the accusation that Laing falls back into 
familialism in Self and Others, is that it contradicts two other pieces of 
commentary on Laing by Deleuze and Guattari where they make the assertion 
that Laing does escape what they see as the trap of the exclusive focus upon the 
family within psychology and psychiatry. I have referred to one of these 
comments earlier, where Deleuze and Guattari claim that only Jaspers and Laing 
have truly understood the voyage, ‘…and so escaped the familialism that is the 
ordinary bed and board of psychoanalysis and psychiatry.’54 Within an earlier 
section of critique of the view of the family as mediating wider social alienation 
through to the family member, Deleuze and Guattari state the following. 
It seems to us that such a viewpoint is present even in Cooper. 
(In this respect Laing is better able to disengage himself from 
familialism, thanks to the resources of a flux from the 
Orient.)55 
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On two occasions, Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate large inconsistencies 
between their praise for Laing, and their criticism of his work. They do not make 
clear whether they consider Laing to escape closed familialism or not. An 
additional inconsistency lies between their positive consideration of Laing’s 
Eastern influences upon his thought in the above quotation, and between the 
section that follows their critique of Laing as falling back into familialism in Self 
and Others.  
Even more than the hostility of traditional authorities, perhaps 
this is the source of the actual failure of the antipsychiatric 
undertakings, of their co-optional for the benefit of 
adaptational forms of familial psychotherapy and of 
community psychiatry, and of Laing’s own retreat to the 
Orient.56 
In a similar manner to Deleuze and Guattari’s incoherence regarding the 
strengths and weaknesses of Laing’s work in terms of its level of familialism, a 
contradiction is also present between their praise for the Eastern influence upon 
Laing’s thought, and between the above critique. Here it could be argued that in 
the above quotation, they are referring more to Laing’s actual time spent in Sri 
Lanka (then Ceylon), which was (allegedly) a source of dissatisfaction to the Left 
at the time. This specific critique will be dealt with later on, when I examine 
Sedgwick’s criticism of Laing.  
                                                However, these differing views on Laing’s Eastern 
influences do not sit easily together. If this influence upon Laing’s work is 
considered to be a benefit by Deleuze and Guattari, then why should they view 
Laing moving to that part of the world as a signal of failure? Would it not rather 
be an example of Laing’s commitment to practising meditation, which can 
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facilitate an individual moving beyond their ego-bound state, something which 
Deleuze and Guattari view as necessary? The main issue here is that Deleuze and 
Guattari have produced the effect of nullifying their own critique of Laing by 
containing arguments within Anti-Oedipus that directly contradict their criticism. 
This then renders their critique into a state of incoherence. I find this to be 
extremely disappointing, given the extent of their engagement and thinking with 
regard to Laing’s ideas. It could be noted that Anti-Oedipus is a voluminous 
tome, and that these contradictions may have slipped under the authors’ 
awareness. However, this cannot be justified on an academic level. It would be 
preferable if Deleuze and Guattari did not accuse Laing’s work of suffering from 
a serious ‘contradiction’,57 when one is apparent between their praise and 
criticism of Laing’s theories. 
                                             I will now briefly summarise the nature of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s direct criticisms of Laing. Their three main criticisms of Laing are 
as follows. 1) Within his work, the process itself is insufficiently politicized. 2) 
Social and mental alienation are viewed in a linear relation, with the family 
simplistically mediating wider social alienation through to the child or family 
member. 3) A paradox occurs within Laing’s work between his transcendence of 
familialism in The Politics of Experience, and his alleged return to it in Self and 
Others. My previous review of these criticisms in this section has identified a 
number of weaknesses with regard to these critiques. These weaknesses severely 
undermine the validity of their attempted criticisms of Laing. Additionally, the 
distinction made between Laing and Cooper’s work could be more precisely 
stated. Deleuze and Guattari’s reference to Laing as an anti-psychiatrist does not 
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aid this distinction being made with sufficient clarity. Their critique of Laing and 
Cooper as insufficiently politicizing the process appears to view these authors as 
one homogenous mass, whose ideas exactly replicate one another’s. I have set 
out the key differences between Laing and Cooper’s work in my previous section 
on Clare’s critique of Laing. Given the nature of these differences, it is therefore 
a mistake to conflate Cooper’s work with that of Laing. As a methodological 
principle for the operation of a grounded and valid critique, such distinctions 
must be made in order to avoid the error of criticising an author on the basis of 
another’s work. In a similar manner, a coherent critique must also clearly 
distinguish between different aspects of different texts, recognise their original 
chronology, and show an awareness of the development of concepts throughout 
an author’s work. These principles are lacking in Deleuze and Guattari’s direct 
criticism of Laing, in addition to the further issues that I have raised in this 
section. 
           However, these criticisms can be seen as productive in some respects. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s raising of the problematic issue of mediating between 
different levels of context introduces the notion of a gap within theoretical 
discourse with regard to this matter. As I have already stated, Laing should not 
be criticised on this basis, since he did not set out to address this issue as the 
main focus of his work. Deleuze and Guattari’s criticism that Laing lapses into 
familialism could be supported (on a surface reading) by the fact that Laing 
produced a text entitled The Politics of the Family (1969). Nevertheless, I would 
like to argue that Laing’s work, including the latter text,58 does move beyond an 
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exclusive focus upon the family, even if comprehensive statements upon the 
relation of social alienation to the family are not provided and developed. 
Some Additional Comments 
 
The fact that Anti-Oedipus is arguably the most Laingian text that I have read by 
an author who was not a direct colleague of Laing’s adds a further level of 
disappointment to the poverty of their critique of Laing.59 The introduction to 
this text by Mark Seem refers to Laing a number of times.60 Within the 
introduction, Seem notes that Deleuze and Guattari’s view of the journey goes 
much further than Laing’s does.61 A Sartrean influence is also apparent upon 
Anti-Oedipus, particularly the late Sartre of Between Existentialism and Marxism 
(1974) and Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960). The latter text was 
summarised by Laing in his co-authored text with Cooper,62 Reason and 
Violence (1964), which Sartre praised as being ‘…a very clear, very faithful 
account of my thought.’63 Deleuze and Guattari make a distinction in Anti-
Oedipus between two different sorts of groups, the subjugated group, and the 
subject-group,64 which has parallels with Sartre’s analysis (as explained by 
Laing) in Critique of Dialectical Reason of the differences between the series, as 
a form of grouping, and the group-in-fusion.65 This link is strengthened by a 
reference to Critique of Dialectical Reason within Deleuze and Guattari’s 
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discussion of groups,66 although the influence had become apparent to me whilst 
reading Anti-Oedipus.  
                                                   In Deleuze and Guattari’s formulation of these 
two groups, the subjugated group is self-explanatory. The subject-group, 
however, is a liberated, revolutionary form of grouping. In Reason and Violence, 
Laing sets out the differences between Sartre’s alternate concepts of groups. The 
following example of a series as a group formation is given. 
Consider a group of persons waiting for a bus… They are a 
plurality of solitudes… The girl in a hurry on her way to the 
office, the man absorbed in his newspaper, and the other 
members of the queue, are all in their own worlds, and they 
live their present relationship to each other as members of the 
queue negatively, that is, they take no notice of each other 
except as a number in a quantitative series.67 
The group as series is a formation of individuals who lack a true group unity, 
they only form a group because of a negative relation, such as waiting for a bus, 
in the above example. ‘…A series finds its tentative unity in an object held in 
common by each member of the series.’68 Such seriality is expanded upon further 
in Reason and Violence as also encompassing forms of conduct and concepts. 
The evidence of a serial idea is in my double incapacity to 
verify it or to transform it in the others. Its opacity, my 
powerlessness to change it in the other, my own and the 
other’s lack of doubt about it, are offered as evidence of its 
truth. The ideas of racialism and colonialism are such serial 
ideas.69 
 The group as series, and serial ideas are akin to forms of alienation. The concept 
of the serial idea links to reified notions, which have become ingrained ways of 
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thinking. These unquestioned ideas have as their basis of ‘proof’ the very fact 
that they are accepted uncritically. The transformation of a series into a group 
proper occurs through the group becoming fused through praxis, through its own 
action, and through ‘…the resurrection of freedom.’70 There is more of a parallel 
between the group-in-fusion and Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the subject-
group, than straightforwardly between the series and the subjugated group. 
Nevertheless, the philosophical enquiry into the nature of the human group forms 
a major line of investigation which runs between Sartre and Laing’s work, and 
that of Deleuze and Guattari, which is worth noting. A subjugated group could 
take the form of a series, if the subjugated group was formed only through 
having an object held in common by its members. 
                                                                            A parallel between these authors 
also appears in Deleuze and Guattari’s reference to the chapter entitled ‘The Man 
with the Tape-Recorder’ in Between Existentialism and Marxism by Sartre. 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that: 
…the benevolent neutrality of the analyst is very limited: it 
ceases the instant one stops responding daddy-mommy. It 
ceases the instant one introduces a little desiring-machine – 
the tape-recorder – into the analyst’s office…71 
‘The Man with the Tape-Recorder’ was originally published in Les Temps 
Modernes in 1969 and proved to be hugely controversial.72 It is composed of four 
texts, which centre around a transcription of a conversation entitled 
‘Psychoanalytic Dialogue’ between a patient (‘A’, who provided the title for the 
                                               
70
 ibid, p.132. It is worth noting that the influence of the later Sartre upon Laing is highly 
apparent in the use of the term ‘praxis’ in Sanity, Madness and the Family, and within other 
theoretical developments. 
71
 Anti-Oedipus, p.312 
72
 Sartre, J-P, (1974), Between Existentialism and Marxism, (trans. J. Matthews), London, 
Verso, pp.198-223 
 94 
piece) who made the decision to tape-record their discourse, and a psychoanalyst 
(‘Dr X’), which occurs within the analyst’s office. It is introduced by Sartre, with 
replies to his comments following the dialogue from Pontalis and Pingaud, both 
of whom were members of the editorial board of Les Temps Modernes, and 
disagreed with ‘…the journal’s decision to publish the tape-recorded document 
in question.’73 The context for the dialogue is that ‘A’ has been a patient of ‘Dr 
X’s’ for some time, and whilst in a session with the analyst, ‘A’ decides to get 
out a tape-recorder because ‘A’ wants the analyst to explain why he has not been 
able to either help or cure ‘A’. As ‘A’ puts it, he wants to ‘…make the 
psychoanalysts stand trial now…’74 The ‘benevolent neutrality of the analyst’ (as 
Deleuze and Guattari call it) can be seen to evaporate as soon as the tape-
recorder is introduced into the session. The analyst reacts badly to the bringing in 
of the tape-recorder, immediately becomes angry about it, and asks ‘A’ to ‘cut it 
out’.75 ‘A’ argues that the doctor is frightened of the machine and its 
implications, when the analyst tries to ring the police because of this situation, 
and then proceeds to accuse ‘A’ of being violent and dangerous. 
                                                                                                     This dialogue has 
parallels with Laing’s statement in The Politics of Experience (following his 
critique of Kraepelinian clinical examination) that: 
A feature of the interplay between psychiatrist and patient is 
that if the patient’s part is taken out of context… it might 
seem very odd… 
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    But if one ceases to identify with the clinical posture, and 
looks at the psychiatrist-patient couple without such 
presuppositions, then it is difficult to sustain this naïve view 
of the situation.76 
In the example of ‘The Man with the Tape-Recorder’, even without abstracting 
this conversation from its wider context, the analyst’s reactions to the use of the 
tape-recorder ‘seem very odd’, compared to the patient’s demands for an 
explanation of why he is kept in a powerless situation in relation to the analyst, 
and why no improvement to his condition has been made. Indeed, ‘A’ seems to 
be attempting to reclaim some power over this situation. The role reversal which 
occurs within this dialogue (which is noted in Sartre’s introduction77), with the 
patient taking command and the analyst having to make the attempt to deal with 
this is striking. ‘A’s’ comments and questions seem far more coherent than the 
responses of the psychoanalyst, who ends up screaming for help at the end of the 
conversation. 
                    The conversation is both hilarious and disturbing, with the latter 
aspect being most apparent in the dismal lack of reciprocity between these two 
individuals. The doctor may well have been frightened, and with some reason. 
The exact physical movements of the patient and doctor are only briefly outlined, 
with it being noted that the telephone had been knocked onto the floor after the 
doctor attempted to dial 999,78 and with ‘A’ strategically leaning against the only 
door in the office later in the conversation,79 to prevent the analyst’s escape. 
However, one wonders whether ‘Dr X’ could have made more of an attempt to 
explain to the patient exactly what his objections clearly were to the use of the 
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tape-recorder, rather than over-reacting immediately. Sartre refers to Laing in his 
introduction to the conversation.  
A…, the indisputable subject of this episode, might find valid 
interlocutors in England or in Italy: a new generation of 
psychiatrists are seeking to establish a bond of reciprocity 
between themselves and those they are treating.80 
A translator’s note added to the above quotation states that this is ‘a reference to 
the work of Ronald Laing and others in London, and of… Basaglia…’81 I am 
unaware of any direct allusion to ‘The Man with the Tape-Recorder’ within 
Laing’s work, but given his immense knowledge of Sartre, he would have been 
aware of it.  
                I now wish to finish this chapter with some concluding comments on 
Deleuze and Guattari’s use and critique of Laing, and with some further 
methodological comments upon the principles for an adequate critique. However, 
first I would like to note that Laing lists Anti-Oedipus in the bibliography for his 
last published theoretical work The Voice of Experience (1982).82 No direct 
quotations from Anti-Oedipus are found within The Voice of Experience, despite 
this listing. Guattari is also mentioned in the ‘acknowledgements’ section at the 
beginning of that text, as having participated in conversations with Laing on the 
themes of that book. Despite this, Laing is scathing with regard to Guattari in 
Mullan’s Mad to be Normal. In a discussion about alternative therapeutic 
communities in other countries, Laing makes the following allegations about 
Guattari’s efforts in that direction. 
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Guattari in Paris, he was the director of the so-called 
therapeutic community, and on the one hand he was playing 
this as a development of a Cooperesque anti-psychiatry sort of 
thing. But in practice it was fuck all, it was just like any other 
psychiatric clinic. He was using electric shocks.83 
It can be considered to be easier to be radical in theory than in actual practice.  
                                                    Laing’s criticism of Guattari continues later in 
Mad to be Normal. Laing claims that he and Guattari never really got on, and 
that he thought that Anti-Oedipus was ‘…just intellectual wanking.’84 Laing then 
states that Guattari asked for his autograph, but Laing turned over the piece of 
paper and ‘…found out that it was a petition to the president of France to release 
a terrorist hijacker.’85 Understandably, Laing was extremely angry about being 
tricked into nearly signing such a document. He continues: 
I thought they were all completely phoney – all the things 
Szasz might have to say about the phoney radical salon 
revolutionary left, well this was them, the Guattari crowd.86 
There is an issue of my inability to verify what Laing is saying here. The issue of 
claims being made about Laing, and of Laing’s responses to them, when these 
occur outside of his theory and actual texts, will be raised again later in this 
thesis with regard to Showalter’s critique of Laing. The problem is that I cannot 
jump into a magical time-travelling machine and check the veracity of these 
statements myself. It is problematic to rely on these sorts of accounts totally. 
However, I will lend Laing the benefit of the doubt, as I am aware from life 
experience that it is all very well to make radical claims, but it is entirely another 
matter whether these individuals actually live out their radicalism. It is clear that 
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between 1982 when The Voice of Experience was published, and 1988 when 
Mullan’s interviews with Laing took place, Laing had lost some respect for 
Guattari. The above incident, with regard to the petition, is cited by Laing, 
however, as having occurred in the early 1970s,87 so potentially Laing never 
voiced his views on Guattari prior to his interviews with Mullan.  
                                                                                                     As I have already 
stated, I found Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of Laing to be highly 
disappointing. Their engagement with Laing in terms of their development of the 
idea of the voyage does not extend into a thoughtful, relevant and direct critique. 
Their most serious error is to attempt criticism of Laing which contradicts other 
statements and praise that they have offered of his work within Anti-Oedipus. 
This cannot be seen as a valid manner of procedure for a critique. In a section of 
Anti-Oedipus where Deleuze and Guattari attempt to anticipate criticism of that 
text, they argue that: ‘…we don’t know which is better, a bad reading or no 
reading at all.’88 I do not consider the deficiencies of their critique of Laing to be 
the result of a poor or non-existent reading, because the extent of their interaction 
with Laing’s work would not be possible if they had not properly read and 
thought about his theories. Deleuze and Guattari’s above comment is more apt to 
describe the poverty of the conservative psychiatric critiques. I was hoping for 
Deleuze and Guattari to reach what can be considered as the higher level of the 
immanent critique. This is an idea that comes from Adorno. 
Our critique of the ontological need brings us to an immanent 
critique of ontology itself. We have no power over the 
philosophy of Being if we reject it generally, from outside, 
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instead of taking it on in its own structure – turning its own 
force against it, in line with Hegel’s desideratum.89 
This concept of the ‘immanent’ can be defined as ‘operating from inside a thing 
or person: not external or transcendent.’90 Therefore an immanent critique can be 
defined as a critique which operates from within a theory itself, ‘turning its own 
force against it’. 
                         Deleuze and Guattari themselves mention a similar concept to the 
idea of the immanent critique when they refer to the notion of the ‘autocritique’, 
which involves leading a theory ‘…to the point of its self-critique.’91 
Unfortunately their critique of Laing fails to embrace this idea. Although they are 
aware that there are differences between Laing and Cooper’s work, many of their 
criticisms seem more appropriately directed at Cooper, with the criticism of 
Laing tacked on to this. A further serious error committed by Deleuze and 
Guattari, other than manifesting a huge contradiction between their praise and 
criticism, consists in ignoring the original chronology of the publication of 
Laing’s work, as they do with criticising Self and Others as lapsing into what 
they view as problems that were transcended in The Politics of Experience. 
However, Deleuze and Guattari are stronger in their critique of anti-psychiatry, 
and raise some valid points for debate, such as the means of conceiving 
theoretically the nature of the relation between social and mental alienation. 
Their exegesis of the nature of the voyage is commendable. It is laudable to see 
some engagement with this concept. The next two chapters will investigate the 
feminist critiques of Laing. 
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5) Feminist Critiques of Laing I 
 
This chapter, along with the following one, will evaluate the feminist critiques of 
Laing by Juliet Mitchell in Psychoanalysis and Feminism (1974), and Elaine 
Showalter in The Female Malady (1985). Furthermore, I will be presenting my 
own arguments for a feminist reading of Laing, in the seventh chapter, which is 
intended to argue against the feminist critiques. Mitchell’s discussion and 
critique of Laing’s work occurs within two substantial sections of Psychoanalysis 
and Feminism. Her critique of Laing is much greater in scope and depth than 
those previously examined in this thesis. Her criticism avoids some common 
errors that I have identified in the critiques of Laing so far. Nevertheless, some 
aspects of her critique are problematic.  
Mitchell’s Critique of Laing 
 
Mitchell’s discussion of Laing forms the basis of seven chapters of 
Psychoanalysis and Feminism, with an additional preceding section which places 
Laing’s thought within the broader historical context of post-World War Two 
Britain. Her first theoretical chapter is entitled “A ‘Science of Persons’”, which is 
taken from the title of the first chapter of The Divided Self, and deals with the 
formulation of this within Laing’s work. 
Criticism of The Divided Self and Self and Others 
 
 I have noted previously, in my section on Clare, that The Divided Self tends to 
receive less criticism than Laing’s later works. However, Mitchell suggests that 
this text is not as unproblematic as the lack of other critiques would suggest. She 
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provides a quotation from Laing’s critique of Freud in The Divided Self where 
Laing suggests that Freud used his theories as ‘an instrument of defence’1 against 
the ‘terrors’ of dealing with mental distress. Mitchell argues that: 
…at that stage Laing’s wish to break down the defence-barrier 
between the scientist and the object of his research… 
extended only to empathizing and treating as authentic 
experience all that the psychotic claimed to feel; the psychotic 
is the person with misunderstood problems, but problems 
nonetheless.2 
I do consider this criticism of Laing’s first text to be valid. Within The Divided 
Self the reader is taken on a journey into what the experience of the 
schizophrenic is like, but there is a distancing that occurs where Laing’s 
presentation of the material suggests that schizophrenia is something that 
happens to others rather than to the reader, the author or other ‘normal’ 
individuals.3 However, in the praise of The Divided Self it is never mentioned 
that this is an extremely dark and claustrophobic book in terms of its tone, which 
is undoubtedly occasioned by the content of the text.  
                                                                                   Mitchell puts forward an 
additional similar criticism of The Divided Self later in this chapter. 
At this stage in Laing’s thought schizophrenic symptoms may 
certainly be intelligible, but the schizophrenia is still there, 
and that minority of people who thus regard themselves as 
automata ‘are rightly regarded as crazy’.4 
Again, I regard this as a legitimate criticism of this text. Since The Divided Self is 
the closest to conventional psychiatry of all Laing’s works, it may have received 
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less criticism than his more radical works. As it was his first published work, as a 
young psychiatrist, Laing’s thinking in this text has yet to make the substantial 
breaks with standard psychiatric thought that are found in his later work. 
Nevertheless, some aspects of The Divided Self do make important advances, 
such as the attempt to enter into the patient’s world and to not discount their 
experiences and speech as invalid.  
                                                     It is worth noting that Laing stated in a 1978 
interview that he had written The Divided Self as an expression of his discontent 
with his chosen profession of psychiatry. ‘“If I hadn’t had the capacity to express 
myself in writing, I would have blown my top.”’5 The Divided Self can be viewed 
as a transitional work, where the tensions between Laing’s criticism of psychiatry 
and his interest in the subject have yet to evolve into his transcendence of 
conventional psychiatric thought. Mitchell’s critique of Laing is based upon a 
thorough reading of all of Laing’s work up until the date of first publication of 
Psychoanalysis and Feminism in 1974. Mitchell’s reading of Laing is admirable 
as it enables her to avoid some (but not all) of the pitfalls that I have identified 
with the previous critiques of Laing that I have analysed. For the most part, her 
interpretation of Laing’s theories is correct, and is supported by textual evidence 
in the form of direct quotations from Laing which are not abstracted from their 
context. Mitchell’s reading of Laing is not restricted to his most well-known 
texts. She additionally evaluates texts such as Reason and Violence, and 
Interpersonal Perception (1966), which are not usually considered by critics of 
Laing. This substantial reading of Laing’s oeuvre enables Mitchell to trace the 
lines of development of ideas throughout Laing’s work, which I identified in the 
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previous chapter as a necessary component of a scholarly critique of an author’s 
texts.  
        Mitchell suggests that there is a considerable change in thought that occurs 
between the viewpoints and concepts presented in The Divided Self and Self and 
Others. She argues that in The Divided Self, the patient’s 
…symptoms express a way of interacting; but by the next 
book… Self and Others … the way of interacting is the 
‘disease’. This shifting emphasis – indeed, changing 
conception – is marked by a new definition of the field: the 
relationship between how we behave and how others 
experience our behaviour and we experience theirs.6 
Mitchell identifies earlier in this chapter that the relation between behaviour and 
experience is a key aspect of Laing’s ‘science of persons’.7 The Divided Self and 
Self and Others certainly are very different texts. However, these works were 
originally intended by Laing ‘…to be one book or one book in the form of 
volume one and volume two. But the publishers wanted them separated as two 
books.’8 The differences between these texts are composed from the different 
objectives of each one. The Divided Self’s purpose is to make schizophrenia 
comprehensible through offering a theory of the splitting of the self, and through 
a phenomenological account of the experience of the condition. The purpose of 
Self and Others is to offer an interpersonal theory of human relations in terms of 
both experience and action. The latter text, in a similar vein to The Divided Self, 
tends to receive little critique, with the exception of Deleuze and Guattari.  
                                                           Nevertheless, Mitchell offers some criticism 
of Self and Others. She argues that the distinctions that Laing makes with regard 
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to the falsity and / or truth of behaviour and experience are not clearly drawn 
within Self and Others, and that thus ‘…Laing’s language gets a bit confused.’9 It 
is fair to say that on occasions Laing does not fully explain what he means, and 
that his sentence construction can be over-long. Mitchell provides an example 
from Laing’s work to illustrate her criticism.  
If we examine carefully Laing’s use of the term ‘experience’ 
we can see that he uses it in two ways which often have a 
tendency to be either contradictory or mutually exclusive. 
‘Experience’ as a noun, is thus Laing’s existential, essentialist 
‘existence’ – always ‘true’ – and experience as a verb is to 
perceive or conceive of something and these conceptions can 
play us true or false.10 
This point raised by Mitchell is not something that had struck me before with 
regard to Laing’s use of the term ‘experience’. It is common for words to have 
more than one typical usage in the English language, and these different uses are 
not then seen as contradictory. I am happy to share Mitchell’s concern that some 
of Laing’s writing could be more precisely stated. However, I do not consider his 
specific use of the term ‘experience’ to be problematic in the way that Mitchell 
states. Nevertheless, her semantic quibbling here and the progress that her 
argument takes following the above quotation introduces two lines of critique 
which are present throughout her two large sections on Laing entitled ‘R.D. 
Laing: The Family of Man, I and II’. The first is her argument that a confusion 
and a lack of clarity is present in Laing’s work. The second is that Laing’s 
‘science of persons’ is insubstantial and not really a science at all. I wish to deal 
with this latter line of critique first. 
                                               
9
 Psychoanalysis and Feminism, p.243 
10
 ibid 
 105 
Criticism of Laing’s ‘Science of Persons’ 
 
 Mitchell argues that due to her perceived problem with Laing’s use of the term 
‘experience’ as a verb, this has the result of degrading Laing’s ‘science of 
persons’ to a lesser status than an evaluation of the relation between behaviour 
and experience. 
So really Laing’s achieved ‘science of persons’ amounts to his 
demonstrating the difference between behaviour and 
perception of behaviour – the project he set himself to 
analyse. Given his premises, it is ultimately only possible to 
show, at the most, the degrees of disjuncture that occur…11 
The implicit criticism here is that Laing’s ‘science of persons’ is a limited 
undertaking. A recurring problem with the criticism of Laing (and one that I will 
return to later in this chapter) is that Laing appears to be expected to have done 
absolutely everything, and to have covered all possible angles of research. I find 
it probable that if a theorist has made some important contributions, as Laing has, 
then this sort of expectation is more likely to be generated. It is understandable 
that critics should raise such points, as their own views are brought to bear upon 
Laing’s work. However, this cannot form the basis of a valid critique of Laing. 
The limited nature of his ‘science of persons’ as set out by Mitchell achieves a 
sufficient level of analysis to highlight the issues that arise when a person’s 
behaviour is perceived as the result of an illness, rather than as an intelligible 
response to being placed in an intolerable interpersonal situation. 
                                                                                                      Mitchell’s 
critique of Laing’s ‘science of persons’ includes the criticism that confusion is 
present within Laing’s schemata for this concept. This next critique is located 
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within a chapter entitled ‘Laing and Psychoanalysis’, which is valuable in terms 
of its analysis of the relationship between Laing’s work and that of Freud. 
Mitchell puts forward the argument that: 
The nature of the ‘object’ is the primary confusion in Laing’s 
‘science of persons’. It is precisely what makes it not a 
science, or even the beginnings of one. Looking at a person 
and saying ‘that’s our object’ is like looking at the sky. Laing 
has got caught up in his protest against treating a person as ‘an 
object’… and merely transposed his ‘cleansed’ object into the 
object of science.12 
Her criticism here appears to be directed at Laing’s statement in The Divided Self 
that: 
If it is held that to be unbiased one should be ‘objective’ in the 
sense of depersonalizing the person who is the ‘object’ of our 
study, any temptation to do this under the impression that one 
is thereby being scientific must be rigorously resisted.13 
Mitchell’s conception of science, which she criticises Laing for not adhering to, 
is far closer to conventional positivist science than Laing’s suggestions for the 
principles of a ‘science of persons’. Here she omits the influence of 
phenomenology upon Laing’s work, which provides the reason for Laing’s 
refusal to view the individual within standard scientific methodology. Mitchell 
argues that: ‘An a priori existent object, in this case a person, is not an ‘object’ 
of science until it is transformed by the knowledge that is brought to bear on it.’14 
She then proceeds to put forward the view that only when the defining feature of 
the object of study has been isolated can it become a correct object of scientific 
study.15 One can see the point that she is making, in that a specific aspect of a 
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person requires definition before it can become an object of scientific 
investigation. 
                     However, it is a principle of Laing’s ‘science of persons’ that the 
researcher must take care in this respect that they are not simply imposing a view 
onto their object of study, under the illusion that they are therefore being 
scientific. This is an issue of special relevance when it comes to the study of the 
human being, as to extrapolate certain features of the person means to ignore 
other inter-related elements. As Laing notes: 
There is a common illusion that one somehow increases one’s 
understanding of a person if one can translate a personal 
understanding of him into the impersonal terms of a sequence 
or system of it-processes.16 
Mitchell’s criticism here has the unusual aspect of criticising Laing on the basis 
of what he himself criticises. By a ‘science of persons’, Laing is not referring to 
the creation of another form of conventional science. The transformation of the 
object of study into its defining features is not the aim of Laing’s ‘existential-
phenomenological’ method. The aim of this method runs in the opposite 
direction to that stated by Mitchell, as Laing’s project is to attempt to investigate 
the phenomena of schizophrenia, without placing unnecessary constructions 
upon it. 
Existential phenomenology attempts to characterize the nature 
of a person’s experience of his world and himself. It is not so 
much an attempt to describe particular objects of experience 
as to set all particular experiences within the context of his 
whole being-in-his-world.17  
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                                            There are further problematic elements contained in 
this particular critique of Mitchell’s. Firstly, given her considerable reading of 
Laing’s work, these issues with this specific criticism should have been apparent 
to her. Mitchell provides a quotation from The Politics of Experience where 
Laing makes an explicit statement regarding his views on the composition of a 
science in her chapter on the ‘science of persons’. He states that:  
Natural science is concerned only with the observer’s 
experience of things. Never with the way things experience 
us… 
Natural science knows nothing of the relation between 
behaviour and experience… But this relation is the copula of 
our science – if science means a form of knowledge adequate 
to its subject.18 
Since Laing has identified that positivist science is an inadequate method for the 
study of human mental distress, he puts forward the argument that to be scientific 
means using a form of inquiry which is appropriate in terms of what is being 
studied. Mitchell’s above criticism runs counter to her previous identification of 
Laing’s views on the nature of a ‘science of persons’, and the fact that she 
correctly elucidates Laing’s critique of science in relation to the study of the 
human itself.  
Laing makes three quite clear objections to previous scientific 
procedure: the language of science dissects the whole man – 
in his total selfhood; all sciences treat the individual as 
isolated from other individuals; human sciences mimic natural 
sciences in treating people as ‘mechanical things’, simply 
because they are the objects of study…19 
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However, there is some limited validity to Mitchell’s criticism, if it is taken to 
refer to a plea for greater clarity on behalf of Laing in terms of stating what 
aspects of the human he is analysing.  
                                                         A further problematic facet of this element of 
Mitchell’s critique is her assumption that psychoanalysis itself is a science, and is 
more scientific than Laing’s theories. She presents the assertion that Freud’s 
concept of the unconscious has a greater scientific basis than Laing’s ‘science of 
persons’.20 She then proceeds to argue that: 
It is not, in fact, Laing’s radicalism that is antithetical to the 
spirit of Freud’s work; it is its ‘scientific’ claims that go 
counter to psychoanalysis as to other sciences. As Freud said: 
‘The true beginning of scientific activity consists… in 
describing phenomena and then in proceeding to group, 
classify and correlate them. But Laing…does everything he 
can to restore things to their pristine, unanalysed condition.21 
This provides an additional example of Mitchell’s ignorance of the aims of 
phenomenology, despite her awareness of this influence upon Laing’s work.22 
Her consideration that psychoanalysis is more scientific than Laing’s theories 
appears to have the sole foundation that psychoanalysis attempts to mimic 
positivist science, in a way that phenomenological studies seek to avoid. As 
Laing argues: 
Too many, not all, psychoanalysts plunge right in and out of a 
revolving door at the threshold of phenomenology, and a 
second lunge carries others right away from science of any 
kind.23 
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 The modus operandi of phenomenology is not to place unnecessary 
constructions upon what is being studied. The methods of grouping, classifying 
and correlating, especially when carried out through the doctrine of 
psychoanalysis, run entirely counter to Laing’s intentions for the study of the 
human individual. As Mitchell’s career changed from that of an academic to 
training as a psychoanalysis a few years before the publication of Psychoanalysis 
and Feminism,24 she appears to let her regard for Freud’s work nullify any 
greater reflexive awareness in terms of her comparison of the scientific basis of 
Freud and Laing’s work.  
                                       The view that psychoanalysis constitutes a science has 
become a serial (or received) idea. Laing himself critiques this notion.  
Freud’s development of metapsychology… drew its impetus 
from the attempt to see man as an object of natural scientific 
investigation, and thus to win acceptance for psychoanalysis 
as a serious and respectable enterprise. I do not think such a 
shield is now necessary; or even, that it ever was. And the 
price paid when one thinks in metapsychological terms is 
high.25 
Mitchell has become confused by the imitation of science by psychoanalysis, and 
by the adoption of scientific methods by psychoanalysis, to the extent that she 
considers psychoanalysis therefore to be a science. One of Laing’s contributions 
to the critique of psychoanalysis is his identification of these shields and defence 
mechanisms contained within psychoanalytic theory. This is put forward in the 
above quotation, and in the instance referred to earlier, in The Divided Self, 
where Laing argues that: 
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Freud… carried with him his theory as a Medusa’s head 
which turned these terrors [of dealing with mental distress] to 
stone… We must see if we can now survive without using a 
theory that is in some measure an instrument of defence.26  
The mimicking of the methods of natural science, and the operation of a 
dogmatic theoretical system by psychoanalysis are identified by Laing as ways 
that it tries to defend itself and assume a respectable guise. It should have been 
apparent to Mitchell, given her reading of Laing, her awareness of his criticism 
of positivist science, and largely correct interpretation of Laing’s work, that 
Laing’s ‘science of persons’ was never intended to be a science in the standard 
meaning of that term. It is surprising that a full comprehension of this is never 
achieved in her analysis.  
                                      There are no concrete grounds for her assumption that 
psychoanalysis is more of a science than Laing’s theories. Deleuze and Guattari’s 
critique of psychoanalysis is worth recalling here, as they argue that 
psychoanalysis is in fact highly unscientific.  
At its most autistic, psychoanalysis is no longer measured 
against any reality, it no longer opens to any outside, but 
becomes itself the test of reality and the guarantor of its own 
test…27 
Psychoanalysis, from my perspective, is largely an example of hypostatization, 
of treating something conceptual as though it were real. The unconscious itself, 
which Mitchell claims as one of Freud’s most scientific discoveries28, is a good 
example of this. Laing’s critique of the idea of unconscious experience in the 
first chapter of Self and Others raises the problem that psychoanalysis itself is 
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based upon inferences. This is because a person cannot experience the experience 
of the other. ‘Yet the whole of psychoanalytic theory rests upon the validity of 
such inferences; if they are wrong, everything built upon them loses its raison 
d’être.’29 Additionally, Laing argues here that because of the requirement to 
make such inferences, psychological theories are dealing with phenomena that lie 
outside of the realm of natural science. ‘No branch of natural science requires to 
make the peculiar type of inferences that are required in a science of persons.’30 
In consideration of this fact, the suggestion can be presented that such inferences 
may be liable to have a greater validity if they are not made through the use of a 
closed theoretical system such as psychoanalysis because of the danger, that 
Laing sets out, of making interpretations which are incorrect, and which have no 
relevance to the individual concerned.  
                                                            Mitchell’s psychoanalytic persuasion 
produces a related set of criticisms of Laing which proceed along the line that he 
does not engage sufficiently with psychoanalytic theory on its own terms. 
Despite her consciousness that Laing sets ‘…himself up in opposition to most 
generally accepted tenets of psychoanalysis’,31 including the idea of the 
unconscious, Mitchell nevertheless criticises Laing for not taking into account 
specific aspects of Freudian theory. She draws some similarities between Laing 
and Freud in terms of the assertion of both of ‘…the continuum between sanity 
and madness…’ She then goes on to suggest that Laing does not make a 
substantial difference between neurosis and psychosis in his work.32 This clearly 
was not Laing’s aim. The study of the neuroses has received more attention than 
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that of the psychoses historically within psychiatry and psychology. Laing’s 
focus is on making forms of psychosis, such as schizophrenia, comprehensible, 
rather than on studying types of neurosis. Mitchell then suggests that: 
It is, of course, possible that Laing, in company with some 
other analysts, implicitly regards psychosis merely as a more 
severe form of neurosis. Such a position seems to me not to 
recognize that the later event of the Oedipus complex – the 
nucleus of the neurosis – is an ever-in-waiting ‘overlay’.33 
                                             Such a criticism would be appropriate had Laing 
attempted to fit his theories into a psychoanalytic framework. However, Laing 
does not do this, and the Oedipus complex is not referred to in his work in any 
positive manner. Therefore, Mitchell either needs to explain further why she 
considers that Laing should use this concept, or she needs to acknowledge the 
fact that Laing would not have used this idea, due to the fact that he regards 
psychoanalytic concepts as obscuring more fundamental issues in patients’ lives. 
Instead, Mitchell assumes that the imposition on her behalf of a psychoanalytic 
frame of reference on to Laing’s work has a self-evident validity. This constitutes 
one of her most serious errors in her critique of Laing, which is compounded by 
her (otherwise) fairly accurate explanation of his work. It is as though Mitchell’s 
respect for psychoanalysis blinds her to Laing’s critique of it, which she deals 
with only very briefly. 
                                  Earlier in her chapter on ‘Laing and Psychoanalysis’, 
Mitchell criticises Laing for ‘…conflating some Freudian concepts with more 
generally debased and popular notions deriving from these.’34 Here I am 
reminded of Fromm’s retort to Marcuse’s critique of his work in Eros and 
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Civilisation (1956). Fromm accuses Marcuse of making ‘…elementary mistakes 
in presenting Freudian concepts.’35 It appears to be a popular response to make 
the claim that an author’s interpretation of psychoanalytic ideas does not 
conform to the orthodox view. No doubt such issues are likely to arise with 
psychoanalysis making use of such a complex jargon.36 However, it is not my 
concern here to engage in an investigation of whether Laing’s use of such ideas 
in the paragraph from Self and Others that Mitchell cites37 conform to the 
standard psychoanalytic doctrine. What is my concern is to identify the arbitrary 
nature of the criticisms that Mitchell makes through her failure to bring to bear 
Laing’s critique of psychoanalysis on to her analysis of Laing’s work.  
                                                                                                             She takes 
issue with Laing’s criticism of the concept of the unconscious, and his reframing 
of it as ‘…what we do not communicate, to ourselves or to one another.’38 
Mitchell considers that therefore: 
Laing thus wants to change the whole meaning of the 
psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious, making sure that 
there is nothing distinctive about it… what he is in fact doing 
destroys the entire concept.39 
Here she fails to recognise that destroying the concept of the unconscious was 
precisely what Laing wanted to do, as he considered it to be useless in terms of 
comprehending the individual. With regard to the failure of psychoanalysis to 
achieve a substantial theory of psychosis, which I have referred to earlier, in my 
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chapter on Deleuze and Guattari, Mitchell notes that Freud did have an 
‘…emergent theory thereof. Some recognition of a point of departure from the 
tentative tenets of psychoanalysis could then be expected and yet Laing offers no 
such recognition.’40 This provides a further example of Mitchell’s omission of 
Laing’s critique of psychoanalysis. Whilst it is clear that Laing respected Freud’s 
work, Laing’s work attempts to offer a radically different means for the study of 
mental distress to that of Freud. Therefore, given the extent of his critique of 
psychoanalysis, why would Laing seek to employ such bizarre ideas as the 
disavowal of castration in his work? Such a concept runs counter to Laing’s wish 
to engage with the patient in the language of persons, rather than the jargon of 
psychoanalysis. Mitchell’s critique of Laing also critically assesses this attempt 
on behalf of Laing to use the language of persons, which will be reviewed 
shortly. 
           During Mitchell’s criticism that Laing’s ‘science of persons’ is not a 
science, she elucidates a perceptive aspect of this element of Laing’s work. In a 
chapter entitled ‘The Schizophrenic World’, she observes the following. 
Laing’s ‘science of persons’ would, he hoped, be a perfectly 
homologous structure. That is, the ‘science’ would reflect its 
object. Its ‘object’ is the ‘person’ and the science must thus be 
personal… Such a reflection is not science… A science must, 
from within its own domain, offer the possibility of 
consistency and some form of proof.41 
With regard to the latter aspect of the above quotation, I consider my preceding 
discussion to be sufficient as a response. Nevertheless, Mitchell’s identification 
of the ‘homologous structure’ of Laing’s ‘science of persons’ is a particular 
aspect which I have not previously seen in other work on Laing. Her pin-pointing 
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of this enables her to then apply a critical view as to whether Laing does fully 
achieve his aim of viewing the person in personal terms.  
…Such an echoic relationship between the object and its 
science is, as we have seen, Laing’s aim: a ‘science of 
persons’ uses a language of persons. Except, of course, in… 
becoming ‘technical’ it doesn’t: process, praxis, series, nexus, 
totalization…42 
This criticism of Mitchell’s is located in a chapter called ‘The Various Scientific 
Methods’, which deals with Laing’s engagement with Sartre’s late work within 
Sanity, Madness and the Family, and Reason and Violence. The chapter 
additionally investigates Laing’s use of mapping. With regard to the latter aspect, 
Mitchell produces a critique of this. 
The mathematical formulations of The Politics of the Family 
must seem to most people to be further removed from an 
ordinary ‘language of persons’ than the ‘defensive’ and 
depersonalizing way of expressing things that Laing originally 
objected to in Freud.43 
The system of mapping, or the ‘topological scheme’,44 as Mitchell refers to it is 
utilised in The Politics of the Family (1969) within the second section of the text. 
However, this method of notation of the varying perspectives held of each other 
by two or more people originates within Self and Others in the appendix ‘A 
Notation for Dyadic Perspectives’.45 Mitchell does not note this within her 
chapter on ‘The Various Scientific Methods’. However, it is feasible that this 
appendix may have been added in later editions of Self and Others.  
                                                                                                          It is fair to say 
that Laing’s use of mapping is most prominent within Interpersonal Perception 
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and The Politics of the Family, as Mitchell states. Her critique here of Laing 
benefits considerably from her tracing of the lines of development of concepts 
throughout his work. Her main criticism at this point involves the argument that 
Laing’s aim in his early work of addressing the person in personal terms 
becomes lost in the middle period of his publications. This is a relatively 
sophisticated method of critique, as Mitchell endeavours to criticise Laing’s 
work in such a way that she evaluates his work through the aims and methods 
that Laing set for himself. With regard to Mitchell’s criticism of Laing that 
mapping itself is further removed from a language of persons than the aspects of 
psychoanalysis that Laing criticises, I find this debatable. This is a further 
example of Mitchell’s psychoanalytic influences lessening her awareness of the 
problems with that perspective. I would argue that a ‘layperson’ would have the 
capacity to find Laing’s use of mapping intelligible, as it is sufficiently explained 
within his work for that to occur. The jargon of psychoanalysis, however, 
requires far more specialist knowledge for it to be interpreted.46 
                                                                                                    Nevertheless, 
Laing’s use of mapping is arguably one of the lines that run through his work 
that I dislike the most. However, my discomfort with this form of notational 
representation may provide the reason for this. I can perceive that there is some 
value in having a method whereby the disjunction between the perspectives of 
two or more people can be noted and analysed. Since Laing’s studies of families 
frequently found such disjunctions, it is unsurprising that he would want to make 
use of such a method. Nevertheless, I do consider this overall criticism of 
Laing’s work to be fair, despite my issue with Mitchell’s framing of it within the 
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last quotation from her that I have used. In some ways, Laing does move away 
from the language of persons within the middle period of his oeuvre. However, it 
could be argued that this is a result of the changing aims of his work as his career 
progressed, but I feel that there is value in Laing’s early attempt to meet with the 
individual on personal terms. 
                                            The issue remains that Laing utilises mapping and the 
Sartrean terms that he develops from Critique of Dialectical Reason in order to 
make important advances in terms of his theory. To only use the quotidian 
language of persons in his work would have restricted Laing in this manner. 
Laing’s use of ‘praxis’ and ‘process’ in Sanity, Madness and the Family does not 
occur in such a way that a non-specialist in such thought would find these terms 
to be alienating. Indeed, these concepts, and Laing and Esterson’s deployment of 
them to explain how the family interactions, and the position of the person 
designated as ‘mad’, become much more comprehensible are a key aspect of this 
study. Mitchell correctly recognises this. 
What [Laing] takes from Sartre’s Critique was formulated as 
a method for making behaviour intelligible: what you have to 
do is to find out who did what and why; you have to 
‘personalize’ the apparently impersonal, restore ‘the process’ 
to ‘the praxis’.47 
Mitchell is more critical of the use of mapping within Laing’s work than of his 
development of late Sartrean concepts. The extent of her engagement with this 
aspect of Laing’s work is unrivalled as far as I am aware. This is demonstrated in 
her chapter ‘Dialectics and Totalizations’, where she again makes use of a fairly 
sophisticated method of critique. 
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Laing’s Deployment of Sartrean Concepts 
 
 Mitchell argues that: ‘…given the preoccupations of the body of Laing’s work, 
we can quite legitimately apply his explanation of what interests him in Sartre’s 
thought to his own position.’48 She is correct in noting that: 
Laing… is interested in finding a dialectical method of 
totalization. This latter concept runs through his work like a 
theme-song. In first trying to attain ‘totalization’, that is to say 
a view that looks at the whole in its entirety without 
destroying the parts, Laing deploys Sartre’s ‘dialectical’ 
method.49 
Mitchell’s approach within this chapter moves close to the aims of an immanent 
critique. She sets herself the task of using the influence of the late Sartre upon 
Laing’s work as a method of evaluation, and a basis for critique. She avoids the 
pitfall of picking out decontextualised snippets of Laing’s work for critique 
through her reading and awareness of the majority of Laing’s work, up until the 
date of first publication of Psychoanalysis and Feminism. Her first criticism of 
Laing within this chapter is directed at his very use of dialectics itself, and is 
additionally directed at Reich’s use of dialectics as the two sections prior to those 
on Laing in Psychoanalysis and Feminism are concerned with Reich’s ideas. In 
her explanation of the use of dialectics within Reason and Violence, she states 
that ‘dialectic, as used in these instances, without the concept of contradiction, is 
meaningless.’50  
                       With regard to this specific criticism, it is not clearly stated by 
Mitchell whether this is a criticism more of Sartre’s use of dialectics, as set out 
by Laing in the section that he was responsible for from Reason and Violence, 
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rather than a direct critique of Laing himself. Laing’s contribution to the latter 
text is a summary of Sartre’s Critique… as opposed to an original piece by 
Laing. A full inquiry into this is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, 
Mitchell appears to view the concept of the dialectic as encompassing alone 
Hegel’s original formulation of this idea. 
Hegel thought that all logic and world history itself followed a 
dialectical path, in which internal contradictions were 
transcended, but gave rise to new contradictions that 
themselves required resolution. Marx and Engels gave 
Hegel’s idea of dialectic a material basis…51 
Laing’s explanation of Sartre’s thought in Reason and Violence does note a 
similarity with the above quotation, when Laing states that ‘…dialectical 
reason… is seen in the material conditions of history.’52 Nevertheless, the notion 
of contradiction does not take a central place within Sartre’s theory, with the 
exception of the concept of counter-finality. Laing puts forward Sartre’s 
argument that: 
…we must try to understand the nature of the relation of the 
material field to many of the passive actions… whereby 
materiality exercises power over men, in returning to them the 
praxis that they have put into it, but now as though stolen 
from them and coming back to them as a contra-finality, as an 
end that contradicts the ends of man…53 
Counter-finality can be defined as the ‘…tendency of matter to channel the 
labour it absorbs in directions that run counter to those intended by the people 
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whose labour it is…’54 Therefore a contradiction occurs between the intended 
aims of the human praxis and the result that eventually takes place. 
                                                                                                          Many 
instances of counter-finality can be seen at this stage in history. For example, an 
individual may decide to drive to work rather than taking the bus, as public 
transport is expensive compared to car use, is over-burdened at peak hours, and 
time can be saved by driving as the person can drive directly to their work place 
as opposed to walking between bus stops. However, the increasing use of cars in 
this country is adding to road congestion, which then leads to greater traffic jams, 
slowing down travelling times. The pollution derived from exhaust fumes adds to 
the threat posed to our species from environmental devastation. Sartre makes the 
argument that counter-finality ‘…occurs precisely because the action in question 
is that of isolated individuals.’55 The example given by Sartre is that of the 
deforestation of Chinese land, which has had the unintended result of rendering 
the land incapable of holding silt and topsoil in place, therefore raising river 
levels and leading to flood disasters.56 In this manner, ‘...the worker can become 
his own material fatality, in that he produces the inundations that ruin him.’57 
This notion of counter-finality is one of the most striking concepts found within 
Reason and Violence, and the idea of contradiction forms a key aspect of this. 
Mitchell does not refer to this concept in her chapter on ‘Dialectics and 
Totalizations’.  
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                      Lasch identifies in his extensive notes to The Minimal Self (1984) 
that ‘…Mitchell clings to a Leninist conception of politics…’58 It may be the 
case with her criticism of Laing and Sartre’s use of dialectics that, in a similar 
manner to her clinging to psychoanalytic orthodoxy, Mitchell is adhering to an 
old-fashioned conception of socialism and dialectical materialism. Sartre’s use of 
dialectics arises from a critique of such orthodoxy, and through criticism of 
Hegel and Engels. With regard to counter-finality, Laing notes that ‘this dialectic 
is lost in simplistic Marxism’.59 In the introduction, a distinction between the 
‘dogmatic dialectic and critical dialectic’ is drawn. The argument is proposed 
that ‘there are certain basic principles of dialectical materialism… But these are 
principles not dogmas.’60 Dogmatism is identified in this chapter as having lead 
to a ‘theoretical paralysis’61 in Marxist theory. Engels comes in for a substantial 
amount of critique here.  
Engels’s error was to suppose that he could derive dialectical 
laws of nature from procedures which were themselves non-
dialectical: comparisons, analogies, abstractions, inductions.62 
 Hegel is later criticised for having suppressed ‘…matter as the mediator between 
individuals.’63 Mitchell, in a similar vein to her omission of Laing’s full critique 
of psychoanalysis, fails to include this critique of existing conceptions of the 
dialectic in her chapter on this subject. Her criticism that the use of dialectics in 
Laing and Sartre’s work is meaningless without the concept of contradiction is 
made in a footnote to a quotation from Reason and Violence. This is one of the 
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most disappointing aspects of her critique of Laing. Her avoidance of certain key 
lines of critique (because she is sympathetic to what has been criticised) has the 
unfortunate result of generating criticisms that fail because they are presented 
from a standpoint that has already been critiqued by the very author that she is 
attempting to criticise. If a crucial aspect of a theory is missed in a critique, this 
has the tendency to displace at least some aspects of the criticism, as they lack 
the foundation derived from the element that has been ignored. From my 
perspective, through Laing’s summary of Sartre’s thought in Reason and 
Violence, substantial contributions, such as the concept of counter-finality are 
offered by Sartre, which cannot simply be written off as ‘meaningless’.  
                                                                                                                 Mitchell’s 
next criticism of Laing in this chapter follows an investigation on her behalf into 
how truth is constituted in his work. She argues that Laing makes use of ‘…a 
romantic concept of truth for his ‘science of persons’’,64 which involves the 
‘…Greek notion of truth as an unveiling.’65 Mitchell links this latter conception 
of truth to the idea of ‘phenomenological truth’,66 which she argues provides a 
means for Laing to do away with the problem of the relation between the person 
conducting the study and the individual or group being studied.  
Phenomenological truth thus gets rid of ‘artificial’ structures, 
it gets rid of the doctor and rid of the patient. It gets rid of the 
sane and of the mad. All is communication – good or bad…67 
Mitchell then provides some further discussion of Laing’s use of the idea of 
experience.68 She then makes the following criticism. 
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As a breaking of boundaries was his original project, it should 
come as no surprise that any categories of ‘normal’ and 
‘abnormal’, health/ psychosis, ultimately all but disappear for 
Laing… But it seems to me that it is Laing’s basic 
philosophical position that eradicates the locatable ‘disease’ 
schizophrenia; not, as is usually contended… his empirical 
demonstration of its absence – his elucidation of its 
intelligibility.69 
This is an interesting criticism because it achieves a level of operation above the 
standard critique of Laing that claims that schizophrenia is a disease after all, 
despite Laing’s arguments. This is an achievement on Mitchell’s behalf, as she 
attempts to engage with Laing in terms of his philosophical influences. 
                                                                                                               However, is 
this a valid criticism? I do consider there to be some legitimacy to this claim, 
because the phenomenological view as an attempt to investigate a phenomena 
does make the effort to perceive what is being studied without placing 
constructions, such as the label of schizophrenia, on to the person being studied. 
Therefore, this perspective extirpates the disease of schizophrenia by not viewing 
the person in that primary manner. Nevertheless, is it not the very point of 
Laing’s methodology that the perspective used enables this eradication of 
schizophrenia in this way? Rather than providing a criticism, the above quotation 
from Mitchell serves to highlight the value of the existential-phenomenological 
method. However, Mitchell’s suggestion that this is the primary reason for 
Laing’s destruction of schizophrenia as a disease entity, rather than the 
intelligibility of the situation of the labelled person, is something that I take issue 
with. I would suggest alternatively that the former facilitates the latter – by not 
imposing the view of the person as ill upon the individual, the comprehensibility 
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of their social context becomes apparent. Mitchell’s comments on Laing are 
frustrating in this manner. She raises issues which operate on a more complex 
level than many of Laing’s critics and commentators, only to confound the 
central matters through slight misunderstandings and omissions of some aspects 
of Laing’s work.  
                          Mitchell ultimately does not achieve her aim in this chapter of 
turning what interests Laing about Sartre into a coherent critique of Laing 
himself. Nevertheless, she does achieve the highlighting of some aspects of 
Laing’s work that are not usually recognised in the standard reception of Laing. 
Following her criticism that I have cited above, Mitchell claims that in Laing’s 
work ‘the demand for intelligibility is as such a merely truistic one.’70 This 
stands in contradiction to some aspects of her praise for Laing, which I will 
review later in this chapter. As an example, later on in Mitchell’s sections on 
Laing, she puts forward the argument that he: ‘…lucidly exposes for us how 
most of us in Western capitalist culture live, the terms of our lives, what 
constitutes our illusions, our reality, our hopes and despairs.’71 It can be argued 
that viewing the experiences which become categorised as schizophrenia as an 
illness is a peculiar aspect of Western capitalist culture itself. Laing himself notes 
this in the last chapter of The Divided Self, the psychobiography of Julie. With 
regard to schizophrenia, he suggests that: ‘I am, however, describing something 
that occurs in our… Western world, and perhaps not, in quite the same terms, 
anywhere else.’72 If Laing’s efforts at rendering schizophrenia intelligible are 
‘merely truistic’, then Mitchell’s praise for his work on the family and his wider 
cultural criticisms become negated by her own critique. From my perspective, 
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Laing’s work in terms of making madness comprehensible has a more substantial 
basis than Mitchell here accords it. This element of Laing’s work provides a 
central aim for many of his studies, so it seems rather trite for Mitchell to write 
this off so easily, even despite her perceptive identification of this aspect. 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that there is an extremely close relation between 
capitalism and psychoanalysis, which they explain through some criticism of 
Reich. 
When Reich denounces the way in which psychoanalysis joins 
forces with social repression, he still doesn’t go far enough, 
because he doesn’t see that the tie linking psychoanalysis with 
capitalism is not merely ideological, that it is infinitely closer, 
infinitely tighter… Oedipus as the last word of capitalist 
consumption…73 
I find their argument to be valid. Mitchell’s defence of psychoanalysis renders 
her unable to comprehend that Laing’s critique of this theory is central to his 
wider cultural criticisms, as psychoanalysis has arisen precisely out of capitalist 
culture. ‘…Psychoanalysis is content to live off Oedipus, to develop and promote 
it, and to give it a marketable medical form.’74  
Criticism of Laing’s Case Studies 
 
Earlier in this chapter I referred to two main lines of critique of Laing which are 
made on Mitchell’s behalf: that his ‘science of persons’ is not really a science, 
and that a confusion and a lack of clarity are present in Laing’s work. An 
example of this latter line of critique is found towards the end of her chapter on 
‘Dialectics and Totalizations’. 
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What is needed is… some explanation that accounts for why 
one thing leads to another, why a certain response to a certain 
situation produces this and not that particular result.75 
Mitchell here shows herself to be in some agreement with this form of critique 
which has been produced (and evaluated already in this thesis) by Clare. 
However, Laing does suggest that there is one particular aspect of the social 
context surrounding the person who comes to be regarded as schizophrenic that 
aggravates their condition – the lack of any available person to confirm what is 
really going on for the ‘schizophrenic’ individual. In ‘The Ghost of the Weed 
Garden’ in The Divided Self, within a discussion of Julie’s ‘bad’ phase (from 
around the age of fifteen), Laing states the following. 
What I feel must have been the most schizophrenogenic factor 
of this time was not simply Julie’s attack on her mother, or 
even her mother’s counter-attack, but the complete absence of 
anyone in her world who could or would see some sense in 
her point of view, whether it was right or wrong.76 
Later in this chapter I will return to Laing’s discussions of Julie’s family in order 
to assess the validity of Mitchell’s criticisms that Laing is ‘prejudiced’ against 
women, and mothers in particular, and blames the latter group solely for creating 
schizophrenic individuals.  
                                         It is additionally made clear in some of the case studies 
in Sanity, Madness and the Family, that this lack of a person to confirm the 
‘mad’ individual’s point of view served to increase their confusion. In the 
chapter on ‘Family Two: The Blairs’, Laing and Esterson state that, with regard 
to Lucie: 
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Her inability to find significant others with authority to 
confirm or validate her point of view left her, as we saw, 
mistrusting the fabric of her experience. More than this, it left 
her disheartened and dispirited.77 
I am sure that I am not unique in having experienced situations where either 
another person or myself was being kept in a state of mystification by others. 
Laing’s above statement from The Divided Self is arguably the closest that he 
gets to providing a fully explicit statement with regard to what he sees as the 
main maddening aspect of the families of schizophrenics. I find it intelligible that 
being kept in such a condition of having no bearings by which to orient oneself 
in a social situation, particularly within the family, where the parents have 
complete control over their children (which they abuse in many cases cited by 
Laing), could lead an individual to become ‘disheartened’ and withdrawn.              
                                                   Another statement by Laing and Esterson 
regarding what they view as particular about the families of schizophrenics is 
provided in Sanity, Madness and the Family. 
Our impression, comparing the families of schizophrenics 
with other families, is that they are relatively closed systems, 
and that the future patient is particularly enclosed within the 
family system.78 
It is probable that Mitchell, and other critics, would like to see more of these 
kinds of statements on Laing’s behalf. However, I have never found this to be a 
major deficiency with Laing’s work, because I have always found it clear within 
Laing’s work that if a child is placed within a suffocating, closed family 
environment, that stifles their personal development, and that if the family 
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continually mislead the child, then the child stands little chance of achieving 
some degree of happiness in their life. As Laing puts it: 
…what can happen if the mother’s or the family’s scheme of 
things does not match what the child can live and breathe in? 
The child then has to develop its own piercing vision and to 
be able to live by that… or else become mad.79 
What I find the most surprising is that critics such as Mitchell and the 
conservative psychiatric critics cannot understand the impact of such an 
environment and treatment upon a young, vulnerable person. It is also likely that 
not all case studies will follow a simplistic ‘one-thing-leads-to another’ format, 
and that there may be no easy way of expressing exactly what is the key factor 
for all cases, as this will ignore the specificities of each one. As I have stated 
earlier with regard to Clare’s critique, reductive cause-and-effect explanations 
operate on a level below the aims of Laing’s work. Therefore they do not provide 
a valid means of critique of his work. 
                                                          Mitchell provides some specific criticisms of 
the case studies in The Divided Self and Sanity, Madness and the Family, which 
are worth an evaluation at this point. In her second section on Laing, in a chapter 
entitled ‘Rebels with a Cause’, she again provides examples of her criticism that 
Laing’s work is unclear in some respects. Mitchell suggests that in Sanity, 
Madness and the Family, Laing only manages to remove the schizophrenic label 
from the person so diagnosed in order to transfer the ‘denigratory value 
judgement’80 to the rest of the members of the family. Mitchell appears to view 
this as a theoretical conjuring trick, rather than an evaluation of the family 
environments by Laing and Esterson. She sees this as problematic to an extent 
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that has never arisen to me, since I am fully aware that human groups, with the 
family as an example, can act in ways which cannot be described as ‘sane’. 
Therefore, it is not a matter of ‘transposing distinctions’81 for the sake of it, but 
rather of setting out the conditions of the family nexus that encircled the 
individual who came to be seen as ‘mad’. Mitchell then puts forward the 
argument that in Sanity, Madness and the Family, Laing 
…by drawing into the same strange bag all the members of 
the nexus,… often fails to point out what is really ‘odd’ – at 
least from the standpoint of our society.82 
Here Mitchell is operating on the assumption that the majority of our society 
regard keeping children in a state of mystification, and snuffing out their 
developing autonomy and sense of themselves as separate from their family, 
which I regard as two main characteristics of the families studied in Sanity, 
Madness and the Family, as not unusual practices. This may well be the case. 
However, her failure to note these (to my mind) glaring similarities between the 
eleven families, in order to make the criticism that Laing and Esterson do not 
distinguish some key unusual aspects of them, does not enable her to reach this 
level of awareness. Such a failure of a reflexive examination of her own 
assumptions, and how these influence her critique, is one of Mitchell’s greatest 
deficiencies.  
                  From my reading of Sanity, Madness and the Family there are some 
prime examples of the treatment by these families of their daughters in ways 
which, arguably, many of our society would view as odd. Ruby, in the case study 
of ‘Family Five: The Edens’, became pregnant at the age of sixteen, and ‘…had a 
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miscarriage at four months.’83 It is not stated in this chapter whether the 
miscarriage was the result of the following treatment she received (essentially a 
forced attempted abortion) from her family. 
As soon as they could after hearing about it from Ruby, 
mummy and mother got her on the sitting-room divan, and 
while trying to pump hot soapy water into her uterus, told her 
with tears, reproaches, pityingly and vindictively at once, 
what a fool she was, what a slut she was…84  
No definitive statement is provided of whether Ruby herself would have liked to 
have kept the baby. However, it seems clear that her family would not have let 
her make up her own mind about that (let alone whether such a family would 
have provided a decent environment for a baby). Her ‘cousin’ (who was really 
her brother) stated in an interview that she was ‘…not allowed to make a 
decision.’85 In the case study of ‘Family Six: The Fields’, the mother mentions in 
an interview that because June (her daughter) had a ‘congenital dislocation of the 
hip’86 and thus had to wear a special plaster cast to correct this, the mother 
proceeded to tie her with dog leads to a bed in order to stop June from wearing 
out the plaster.87 From the account given, this went on for at least two years.88 
Here I find it debatable whether Laing truly needs to point out what exactly is 
odd about these families. Is it standard practice for families to give their 
daughters forced home abortions, or to tie them up? Whilst I am conscious that 
the family in our society is far from the Disney portrayals in reality, nevertheless 
these chilling examples may well be seen as odd from the standpoint of our 
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society. What is additionally disturbing is that both the families in these cases 
failed to see anything wrong with treating their daughters in such a manner. 
                                                      Mitchell ignores these instances in order to 
make her criticism, but provides examples from Sanity, Madness and the Family 
and The Divided Self which she sees as bolstering her argument. She does 
mention Ruby’s family, but fails to include the above horrifying incident. Instead 
Mitchell decides to pick upon the confusion occasioned by Ruby’s family’s lies 
about their real identities.  
…The factor that seems to me to have been a constant 
problem… is not even commented on by Laing and Esterson: 
this child has simultaneously a ‘mummy’ and a ‘mother’ – 
surely an obtrusively abnormal state of affairs in our 
society?89 
It is a correct statement that no further comment on this state of affairs in the 
manner suggested by Mitchell is provided by Laing and Esterson. Ruby was 
taught by her family to address them by titles other than those that actually 
corresponded to her relations’ real biological status to her. For example, she was 
trained to refer to her biological mother as ‘mummy’, and to her aunt as 
‘mother’.90 This was presumably due to the fact that Ruby was an ‘illegitimate 
child’.91 However, Laing and Esterson do provide a table of Ruby’s family where 
her relatives’ biological status is noted next to the names that Ruby was taught to 
call them. In the following discussion, the former set of names are given in 
standard typescript, and the latter are given in italics. Both of these clarifications 
of a highly mystifying situation are provided by Laing and Esterson ‘in order to 
spare the reader the initial confusion of the investigators, not to say of this 
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girl…’92 Therefore, an awareness of the bizarre nature of this family context is 
given by Laing and Esterson. It could additionally be argued that the complex 
dislocation between each family members’ biological status and the names that 
Ruby was taught to use for them, as a totality, is at least as unusual as having 
both a ‘mummy’ and a ‘mother’. 
                                                   In one example of Mitchell’s praise for Laing, 
she argues that ‘…Laing’s work has the merit of lucidly giving us new (and 
forgotten old) aspects… for future analysis.’93 However, I consider this to 
provide a greater insight into some of Mitchell’s reasons for criticising Laing, 
rather than offering a substantial commendation of Laing’s work. She criticises 
Laing, through her ignorance of the aims of phenomenology, for not sufficiently 
interpreting the case studies that he uses. With regard to her above criticism of 
the study of Ruby’s family, and in the following quotation, Mitchell critiques 
Laing for not providing any analysis of gender relations. The quotation below 
refers to Laing’s use of the descriptions of her illness given by Joan in chapter 
ten of The Divided Self. 
Joan in her ‘separated’ persona always refers to herself as 
‘he’; later, almost by accident, in the general analysis we learn 
her parents had wanted a boy – but surely the persistently 
transposed gender was worth a specific comment?94  
It is of note that Joan’s account was not provided directly to Laing himself, but 
was reported by two other authors.95 Mitchell’s above criticism is not supported 
by any textual evidence in the form of direct quotations or references providing 
an indication of the exact pieces that she is critiquing. Her attempt at elucidating 
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some feminist criticism of Laing appears to involve selecting some incidences 
where Laing could have made some further comment on gendering. This clearly 
was not Laing’s main project, and he cannot be criticised on the basis of this. 
                                                     However, the above criticism by Mitchell is 
erroneous according to my reading of The Divided Self. When Joan uses the term 
‘he’, she is not referring to herself, but to an ideal, generalised patient which she 
uses as a means of explanation of her experience of schizophrenia. For example, 
Joan states that ‘the patient hates the doctor for opening the wound again and 
hates himself for allowing himself to be touched again.’96 Joan also refers to the 
generalised doctor in her statements as ‘he’. This is not the only example where 
Joan refers to a patient in general as ‘he’.97 At other stages in this chapter Joan 
clearly demonstrates an awareness of the fact that she is female. 
If you had actually screwed me, it would have wrecked 
everything… It would have meant that you were using me like 
a woman when I really wasn’t one… It would have meant you 
could only see my body and couldn’t see the real me which 
was still a little girl.98 
When Joan uses ‘I’ she clearly refers to herself as female. Mitchell fails to note 
this, which provides a further instance of her unfortunate tendency to erase 
aspects of Laing’s work and texts in order either to make a criticism or to attempt 
to support one. Whether Joan’s use of ‘he’ as referring to a patient in general was 
prompted by the doctors that she conversed with originally is not stated by Laing.  
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‘Feminist’ Criticism of Laing 
 
These ventures by Mitchell into criticising Laing on the basis of ignoring gender 
relations demonstrate a tendency within her ‘feminist’ critique to criticise Laing 
on the basis of non-existent textual evidence, and to engage in what I call 
‘playground feminism’,99 where examples of the absence of an explicit statement 
by Laing on gender relations are taken as far more significant than they really 
are. Mitchell is far less interested in any analysis of gender relations when the 
individual in question is male. For example, David’s case study in The Divided 
Self contains some discussion of his acting and dressing in a feminine manner.100 
Mitchell’s discussion contains no reference whatsoever to this. It is not explained 
why she sees alleged gender confusion on behalf of a woman to be more 
significant than David’s case. I will later argue, in my section on a feminist 
reading of Laing, that Laing’s project of demystifying madness is itself of benefit 
to women, since we tend to receive a greater prevalence of the diagnosis of 
mental illness than men.  
                                      Mitchell demonstrates a further similarity between her 
critique of Laing and that of the conservative psychiatric critics when she 
suggests that Laing 
…resists classifying the patient ‘schizophrenic’ only to 
classify those that drove him thus (and by classifying we tend 
to mean blame)…101 
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 I am unaware of any point in Sanity, Madness and the Family where Laing and 
Esterson explicitly state that they have classified any of the families in such a 
manner. Remarks such as those made in the following quotation do not constitute 
classification as such, but rather explain the family context of the individual 
concerned. 
Neither of Lucie’s parents had emerged from their relations 
with their parents as persons in their own right. Both had been 
hopelessly immersed all their lives in fantasy unrecognised as 
such.102 
Mitchell’s interpretation of Laing’s work sharply declines in its validity as her 
critique proceeds into attempts at feminist criticism. She operates on the 
assumption that the families of the individuals in Sanity, Madness and the 
Family, and the mothers in particular, are seen as to blame for their daughter’s 
condition. She seems to assert that mothers are blameless simply because they 
are female, and that females are blameless because Mitchell is a feminist. I do 
not consider feminism to comprise a blind defence of women simply for being 
women. Mitchell’s above criticism highlights a further presumption on her 
behalf. She equates classification with blame. This is problematic for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, as I have stated, Laing does not classify, in the standard use of 
the term, the families that he studies. Secondly, the conflation of the former term 
with the latter is a misrepresentation of Laing’s work. It is additionally 
something of a leap to equate one with another, even if Mitchell is here drawing 
upon Laing’s theories of diagnosis and labelling as scapegoating an individual. 
Thirdly, no direct statements are provided by Laing and his co-author that the 
families or mothers are directly to blame in this way. Instead, this attribution of 
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blame is something that Mitchell is reading on to Laing’s work. There may be a 
greater danger of this occurring with work such as Laing’s where explanations, 
in accordance with his phenomenological influences, are not presented as a 
finished totality. Nevertheless, this does not excuse imposing a view on to a text 
which cannot be supported by evidence from it. The following discussion will 
serve to illustrate these deficiencies in Mitchell’s critique. 
                                                                                           Mitchell argues that 
‘…Laing’s… more concrete illustrations… seem, if in an elusive fashion, to 
blame parents, or more particularly the mother.’103 She then provides a long 
quotation from The Politics of Experience, where Laing discusses the 
methodological break-through of considering the whole family nexus as opposed 
to simply the mother. 
At first the focus was mainly on the mothers (who are always 
the first to get the blame for everything), and a 
‘schizophrenogenic’ mother was postulated, who was 
supposed to generate disturbance in her child.104 
Mitchell then claims that ‘as Laing’s theory reverses the sane-mad situation…’105 
this has the result of making ‘…comparable conclusions…’ to the 
schizophrenogenic mother ‘…inevitable, if implicit.’106 Here I would consider it 
to be more the case that Laing’s mother-blaming is ‘elusive’ or ‘implicit’ as 
Mitchell claims because it is non-existent. Her use of the above quotation from 
The Politics of Experience has the effect of undermining rather than reinforcing 
her assertions, as Laing explicitly states there that it is wrong to blame the 
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mothers alone. Laing’s idea that the absence of any other validating point of view 
for the individual who comes to be seen as ‘mad’, which I have referred to 
previously, is not solely directed at the mothers. However, many people would 
expect the mother in a family to perform such a function, along with other family 
members. Neither is the indication given by Laing and Esterson that the families 
of schizophrenics are suffocating, closed environments presumed as the fault of 
the mother. How does Mitchell come to such a conclusion? She provides very 
little textual evidence to support her idea, other than the quotation from The 
Politics of Experience, which fails to bolster her views, and the examples below.  
                                                   Mitchell states that in Sanity, Madness and the 
Family, the only time that the father is criticised is in the chapter on ‘Family 
Four: The Danzigs’, where she claims that Sarah Danzig’s father is let ‘…off the 
hook…’ by Laing,107 and that ‘…this is the only time the father is thus 
criticized.’108 This comment appears in a chapter which is muddied by Mitchell’s 
insistence that Laing ignores ‘…the absence of the Oedipal father’,109 in a way 
which does not further her analysis of Laing, and which, in this aspect, 
contributes nothing but another forcing of psychoanalysis on to Laing’s work on 
her behalf. With regard to this example, Mitchell is again twisting the material to 
fit her critique. Laing’s comments found in his texts regarding the Procrustean 
nature of psychoanalysis, psychiatric theory and socialisation itself110 – that they 
all involve chopping off aspects which do not fit in, in the same manner as the 
Greek robber who cut off the limbs of travellers to hide them in his bed – can be 
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applied to Mitchell’s critique. She uses a Procrustean method of criticism, where 
she chops off any ill-fitting aspects. 
                                                       It is not Laing himself who lets the father of 
the Danzig family ‘off the hook’, but instead it is made clear in the study of this 
family that negative feelings towards the father had been generated by the mother 
and brother, and that Sarah Danzig was ‘…the one person who was really 
expected to comply with her father’s wishes.’111 Here it could be expected that 
Mitchell would take note of the recurring theme within Sanity, Madness and the 
Family, which an example is here provided of, that these families all seem to 
expect total compliance and obedience from their daughters, because they are 
daughters. However, she does note that: 
…remaining in the family [is]… something in our culture that 
women are certainly supposed to do. Laing’s descriptions 
show us forcefully the difficulty the girl will encounter when 
she must leave this family.112 
This perceptive element which is raised by Mitchell here to me understates the 
extent to which the daughters in Sanity, Madness and the Family are expected to 
behave like docile robots that do as their families say. I will flesh this argument 
out further in my later section on a feminist reading of Laing. Mitchell makes 
some moves in that direction, but does not achieve a full discussion. Her above 
comment gets lost in a mire of psychoanalytic views that she relates to this 
material regarding how girls have a ‘weaker superego’, and so on. 
                                                                                                         In the example 
of the Danzig family, Laing and Esterson do not let the father escape 
uncriticised. Mitchell’s misinterpretation of the material instead generates her 
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criticism of it, and the textual examples that she provides do not support her 
claim. Fathers do not receive as uncritical a treatment as Mitchell claims in 
Sanity, Madness and the Family. Both the mother and the father of the Abbott 
family are criticised for regarding their daughter’s developing autonomy as 
symptoms of an illness.113 The father of the Blair family is presented by Laing 
and Esterson as a highly unsavoury character.  
Mrs Blair said that her husband watched over all Lucie’s 
movements, required her to account for every minute she 
spent outside the house, told her that if she went out alone she 
would be kidnapped, raped or murdered… He would ridicule 
any feelings she had…114 
Lucie herself states that her father ‘…doesn’t believe in the emancipation of 
women.’115 Laing and Esterson are highly critical of this patriarchal, domineering 
father of the Blair family. ‘Mr Blair appears to have made it quite clear what he 
wanted of Lucie, and he made it clear enough to us, without betraying the 
slightest impression that his expectations were unusual.’116 It is noted that the 
mother had effectively surrendered to the father’s wishes.117 
It was clear that Mr Blair did not feel his concern about his 
wife and daughter to be excessive, and it was clear to us what 
he wanted his daughter to be – a pure, virginal, spinster 
gentle-woman. His occasional physical and frequent verbal 
violence towards her were prompted by his view of her as 
sexually wanton.118 
The example of the Blair family shows a father whose desire to control his 
family exceeds what can be considered as ‘normal’. Mitchell fails to examine 
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this case. I find the absence of discussion of this family, and the father in 
particular, on Mitchell’s behalf to be significant. Her silence on certain aspects of 
Laing’s work, and her selective identification of elements of it which are 
abstracted from other parts, facilitate her critique, whilst additionally 
undermining it.  
                       It is Mitchell’s contention that ‘…the absence of the Oedipal 
father’119 is apparent within Laing’s case studies. She identifies examples which, 
from her point of view, reinforce this assertion. However, the father was all-too-
present within the Blair family. Mitchell’s comments on Julie’s case study in The 
Divided Self operate on a greater level of validity. Nevertheless, the conclusion 
that she draws at the end of the following quotation is unwarranted. 
…Laing comments: ‘The father, indeed, as he said, had not 
much to tell me, because he had “withdrawn himself 
emotionally” from the family before Julie was born.’ So Laing 
lets him withdraw once more, though surely this very 
statement by the father should have told him a lot that was 
worth pursuing? But Laing’s prejudice is, in itself, very 
interesting.120 
I would agree with Mitchell that some interesting analysis could have been 
generated by further discussion on Laing’s behalf of Julie’s father. However, 
Laing does state that, as opposed to Julie’s older sister, ‘the father had a more 
obviously significant part to play.’121 It is made clear in the psychobiography that 
relations between Julie’s parents had severely broken down prior to her birth. 
Given Mitchell’s tendency towards a Procrustean method of critique, she seems 
to have avoided the issue that Julie’s father’s withdrawal from the family was 
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due to this, rather than it being a case of Laing being ‘prejudiced’ against women 
and mothers. If Laing was such a misogynist, would he have bothered to present 
the intelligibility of the female case studies that he makes use of?122 Given 
Mitchell’s attempts at a feminist analysis of Laing, one would expect some 
awareness to be shown of how gender roles are socially and culturally 
conditioned, and some bringing to bear of this upon her analysis. Mothers are, 
still, generally expected to perform child-rearing functions, even in this day and 
age. It may be the case that this withdrawal or absence of fathers, which Mitchell 
views as an intentional act on behalf of Laing as a writer, may be rather more 
boringly a statement of fact with regard to specific cases.  
                                                                                          Mitchell’s view that 
Laing blames the mothers alone for creating ‘mad’ children is based upon a 
number of assumptions. In her above discussion, she assumes that because Laing 
does not blame the fathers to the extent that she would like, therefore Laing must 
be blaming the mothers. Here I would like to add to this evaluation another 
mundane fact that Mitchell avoids – not all mothers will be good mothers, and 
some mothers may treat their children very badly. Her inclination to see all 
women as good, because she is a feminist and therefore wants to defend women, 
no doubt has good intentions. However, I would like to make it clear that this 
thesis would not have been written if Laing was as ‘prejudiced’ against women 
and mothers as Mitchell states. She attempts to support her view of Laing in this 
way through providing a long quotation from The Divided Self in which Laing 
states that the mother is the first mediator of the world to a child, and that the 
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father and other adults play a role in this in later stages of development.123 
Mitchell argues that in that quotation, ‘Laing… explicitly gives a different role to 
the two parents…’124 It is fair to say that Laing places more emphasis upon the 
role of the mother in the quotation that Mitchell cites. However, the influence of 
his tutors, such as Winnicott, cannot be discounted in Laing’s early work. This 
will be discussed shortly. 
                                       Mitchell suggests that Laing implicitly includes these 
different parental roles in his later work. 
…By the time of Sanity, Madness and the Family he seems to 
have so absorbed this feature as to echo it in his researches 
without either comment or conclusion therefrom, and by the 
time of The Politics of Experience he implies that he has 
outgrown such notions.125 
In this example, Mitchell’s tracing of the lines of development in and influences 
upon Laing’s thought goes astray. The very purpose of Sanity, Madness and the 
Family is to show that the whole family context is involved in encircling the 
individual who comes to be seen as ‘insane’. Nevertheless, she is correct in 
stating that Laing moves somewhat beyond that view in The Politics of 
Experience, although some comments on the family are provided therein. Her 
critique of Laing as blaming mothers sits uneasily with her additional line of 
criticism that runs through her second section on Laing, that he ignores the 
Oedipus complex. In this manner, Mitchell claims that Laing loses ‘…the 
particularity of the mother-child relationship’,126 but then proceeds to criticise 
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him for discussing this very relation as (from Mitchell’s perspective) Laing 
therefore blames the mother if this relation goes wrong. Furthermore, for a 
psychoanalyst to be criticising Laing on the basis of his alleged ‘prejudice’ 
against women, seems to be darkly amusing given Freud’s noted sexism. There is 
also a considerable tension present between Mitchell’s first chapter on Laing, a 
piece of social history entitled ‘Social Psychotherapy and Post-war London’, and 
these later criticisms made on her behalf. The influence of Object Relations 
Theory upon Laing, particularly in The Divided Self, is only noted in this chapter. 
It is by far the best by Mitchell in her sections on Laing, as the way in which 
gender roles were disrupted during World War Two, and then reinstated in their 
conservative form following the war is highly informative. Her bringing to bear 
of this historical context upon Laing’s work becomes lost as she proceeds. 
                                                        The following quotation from Mitchell 
regards the zeitgeist of the late 1950s. 
Within psychology the stress was all on mother-care; from the 
psychoanalyst John Bowlby, whose work was popularized on 
radio and in women’s magazines, we learned that a person 
sucked his emotional stability literally with his mother’s 
milk.127 
Mitchell criticises this as being part of ‘…a heritage of a mother-child 
obsession.’128 She additionally briefly reviews Winnicott and others who formed 
part of the Tavistock Clinic. Mitchell suggests that Laing’s work was produced 
as a reaction to the focus on the infantile mother-child relationship within Object 
Relations Theory.129 With regard to Winnicott she claims that his: 
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…very sensitive work nevertheless had an effect somewhat 
like Bowlby’s in its earliest popularizations. Paeans to the 
family obscured its more interesting content though his later 
work in the sixties… was, I think, exempt from this.130 
At this stage I consider a review of Winnicott’s thought in terms of making a 
contrast between the extent of mother-blaming within Winnicott’s and Laing’s 
work to be valuable. This evaluation will additionally illustrate that some 
residues of the influence of Object Relations Theory remain in The Divided Self. 
The examples from Winnicott’s work that I will be using are from publications in 
the 1960s and early 1970s. Mitchell’s above quotation does not clearly state 
whether the work that she is referring to from the 1960s was researched or 
published during that decade. If she is claiming that Winnicott’s published work 
in the 1960s and 1970s is free from ‘paeans to the family’, the following 
examples, which concern the mother-child relationship, throw this into doubt. 
                                                      The first paper by Winnicott that I wish to 
examine dates from 1960, and is titled ‘Ego Distortion in Terms of True and 
False Self’.131 There are some considerable similarities between Winnicott’s and 
Laing’s conceptions of the true and false self, particularly with regard to Laing’s 
views on this in The Divided Self. However, a full review of this would take me 
far out of the orbit of my present discussion, although some parallels will be 
drawn. The development of a false self is regarded within this theoretical 
tradition as a key aspect that is involved in schizophrenia. In this paper, 
Winnicott explicitly places the full focus upon the mother in terms of the 
generation of a false self within the infant.  
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It is necessary to examine the part played by the mother, and 
in doing so I find it convenient to compare two extremes; by 
one extreme the mother is a good-enough mother and by the 
other the mother is not a good-enough mother.132 
Winnicott provides clear examples of his consideration that not good-enough 
mothering is to blame for the creation of a false self within the child. 
The mother who is not good enough… repeatedly fails to 
meet the infant gesture; instead she substitutes her own 
gesture which is to be given sense by the compliance of the 
infant. This compliance on the part of the infant is the earliest 
stage of the False Self, and belongs to the mother’s inability to 
sense her infant’s needs.133 
                                                    There are some similarities between the above 
statement by Winnicott and Laing’s analysis of Julie’s case study in the last 
chapter of The Divided Self, particularly in Laing’s reconstructions from the 
mother’s accounts of Julie’s behaviour as a baby and a young child. Julie’s 
mother recalls: 
…that she played a ‘throwing away’ game with the patient. 
Julie’s elder sister had played the usual version of this game 
and had exasperated Mrs X by it. ‘I made sure that she (Julie) 
was not going to play that game with me. I threw things away 
and she brought them back to me,’ as soon as she could 
crawl.134 
Laing comments upon this example that: ‘it is hardly necessary to comment on 
the implications of this inversion of roles for Julie’s failure to develop any real 
ways of her own.’135 The above quotation from The Divided Self clearly 
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demonstrates a child who is having to comply with the mother in the way that 
Winnicott sees as characteristic of the ‘not good-enough’ mother.  
                                                                                                      However, a 
significant point of divergence occurs between Winnicott and Laing in terms of 
their consideration (or the absence of it) of the rest of the family nexus as 
additionally playing a part in reinforcing the situation of the individual who 
comes to be viewed as schizophrenic. Winnicott, in a far more strident manner 
than Laing, assigns different ‘natural’ roles to the father and mother. Here 
Mitchell would have perhaps aided her critique of Laing through an 
acknowledgement that Winnicott presents such views in a far more absolute and 
conservative fashion than Laing. An example of Winnicott’s views on this topic 
is provided in the following quotation. 
The assumption made by me in this paper is that, in health, the 
mother who becomes pregnant gradually achieves a high 
degree of identification with her infant… This special 
orientation… not only depends on her own mental health, but 
also it is affected by the environment. In the simplest case the 
man, supported by a social attitude which is itself a 
development from the man’s natural function, deals with 
external reality for the woman, and so makes it safe and 
sensible for her to be temporarily in-turned, self-centred.136 
At the very least Winnicott exposes his main assumption of his paper in this 
quotation. However, further assumptions are bound up in the rest of his 
discussion. He regards the mother, and the mother alone as having a ‘special 
orientation’ in terms of having the ability to identify with the child. The father is 
allocated a different role of dealing ‘with external reality for the woman’. 
Winnicott’s ideas here seem like something dating from 1860 rather than 1960, 
particularly in contemporary times, where many women work whilst pregnant, 
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and where economic pressures mean that two incomes are required. In this 
quotation, Winnicott also states that the identification of the mother with her 
infant is something that occurs if the mother is in a state of good mental health. 
This placing of absolute responsibility upon the mother for the child’s future 
welfare does essentially promote the idea (far more than Laing does) that the 
mother is the key problem if a child eventually becomes ‘mad’. In Winnicott’s 
work, women appear only as producers of babies and as their carers. Men, 
however, have to deal with the ‘real’ world. This assigning of ‘natural’ gender-
based roles to the parents by Winnicott additionally cements his blaming of 
mothers, as does his label of the ‘not good-enough’ mother. One would expect 
fathers also to identify with their new-born children, yet Winnicott sees this as a 
maternal role alone. 
                               No consideration is made on Winnicott’s behalf of the impact 
of siblings and other family members upon the infant. The mother is all. 
However, Winnicott does provide reasons for this early on in his paper on the 
true and false self. 
I leave out infant-father relationships in this context because I 
am referring to early phenomena, those that concern the 
infant’s relationship to the mother, or to the father as another 
mother. The father at this very early stage has not become 
significant as a male person.137 
I have no means of corroboration of whether young children do recognise their 
parents early on as gendered. Winnicott offers no supporting evidence for his 
assertion.138 Laing’s studies far surpass those of Winnicott in terms of the 
consideration of the influence of the wider family network. Even in The Divided 
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Self, which, as I have previously mentioned, stands the closest of all of Laing’s 
work to conventional psychiatry, comments are made which note the collusion of 
the rest of the family in maintaining the compliant and subordinate status of the 
individual who comes to be regarded as ‘mad’. Indeed, the considerable 
influence of Winnicott upon this work provides a reason for its conventionality in 
some respects. 
                      In the case study of Julie, Laing refers to all of her family, 
including her aunt in the following manner.  
…None of the adults in her world know the difference 
between existential life and death. On the contrary, being 
existentially dead receives the highest commendation from 
them.139 
Julie’s profound inability to develop a sense of herself as autonomous was 
supplemented by all of her family regarding this as being ‘good’. Laing further 
comments that: ‘…all of the others in [Julie’s] world took this very feature as a 
token of goodness and stamped with approval the absence of self-action.’140 
Mitchell seems to assume that Laing’s ‘mother-blaming’ is simply an arbitrary 
product of what she sees as his desire to not blame the person who is labelled as 
‘insane’. However, in Julie’s case, according to Laing’s version of events, neither 
can her mother be considered to be blameless. Julie’s mother cannot be 
considered to have treated her child in a ‘normal’ fashion, since she too saw 
Julie’s lack of autonomy as nothing to raise alarm. Nevertheless Laing’s 
statements from The Divided Self illustrate the aspect of his theory that I have 
identified earlier – the lack of any other individual to confirm what is happening 
for the person designated as ‘mad’. Julie’s mother is not alone singled out for 
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criticism. From my perspective, rather than this case study providing an example 
of Laing’s implicit ‘mother-blaming’, as Mitchell views this, it alternatively 
gives us an example of Laing’s implicit social criticism. The assumption made 
by Julie’s family that the inability to act independently on one’s own behalf 
therefore constitutes being ‘good’ speaks volumes about the way in which some 
families may not want their children to become their own people, and instead 
may encourage them to merely conform to the family’s demands. No comment 
on this aspect is made by Mitchell. The possibility may exist that psychoanalysts 
may not be so keen to criticise the family itself, as it is the very foundation of 
much of psychoanalytic theory.  
                                                 In a later text by Winnicott, published in 1971, he 
provides a further explicit statement that the mother is to blame for not being 
‘good-enough’ if the child then develops a mental illness. ‘…There is no health 
for the human being who has not been started off well enough by the mother.’141 
This statement occurs in a chapter on ‘Transitional Objects and Transitional 
Phenomena’. It condemns possibly many individuals to a state of mental ill-
health, as whether many mothers would be considered ‘good-enough’ by 
Winnicott is subject to debate. It is such a sweeping statement, allied to his 
comments that I have reviewed so far, that Winnicott’s discussions of mothering 
contrast with Laing’s to the extent that the former could generate anxiety, guilt 
and feelings of blame if a mother were to attempt to judge herself by those 
standards. It could be argued that the very term of the ‘good-enough’ mother is 
intended to include the proviso that the mother only has to be reaching the 
minimum standards for adequate mothering. However, as the term remains 
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couched in studies which are laden with conservative assumptions about the 
‘natural’ mothering inclinations of women, it connotes a greater degree of 
mother-blaming than anything that I am conscious of in Laing’s work. There is a 
difference between blame where it is due, and Winnicott’s above universalising 
statement. It is a credit to Laing’s achievements that the fact that his work and 
that from Winnicott, which has been subject to this brief review, were 
contemporaneous seems remarkable. As I have previously argued, Winnicott’s 
work seems like a prehistoric relic in comparison to Laing’s work, which I still 
find to be fresh and of value in present times. 
                                                                       Mitchell claims regarding the 
advances and corrections that Laing’s work makes over Object Relations Theory 
seem misguided in the light of the above review. Winnicott’s work from the 
1960s and 1970s still heralds the conventional family as the bastion of the 
production of mentally well individuals. Her description of Winnicott’s work as 
‘very sensitive’142 ignores his mother-blaming, which is an aspect that she finds 
to be unacceptable in Laing’s work. Another member of the Tavistock Clinic in 
the post-war era was Susan Isaacs, who is subject to some blistering criticism 
from Laing in Self and Others with regard to her concept of ‘unconscious 
experience’.143 The following quotation from Mitchell concerns Isaacs’ work. 
…She would write of how the mother, feeling her child as a 
possession, also therefore saw it as an extension of herself, 
rather than as a person apart. One can see that when the 
reaction set in with Laing and others in the vanguard, it was to 
this sort of formulation perhaps as much as anything else that 
they were objecting.144 
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I am not knowledgable of Isaacs’ work, so I therefore am unable to assess 
whether Mitchell’s comment on her work is correct.  
                                                                                 However, despite his critique 
of Isaac’s work, Laing’s case studies reveal similarities with the above quotation 
in that the mothers concerned fail to see their children as separate individuals. 
Julie’s case study in The Divided Self contains this element, as do some of the 
case studies in Sanity, Madness and the Family. For example, in the chapter on 
‘Family Three: The Churches’, Laing and Esterson provide this statement. ‘One 
notes here the imperviousness of the mother to the daughter as a person separate 
and different from herself. She cannot understand that her daughter does not 
seem to like what she likes.’145 In the chapter on ‘Family Nine: The Irwins’, the 
recurring theme of the text that the daughter’s developing autonomy is taken as 
signs of a mental illness is again apparent. Laing and Esterson state the 
following. 
This is by now a familiar story. What Mrs Irwin finds 
particularly upsetting is the developing distance between 
herself and Mary. They used to be the same, and now they are 
different. It is this difference that, for her mother, seems to be 
the essence of the illness.146 
One wonders whether Mitchell had written her first chapter on the historical 
context surrounding Laing’s work prior to reading any of it. Her summary of 
Isaacs’ work rather neatly parallels these case studies from Laing, in direct 
opposition to Mitchell’s claim that Laing was reacting against this. 
                                                                                                          In a similar 
vein, her claim that Laing ‘…attempted to discredit the location of psychosis in 
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the child’s infantile relationship with the mother’,147 does not sit easily with 
certain examples from Laing’s work where he indicates that the problematic 
mother-child relation does begin with the very young child. The clearest 
expression of this is found again within Julie’s psychobiography in The Divided 
Self. This life history begins from Julie as a baby, and Laing makes it clear that 
her profound lack of autonomy was in existence from the very beginnings of her 
life.148 In Sanity, Madness and the Family, there is not such a great emphasis 
upon taking histories of the infancy of the individuals who come to be seen as 
‘mad’. However, there are occasions where such information is provided. I have 
referred earlier to ‘Family Six: The Fields’, where the mother of the family saw 
fit to tie up her daughter, due to her daughter’s hip problem. In this section, some 
discussion is devoted to the daughter’s early years.149 This is additionally the 
case in three further chapters of this text.150 These studies of the early years of 
the individuals parallel Julie’s case study in the respect that a lack of self-action 
and autonomy were present in these cases from the very beginnings of their lives. 
However, Mitchell’s statement may be referring to Laing’s broadening of the 
time-span in which psychosis is alleged to occur. Object Relations Theory, with 
Winnicott as an example, tends to place an emphasis in this respect upon the 
infantile stage of life alone. However, some further clarifying discussion would 
benefit Mitchell’s comments in this area. 
                                                                With regard to the specific criticism that 
Laing blames mothers for the generation of psychosis within their children, my 
most important objection to this, other than the lack of textual evidence to 
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support this, is that I feel that it is an easy criticism to make of Laing’s work. 
From my perspective, the accusation made by Mitchell that Laing engages in 
mother-blaming is a product again of her forcing a particular interpretation on to 
Laing’s texts. If his work is read in such a manner that the assumption of mother-
blaming is heavily foregrounded in the reader’s mind, then the interpretation of 
the text in such a manner becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. This is especially 
the case with critiques operating from a feminist perspective, as any aspects 
relating to women within Laing’s work run the risk of being inappropriately 
selected for a greater amount of attention than they truly deserve. There is the 
additional issue, which I have confronted briefly before in this thesis, that 
Laing’s criticism of the family strikes at the heart of one of this culture’s most 
cherished institutions. An individual who I had a fruitful discussion with 
regarding Laing, as she is an older person who did her degree at the time of 
Laing’s fame, suggested that Laing’s critical work on the family received such a 
large degree of critique because it speaks a truth that this culture does not like to 
hear.151  
         I do feel that some of the criticism of Laing is reactionary in this manner, 
and is produced because his critics dislike the way in which Laing’s ideas 
challenge conventional assumptions, such as the idea that all families adequately 
nurture their offspring. At some unfortunate stage in our history, the truth 
became controversial. Laing’s conception of truth is that of negative truth, what 
is true is what is not the case. As an example, in Sanity, Madness and the Family, 
the truth contained in this text is that it is not the case that the individuals studied 
therein are suffering from a biological disease. Rather it may be more the case 
                                               
151
 I would like to extend my thanks to Patricia, who I met at the Eclectic Criticism conference at 
Nottingham University on 18/4/08, who suggested this point to me.  
 155 
that they are suffering from their family’s inability to let them become their own 
individuals. Laing’s work is counter-intuitive in this fashion, and is therefore 
subject to a greater degree of misinterpretation if this aspect is not 
comprehended. It is facile to claim that Laing blames mothers, if one goes 
looking for this and ignores the ways in which the whole family environment 
reinforces the individual’s position. 
                                                        A further counter-intuitive, but nevertheless 
highly perceptive and unpleasant, element that Laing identifies with regard to the 
families that he studied is how the attribution of illness is used by the families to 
relieve the blame from their shoulders. Julie’s mother states that: ‘In a way, I 
blame myself but, in a way, I’m glad that it was an illness after all, but if only I 
had not waited so long before I took her to a doctor.’152 An additional example of 
the way in which the child’s alleged illness is used by the parents to relieve the 
blame can be found in Sanity, Madness and the Family. 
Mrs Abbott finally told us (not in Maya’s presence) that she 
prayed that Maya would never remember her ‘illness’ because 
she (Mother) thought it would upset her (the daughter) to do 
so. Indeed, she felt this so strongly that, that it would be 
‘kindest’ if Maya never remembered her ‘illness’, even if it 
meant she had to remain in hospital!153 
Here Mrs Abbott appears to have forgotten that people tend to be in hospital 
because they are ill. This quotation demonstrates a further example of the 
mother’s lack of recognition of the daughter as a person with the capacity for 
autonomous thought. I also find this statement to be highly unnerving, as whether 
‘what is best for Maya’ is a substitution for ‘what is best for us, the parents’ 
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appears to be all but explicitly stated. The accusation of mother-blaming rather 
neatly reinforces the status quo, and the subordinate daughter’s position. 
                                                      One would expect a feminist analysis to 
identify this as a matter for critical analysis. Why are daughters expected to 
conform to their families’ wishes? Mitchell simply writes this off as giving 
‘…support to teenage protest…’,154 whereas I consider this to be a more telling 
aspect than Laing’s supposed ‘mother-blaming’. As Mitchell ignores this, I will 
address this absence in Chapter Seven. A comparative situation to Mrs Abbott’s 
above comments is described by Laing in The Politics of Experience. Laing 
discusses the study of the individual within their wider social nexus. 
Something is wrong somewhere, but it can no longer be seen 
exclusively or even primarily ‘in’ the diagnosed patient. 
            Nor is it a matter of laying the blame at anyone’s 
door…Very seldom is it a question of contrived, deliberate, 
cynical lies or a ruthless intention to drive someone crazy, 
although this occurs more commonly than is usually 
supposed. We have had parents tell us that they would rather 
their child was mad than that he or she realize the truth.155 
This is another unpleasant matter that Laing raises for consideration. The very 
idea that Laing places blame on to the mothers of the families that he has 
investigated is, to summarise, either an attribution of blame where it is due,156 or 
is the product of the imposition of this point of view on to his work. Mitchell 
assumes that Laing blames mothers because he is prejudiced against women. 
Whilst it may not be nice to ponder the idea that mothers may severely mistreat 
their children, nevertheless this is liable to be the case in some instances. Laing’s 
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critics, with Mitchell as an example, would fare better if their critiques were not 
based upon naïve assumptions, such as that held by Mitchell that all mothers are 
good mothers and are therefore blameless. A further problem with the issue of 
blaming an individual, such as the mother, for the situations described by Laing 
is that it reduces any analysis of his work to a rather puerile level. I find it 
intelligible that a reader of his case studies may then decide to try and identify 
‘the cause’ of it, or ‘who is to blame’. However, it is a credit to Laing (and 
Esterson) that such simplistic notions are avoided through their presentation of 
the material. It is liable that, as Laing states in the above quotation, no one is to 
blame in the conventional sense of the term, because the individuals concerned 
do not realise the damage that they are occasioning. 
                                                                                  Mitchell further criticises 
Sanity, Madness and the Family in the following manner. 
…The number of interviews with the patient’s mother far 
exceeds those of the father, who receives in almost all cases 
two interviews, whilst the mother may be given as many as 
twenty-nine.157 
This criticism is simply a re-statement of a problem with the methodology of the 
research which is acknowledged fully in the text by Laing and Esterson. ‘As 
such, the focus remains somewhat on the identified patient, or on the mother-
daughter relationship,… rather than on the nexus itself.’158 Their self-critique of 
Sanity, Madness and the Family in the introduction goes much further than the 
above problem. They note that ‘…an interview is itself not a naturally occurring 
family situation’,159 that they are dissatisfied with their method of recording the 
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interviews,160 and that the material is intentionally limited, particularly in terms 
of making interpretations ‘…whether existential or psychoanalytic.’161 This latter 
point is of relevance to Mitchell’s views, since she critiques Laing for not 
offering further interpretations of the material that he makes use of. However, 
with a fair amount of problems identified by the researchers themselves, with 
regard to this text, Mitchell only sees fit to criticise it on the above grounds. In 
this way she amplifies one problem with the text, simply in an attempt to 
reinforce her claim that Laing is prejudiced against women. 
                                                                                              Mitchell suggests that 
‘…by chance, all Laing’s detailed accounts are of ‘schizophrenic’ women.’162 I 
argued in an earlier footnote that this is a misrepresentation of Laing’s work, 
since not all of Laing’s case studies are of women, and in The Divided Self and 
Self and Others, psychobiographies of male patients are highly prominent. In the 
former text, a great deal of attention is paid by Laing to the case study of James, 
who additionally shows a similarity in terms of a lack of autonomy with many of 
Laing’s other case studies. I referred to David’s psychobiography earlier in this 
chapter, due to his gender confusion issues, which are omitted by Mitchell. He 
also receives a substantial amount of attention within The Divided Self. An entire 
chapter is devoted to ‘The Case of Peter’. In Self and Others, two male examples 
are used in Laing’s chapter on ‘Complementary Identity’. Mitchell again appears 
to be engaging in her Procrustean method of analysis, where she cuts out any 
aspects which do not fit into her discussion. It is surprising that Mitchell did not 
see fit to criticise Laing on the basis of her claim that all of his lengthy 
psychobiographies are of women.  
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                                                      In Mitchell’s 1999 introduction to 
Psychoanalysis and Feminism, she produces one of her most coherent critiques 
of Laing’s work. She notes that in an earlier essay, she had  
…tried to intervene in those accounts of the family that 
presented it as a unit, either functional… or dysfunctional (as 
with the 1960s assaults on it typified by R.D. Laing). Such a 
unity echoed rhetorical positions and froze the concept of the 
family in any given time.163 
In the above quotation, Mitchell is suggesting that the family is presented in a 
reified form within Laing’s work. I consider this to be a fair criticism of his 
work, as the relation of the family itself to the broader historical context is not 
explicitly commented on by Laing at any stage. This absence within his work is 
additionally identified by Scorpio in his 1969 interview with Laing. Scorpio puts 
forward the suggestion that the family was viewed then as in a state of near-
breakdown,164 and proceeds to enquire whether Laing thought that the form of 
the family would alter. Scorpio notes that in Laing’s work he regards the family 
as ‘…a sort of primal unit… which will probably go on.’165 Laing himself shows 
an awareness of this omission in his work. 
I don’t think I’ve ever written anything to the effect that I 
regard the family as we know it, the urban western nuclear 
family, two generations, parents and children, as anything else 
but a very unusual social form that has developed recently in 
particular socio-economic circumstances…166 
The discussion in the interview is highly informative regarding the nuclear 
family. We tend to regard the social arrangements that we inhabit as having 
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always existed. To think of the nuclear family as only having prevailed for 
around one hundred and fifty years167 is a staggering thought, as is the fact that 
‘…it still doesn’t exist anywhere else than in the industrialised complex.’168                        
                                                     Nevertheless, with regard to Laing’s work, I 
regard this as an absence rather than as a matter for full critique. If this element is 
taken into account, Laing’s critique of the family therefore becomes criticism of 
this specific social form. However, if the recent and culturally specific nature of 
the nuclear family had been discussed at some point in Laing’s work, this may 
have added to his critique of it. Despite this, I consider Laing to have made a 
sufficient contribution in terms of his analysis of the peculiar and suffocating 
form that the nuclear family can take. The family as an agent of conformity is an 
idea that is present within Laing’s work. The relevance of this to the wider 
cultural expectations of our present society lies in the fact that repression and 
conformity are facts that we historically continue to endure in the wider world 
beyond the family, especially in the arena of paid employment. To consider the 
nuclear family as a recent and unusual social formation has large implications for 
psychoanalysis, which, other than in Freud’s theory of the primal family,169 
additionally considers the family in a reified form. 
                                                                               In the interview with Scorpio, 
Laing does suggest that the nuclear family will ‘…no doubt… come and go 
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according to circumstances.’170 Laing additionally suggests that the nuclear 
family itself puts a great deal of pressure upon the parents themselves. 
…It’s difficult to think of any social form where so much is 
expected of two people by others, where they expect so much 
of each other and of themselves. These two people have got to 
find their total sexual satisfaction and any form of intimacy 
and most of their consolation and support… and delight in life 
from each other and no one else: I refer to what is still the 
‘ideal’ in terms of which people still feel failures.171 
A further aspect that is not commented upon in Laing’s work is the matter of 
why the parents, and the other family members, treat their children so badly. I 
consider this again as an absence, rather than as a matter for critique. The above 
quotation suggests that the huge amount of social pressure which bears down on 
the parents may provide a clue as to an explanation for this. The mothers of 
families, in particular, seem to suffer the most in contemporary society, where 
free time is becoming increasingly scarce. Unfortunately humans have a 
tendency to take out their frustrations on others, who typically are the weakest 
and most powerless individuals. Children fulfil both of these latter criteria. 
However, a problem here is that as Laing frequently suggests in his work, the 
parents, and the rest of the family, may not even be aware of what they are doing. 
 Responses to Other Critics, and Praise of Laing 
                                                 
In Mitchell’s substantial sections on Laing in Psychoanalysis and Feminism, she 
additionally provides some responses to the criticism of Laing, and some praise 
for his work. These will be subject to a brief review before this chapter is 
concluded. In terms of Mitchell’s responses to Laing’s critics, she argues against 
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Sedgwick’s criticism of Interpersonal Perception. Sedgwick is Laing’s most 
cited critic, and his critique will be subject to a review later in this thesis. 
Sedgwick suggests that Interpersonal Perception simply reflects the assumptions 
of ‘…orthodox marital counselling…’,172 and is therefore merely a ‘…liberal-
reformist…’173 work rather than a radical one. Mitchell argues that this is a true 
statement to a certain extent, but that ‘…the aim of the research is to discover a 
system of rapid testing which can be used therapeutically…’174 Mitchell’s 
identification that Sedgwick’s criticism of Interpersonal Perception runs counter 
to the stated aims of that text is valuable. However, I feel that both accounts 
ignore the significant discussions and criticism of the focus on the individual 
within psychology to the exclusion of their wider social context that is present 
within this text. These comments are located within the first section of 
Interpersonal Perception, which is comprised of three chapters pertaining to the 
theory behind the method, but additionally run throughout the text. The 
theoretical chapters contain some further critique of psychoanalysis, and of 
Object Relations Theory as scarcely having developed beyond the premises of 
psychoanalysis. 
Object-relations theory is concerned with internal dynamic 
structure, supposed to consist of a central ego and other egos, 
each with correlated objects. Once more, objects not persons 
are involved; once more the relationship between persons is 
undeveloped theoretically… The “objects” in object-relations 
theory are internal objects not other persons.175              
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Mitchell’s response to Sedgwick’s criticism of Interpersonal Perception, and her 
own omission with regard to it, suggest that Laing’s critics may have a tendency 
to select the easiest element of a given text to critique, and then ignore other key 
aspects. The fact that this text was not authored alone by Laing is also omitted. 
Laing’s co-writers fall under the shadow cast by Laing’s fame. 
                                                                                                    Mitchell notes 
that: ‘many critics have decried Laing’s descent / ascent into mysticism, but it is 
clearly the completely logical progress of his preoccupations.’176 Here her tracing 
of the lines of development within Laing’s work serve her well (although they do 
at times go astray). I have argued a similar point in my previous chapter on 
Deleuze and Guattari that Laing’s mystical comments, with the voyage as an 
example, do not make a sudden appearance in his work, as is assumed by some 
of his critics, but instead are the product of the advancement of certain concepts 
throughout his work. 
                                It is interesting that Mitchell notes in her 1999 introduction 
that ‘…neither at the time of publication nor at any time since, did anyone really 
notice the sections on Wilhelm Reich and R.D. Laing.’177 Mitchell’s sections on 
Laing are briefly evaluated by Kotowicz in his 1997 book on Laing. Kotowicz 
argues that despite Mitchell’s proximity in her views to orthodox psychoanalysis, 
her critique of Laing is ‘…thorough, the least emotionally charged, and the least 
ideologically determined.’178 I agree with this comment by Kotowicz to some 
extent. She does avoid the error of only examining snippets of Laing’s work, and 
avoids criticising Laing in a reactionary manner.  
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                                                          Certain aspects of Mitchell’s praise for Laing 
do elucidate key aspects of Laing’s contributions. At the very end of her sections 
on Laing, she provides a quotation from Freud where he states that he is glad that 
biochemical explanations for forms of neuroses have become obsolete.179 
Mitchell comments that schizophrenia can be added to the list of types of distress 
identified by Freud that are beyond the reach of ‘…naïve biochemists…’,180 and 
that this is ‘thanks to Laing…’181 However, this praise for this element of Laing’s 
work suffers from being placed at the very end of her sections, and from 
receiving no further discussion. In an earlier chapter, Mitchell suggests that: 
Laing’s work demands attention both because of his 
popularity and influence… and because he claims a lot for his 
discoveries… The fact that he has a coherent attitude and a 
battle to fight make him… stand out. Like Wilhelm Reich he 
is a dominant psychopolitical ideologist.182 
This latter view of Laing’s work is thought-provoking because his work is not 
typically viewed in such a manner. However, Mitchell’s view of Laing as an 
ideologist does link to her critique of his ‘science of persons’. Since she views 
this aspect of Laing’s work as not constitutive of a proper science, she therefore 
decides that it is reflective and ideological.183 Nevertheless, the way in which 
Mitchell throws in praise for Laing in the midst of criticism of his work dilutes 
both of her efforts in these areas. This mixing of praise and criticism could have 
been avoided on her behalf by structuring her discussion in such a way that these 
elements were discussed separately. It may be a reflection of her respect for 
                                               
179
 Psychoanalysis and Feminism, pp.291-292 
180
 ibid, p.292 
181
 op. cit. 
182
 ibid, p.277 
183
 ibid, p.273 
 165 
Laing that these identifications of the benefits of his work do appear within her 
critique. 
            In her first chapter on Laing and the social and historical context 
surrounding his ideas, Mitchell asks an important question.  
Does [Laing’s work] show us a way forward in understanding 
the oppression of women as it takes place within the family 
that is supposed to give them both their definition and their 
rationale?184 
I was expecting a substantive response to this question to be provided within 
Mitchell’s later discussions. However, it never appears. The later sections in 
which she comes close to a reply are rather inchoate, and additionally may have 
been better developed in a separate section. Too many differing trains of analysis 
are run together in Mitchell’s chapters on Laing, with a resulting lack of clarity 
in some respects. Since Mitchell does not truly respond to the above question, I 
will deploy this as a line of enquiry in my chapter on a feminist reading of Laing. 
One of the benefits of Mitchell’s considerable analysis of Laing’s work is that 
she does evaluate his work in a manner that regards it as fully distinct from that 
of Cooper. She additionally does not conflate Laing’s thought with the wider 
anti-psychiatric movement. These two elements comprise a considerable advance 
upon the critiques that have been evaluated thus far in this thesis, where at times 
it is unclear whether Laing himself is the subject of the critique.  
                                                                                                     The accusation of 
only having read a small quantity of Laing’s oeuvre cannot be levelled at 
Mitchell, and she provides some discussion of lesser-evaluated works such as 
Interpersonal Perception and Reason and Violence. She takes a scholarly 
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approach for the most part of her sections on Laing. There is only one occasion 
where she cites a piece of Laing’s work as originating from a text incorrectly.185 
This approach, allied to her tracing of the lines of development throughout the 
majority of Laing’s work aids her discussion. For these reasons, I remain 
sympathetic to Mitchell’s critique of Laing, despite the deficiencies with certain 
aspects of it. A substantial problem lies with her tendency to critique Laing for 
an alleged prejudice against women. I feel that this is generated more by her 
defence of the mothers featured in Laing’s work, rather than by any real textual 
evidence being in existence to support her claim. Mitchell appears to assume that 
because the mothers are female, and Mitchell is a feminist therefore she must 
defend the mothers. However, this does not extend to the daughters of the 
families studied in Laing’s work. An analysis of the positions of both would 
contribute to an evaluation of how Laing’s work may contain some insights into 
the position of women, and how women may be subjugated within their families. 
With regard to Mitchell’s critique of Laing, it is apparent to me that her 
misunderstanding of some key elements of his work have the effect of throwing 
her critique out of line. Her lack of comprehension of the aims of 
phenomenology is a key problem involved in this respect. Some of her criticism 
does view Laing’s thought as more simplistic than it actually is. Her comments 
on Laing’s ‘science of persons’, and the way in which she assumes that this must 
constitute a form of conventional science in order to be legitimate is a good 
example of this. Mitchell’s forcing of psychoanalytic material on to Laing’s 
work, and her critique of him as not taking sufficiently into account certain 
psychoanalytic concepts is a further problem. Additionally, she has a tendency to 
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engage in what I have termed a Procrustean method of critique, where she cuts 
out any aspects of Laing’s work that do not fit into her line of criticism. 
Nevertheless, Mitchell’s criticism of Laing contains a greater level of validity, 
and is far more admirable in terms of its scholarly approach, than that of 
Showalter, which will be evaluated in the next chapter. 
 168 
6) Feminist Critiques of Laing II  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the validity of Elaine Showalter’s 
critique of Laing in The Female Malady (1985), which attempts to criticise Laing 
along feminist lines. Showalter’s critique of Laing falls considerably short of 
making cogent criticisms of his work. However, it is worth an examination 
because it serves to highlight further some of the profound misunderstandings 
that exist regarding Laing and his work. Showalter’s attempted critique of Laing 
additionally illustrates negatively the principles that are required for an incisive 
critique of an author’s work.  
Showalter’s Critique of Laing 
 
Showalter’s criticism of Laing occurs within one single chapter of The Female 
Malady. The very title of the chapter itself is significant as the problem contained 
therein resonates throughout the entire piece. It is called ‘Women, Madness and 
the Family: R.D. Laing and the Culture of AntiPsychiatry.’ The complications 
involved in the conflation of Laing with the wider anti-psychiatric movement 
once more rear their head. My previous discussion earlier in this thesis, in my 
section on Clare, with regard to the fact that Laing was not a true anti-
psychiatrist per se does not require restating, other than in the respect that this is 
a frequently recurring element in the problematic critiques of Laing. The lack of 
clarity that results from this conflation leads one to the consideration that Laing 
becomes the ‘fall guy’ for the entire anti-psychiatric movement, and Cooper in 
particular. This is highly in evidence throughout Showalter’s chapter on Laing. I 
will deal with this particular aspect first. 
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                                  Showalter does note that it was Cooper, and not Laing, that 
gave anti-psychiatry its name.1 However, this brief comment is not given its full 
due, as Cooper’s and Laing’s ideas are run together throughout the chapter. It 
would have been far better for Showalter to have considered these authors 
separately in separate sections. In a similar vein to Mitchell, Showalter makes 
some under-developed comments that ‘Laingian theory interpreted female 
schizophrenia as the product of women’s repression and oppression within the 
family.’2 Whilst there is some validity to this interpretation, her first few pages of 
discussion of Laing simply describe some fairly well-known aspects of his work, 
such as Laing’s questioning of the medical model of psychological distress.3 This 
is a further issue with Showalter’s critique of Laing. Far too much of her chapter 
simply describes aspects of Laing’s work and life as opposed to making the 
effort to analyse or offer anything new with regard to it. Additionally, Showalter 
has a similar taste for providing unanswered questions to Mitchell. Showalter 
questions: ‘…did radical antipsychiatry finally have any more to offer women 
than did its predecessors, and did R.D. Laing… fulfill the expectations his 
studies had created?’4 
                                 Some further questions are posed by Showalter which 
expose the poverty of the approach that she takes to Laing’s work. 
But what of the therapy itself? And what of the personality 
and ideology of its central figure? What happens if we look at 
antipsychiatry from a feminist perspective?5 
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The very fact that Showalter takes this approach is ominous in terms of 
indicating what form the rest of her discussion will take. It may be a fair 
consideration that biographical work on Laing could potentially have been far 
more interesting and unusual in 1985 when The Female Malady was published. 
There are a number of biographies of Laing available now, both of which were 
published in the 1990s.6 Therefore, Showalter’s biographical considerations in 
her chapter on Laing may have had a greater relevance when her text was 
originally published. In this manner, her text has not aged well. Her desire to 
moralise over Laing’s life leads one to the suspicion that Showalter was not able 
to take a full scholarly approach in terms of her consideration of Laing, unlike 
Mitchell. Showalter prefers to make ad hominem criticisms, as opposed to 
criticising Laing’s theories themselves. 
                                                            However, some of Showalter’s criticisms of 
Laing closely echo those made by Mitchell. Psychoanalysis and Feminism is 
cited within Showalter’s chapter on Laing, where some of Mitchell’s praise for 
Laing is identified.7 However, in the footnote to Showalter’s reference to 
Mitchell, the former suggests that there is an ‘…extreme sexism…’ apparent in 
‘…Laingian therapy in its later phases…’8 No evidence, textual or otherwise, is 
provided in order to support this assertion. Instead, the assumption of sexism on 
Laing’s behalf is an interpretation which is conjured up by Showalter. The 
following quotation provides an example of this sloppy approach. 
In antipsychiatry… the typical patient… was female, and the 
woman’s role remained that of patient rather than doctor. In 
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Laing’s early work, the majority of case studies describe 
women struggling with conflicting messages about femininity 
from their family and the society, but these potential theories 
of gender are not developed in the studies themselves.9 
Showalter provides no evidence of the numbers of male and female ‘patients’ 
who resided in alternative therapeutic households such as Kingsley Hall. The 
above statement is a generalisation made about her rather lurid and biased 
account of Mary Barnes’ time spent at the above place. This will be investigated 
shortly. Whether Showalter’s first sentence in the above quotation properly 
reflects an intentionally male-dominated power structure at Kingsley Hall, or the 
fact that the role of doctor tends to be taken on by men in our culture, and the 
role of patient (particularly that of the psychiatric patient) tends to be given to 
women, is something that is not considered.  
                                                                     Here I would like to remind the reader 
that male case studies do feature prominently in Laing’s early work, which I have 
referred to in my chapter on Mitchell. The above quotation from Showalter 
conveniently ignores this. It is also worth bearing in mind that in Laing’s day, 
psychiatric wards were single-sex, as opposed to mixed-sex, as they are now. 
Laing describes the excitement of female patients at seeing a new male on the 
ward, during the beginnings of his career in psychiatry in the 1950s. 
Hospital wards at that time were either all women or all men 
so if it was a man, apart from a workman, a guy doing the 
windows or plumbing or something like that, to actually be in 
the ward was very unusual.10 
This provides the reason for all of the case studies in Sanity, Madness and the 
Family being of female patients. They were selected from two specific hospitals, 
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both of which housed female patients.11 Rather than demonstrating misogyny on 
behalf of Laing, his focus on such female case studies is more mundanely a 
reflection of the way in which psychiatric wards were structured at that stage in 
history. However, nothing was preventing Laing from conducting his research in 
a male psychiatric ward. 
                                     Nevertheless, these unexamined assumptions lead 
Showalter to the conclusion that ‘like other radical movements of the 1960s, 
antipsychiatry in practice was male-dominated, yet unaware of its own sexism.’12 
I am aware of no evidence that anti-psychiatry was intentionally excluding of 
women in the manner that Showalter suggests. Her criticism may be indicative of 
a more substantial point than she actually makes. From my experience, counter-
cultural movements, in general tend to be male-dominated.13 Men are given 
greater room to rebel within our culture. Women are still expected to live a 
largely conformist life, or they receive a huge amount of criticism. The way in 
which female existence is still seen as embedded within the family forms, in my 
view, one aspect of the pressure to conform which is placed upon women. 
Showalter fails to bring in further considerations as to why anti-psychiatry was 
male-dominated, and views this simply as a reflection of sexism on behalf of 
those that participated in this movement. I do not consider such a simplistic view 
of this to be fully valid. Rather, all Showalter highlights, without this being stated 
as such, is that counter-cultural movements tend to be male-dominated, and that 
this is a product of the cultural prescriptions placed upon the different genders. In 
this vein, Showalter does not demonstrate an ability to transcend the issues that 
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she identifies with Laing’s work, in terms of the notion that Laing ignores gender 
relations. I have assessed this claim in my previous chapter on Mitchell. 
Showalter does not present a critical discussion of such issues herself. She 
instead also engages in ‘playground feminism’. In this manner, she ignores the 
wider social and historical context, which may have enabled a greater depth of 
analysis on her behalf, had she drawn upon such considerations. 
                                                                                                    Showalter does 
note that Laing did later clarify his position on anti-psychiatry, arguing that he 
was not happy to be labelled in such a manner.14 However, she views this as an 
attempt on Laing’s behalf to simply change his views in line with differing times, 
rather than as a statement of his actual position.15 It may be of relevance here that 
if Showalter had given this matter its due, then it would throw her previous 
discussions into some considerable difficulties. Her entire chapter is predicated 
on the assumption that Laing was an anti-psychiatrist, and that there was little 
substantial difference between Laing and Cooper. These assumptions render her 
critique unclear, as the subject of her criticism is not Laing alone. Showalter does 
note that Cooper was ‘…the most politically radical of the Kingsley Hall 
group…’16  
In The Grammar of Living, Cooper advocates sex with 
patients, which he calls “bed therapy”, as a useful way to 
establish contact… Cooper seems blind… to the ethical issues 
involved when he picks up a beautiful twenty-year-old 
schizophrenic Dutch woman… whom he takes home, feeds, 
and “makes love with”.17 
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This somewhat worrying account is however, thrown in at the very end of 
Showalter’s chapter. This leads me to the consideration that she should have 
provided a more sustained and direct critique of Cooper, rather than tangential 
criticism of Laing. However, to compare the above ‘…to the rape of asylum 
patients by their keepers’,18 shows that Showalter is happy to stereotype women 
as helpless, pathetic individuals who simply obey those who have a greater level 
of social power than themselves. The above account may either be more innocent 
than she claims, or may well be exploitative on Cooper’s behalf. The precise 
relevance of this to a critique of Laing, other than suggesting that his colleagues 
were not angels either, is not stated. 
                                                        I now wish to look at Showalter’s claims 
regarding the psychotic voyage, and the way in which she transposes her 
comments on it on to her account of Mary Barnes’ time spent at Kingsley Hall. 
Showalter makes some profound errors in terms of her use of inaccurate evidence 
with regard to these elements, both actual and textual. With regard to the chapter 
of The Politics of Experience that features Jesse Watkins’ voyage, Showalter 
makes the following suggestion. 
Laing imposed his own terminology of spiritual death and 
rebirth on Watkins’s narrative, and added his own 
interpretation of the role of the “physician-priest” who 
accompanies the patient.19 
In my earlier chapter on Deleuze and Guattari, I put forward the argument that 
one of the contributions made in Laing’s case studies, including Watkins’ 
account of the voyage, is Laing’s willingness to let the patient or person speak 
for themselves. Showalter’s statement in the above quotation is a complete 
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misrepresentation of ‘A Ten-Day Voyage’, since the vast majority of the chapter 
is directly quoted from Watkins. The notion that the individual undertaking the 
voyage requires a guide is a suggestion made by Watkins himself,20 instead of 
being a construction placed by Laing upon the account, as is claimed by 
Showalter. This example is indicative of a tendency upon her behalf to merely 
describe aspects of Laing’s work in a manner which is not only inaccurate, but 
which also loses something of the quality of the original. 
                                                                                         Showalter’s omission in 
her critique of the fact that Laing does allow his patients to speak for themselves 
nullifies another of her claims.  
…Men speaking for women – even with love – may stifle 
their language and being… Over and over again, Laing’s 
women, the women of antipsychiatry, appear as latter-day 
Ophelias and Cassandras whose voices are silenced and 
whose prophecies go unheeded.21 
The first point that Showalter makes is adequate. However, I would view any 
individual speaking for another (if it was an imposed situation) as stifling the 
other person. The way in which Showalter views this as a specific situation in 
terms of men speaking for women has some validity, if it was referring to the 
overall social situation in terms of power relations between the genders, but no 
evidence is provided to support her relation of this to Laing’s work. 
Alternatively, Showalter’s above criticism follows a lengthy discussion of 
various pieces of fiction and dramas which were either inspired by Laing, or 
which contain Laingian themes. It does not follow a critical evaluation of Laing’s 
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actual work. Many of the critiques of Laing have an aura of expediency about 
them. Showalter’s criticism reaches the nadir of critique for critique’s sake. 
                                                 Showalter provides a quotation from The Politics 
of Experience which she interprets as suggesting that the voyage is viewed by 
Laing as ‘…archetypally epic, heroic and masculine…’ 22 Her perception of 
Laing as being obsessed with ‘the metaphors of heroic adventure and 
conquest…’23 is a theme that she builds up throughout her chapter. In what is 
essentially a re-hash of Laing’s memories of his early life in The Facts of Life, 
Showalter claims that: ‘in Laing’s personal vision…, he was clearly destined for 
heroic action from the start.’24 In her account of his time spent at university, 
Showalter suggests that Laing had a ‘…constant predilection for extreme 
experiences through which he could test his capacities for heroism.’25 
Showalter’s view of the journey as masculine and heroic is an interpretation 
which she imports from these portrayals of Laing’s life. I have never considered 
the voyage to be specifically gendered in this way. It has always been my view 
that the journey could be something undergone by any individual, whether male 
or female. Laing’s accounts of it are not exclusively allocated a male protagonist. 
Arguably, given greater overall rates of female mental distress, the voyage may 
be a female one, rather than a male one.  
                                                             The example of the voyage cited by 
Jaspers that Laing utilises in The Politics of Experience does not contain a 
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statement of what the gender was of the individual providing the account.26 
Showalter appears to be taking the fact that Watkins was male as far more 
significant than this aspect truly is. A further similarity can be noted here with 
Mitchell’s critique of Laing. Showalter’s construction of the journey as male, 
which is an assumption that is derived from non-existent textual evidence, is then 
imposed on to her account of Mary Barnes’ time which was spent at Kingsley 
Hall. Barnes was the most famous resident of Kingsley Hall, due to her 
experiences within the alternative therapeutic community.27 She co-authored a 
book with Laing’s colleague and fellow therapist at Kingsley Hall, Joseph 
Berke.28 However, Showalter’s claims are not supported by Barnes’ actual text 
itself. 
At Kingsley Hall… Laing’s model patient was a woman. 
While he may have been hoping for a Sylvia Plath or an 
Antonin Artaud to guide through the void into hypersanity, 
only Mary Barnes, a Catholic nurse in her forties, showed up 
at Kingsley Hall to take the round trip.29 
Where any explicit statement regarding what Laing viewed as a ‘model patient’, 
(which is in itself a most un-Laingian concept) is to be found within his texts is 
not stated by Showalter. Laing himself argued that he had never ‘…used her as 
an example or a paradigm case or set her up in anything I’ve written or in 
lectures I’ve given.’30 
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                               The above quotation from Showalter, in addition to the 
following one, demonstrates two severe problems with Showalter’s attempted 
critique of Laing. 
Although Laing made the most of Mary Barnes’s “recovery”, 
I suspect that her voyage was disappointingly unlike his 
expectations… The image of the schizophrenic voyage that 
Laing had created… was a male adventure of exploration and 
conquest… Faced with the obligation to play mother on the 
psychic journey, Laing seems to have lost enthusiasm for it.31 
The first substantial problem with the above criticism is that Showalter simply 
presumes that she knows what Laing would have been thinking at the time of the 
events that she describes. Imaginative assumptions cannot form the basis of a 
valid critique of any author’s work. The reliability of presuming to know what 
another individual was thinking cannot be guaranteed. The second substantial 
problem with these comments by Showalter is that she has not identified the facts 
of Mary Barnes’ time spent at Kingsley Hall correctly. It was not Laing himself 
who had ‘…to spend three years changing diapers, giving bottles, and generally 
wiping up after a noisy, jealous, smelly middle-aged woman’,32 but Berke, 
amongst others. Therefore, Showalter’s claim that, faced with heavy 
responsibilities of care, Laing lost his interest in the voyage is unfounded. This is 
also abundantly clear from Barnes’ text itself. Barnes desperately wanted Laing 
to be her therapist, but before Berke took over, Esterson was her therapist, which 
Barnes was angry about.33 Indeed, Barnes had a number of carers whilst she was 
at Kingsley Hall.34 However, none of those individuals were Laing. 
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                                                                               The fact that Showalter’s 
critique is not based upon correct and reliable evidence throws its validity into 
strong doubt. Laing himself notes that Berke was Barnes’ therapist in Mad to be 
Normal.35 Kotowicz additionally raises the point of the inaccuracy of 
Showalter’s critique, and suggests that her reading of Laing’s actual work is 
poor.36 He further argues that Showalter’s piece is not really a critique of Laing, 
but is instead simply a character assassination.37 Her tendency to make ad 
hominem attacks upon Laing within the chapter does support Kotowicz’s 
conclusions. A scholarly critique should have no need to operate upon this level. 
It may be easier to launch a personal attack upon an individual, as opposed to 
engaging with actual theories themselves. Showalter’s claim that the text co-
authored by Barnes and Berke permits a comparison between the male 
psychiatrist and the female patient’s accounts of their experiences38 is not 
developed in any substantial analytical depth. In Mad to be Normal, some 
sections of Mullan’s discourse with Laing are directly devoted to identifying 
these falsities in Showalter’s work. As I have previously mentioned, Laing noted 
that he was not Barnes’ therapist. Laing also suggests that he was far more 
sympathetic to Barnes’ sections of the text that she participated in with Berke, 
than he was to the parts written by Berke. 
I think that what she wrote in that book, as I remember it, 
really pleasantly surprised me. What Joe wrote… didn’t 
impress me at the time… But Mary was seriously baring her 
heart and soul and her experience to try to convince other 
                                               
35
 Mad to be Normal, p.198. Laing states on p.185 that he never took on Barnes as a patient. 
36
 Kotowicz, Z, (1997), R.D. Laing and the Paths of Anti-Psychiatry, London, Routledge, 
p.102 
37
 ibid, p.105 
38
 The Female Malady, p.232 
 180 
people that there was something to be said for the way she did 
it and I quite respected that.39 
I fully agree with Laing’s comments in this quotation. Barnes’ sections of her 
text with Berke are excellent. Showalter’s account of this does not do it justice. 
Barnes has provided another first-hand account of experiencing psychosis, in a 
similar manner to Watkins’ account, ‘A Ten-Day Voyage’, in The Politics of 
Experience.40 She provides excellent descriptions of her mental state.               
                                           A significant omission in Showalter’s account of 
Mary Barnes and her residence at Kingsley Hall, and something which is absent 
in other biographical accounts, is that Laing suggests in Mad to be Normal that 
Barnes was a self-publicist, and that she was ‘…an evangelist for a certain type 
of trip – going down and coming up.’41 These comments are not made in such a 
manner as to deny the validity of Barnes’ experiences, however. Nevertheless, 
Barnes’ brother was, according to Laing, in arguably a worse state than herself. 
I had a great deal of concern for her brother who was the real 
– you’ve got to say this with double treble irony – the real 
schizophrenic… He was in real despair and was seriously 
struggling his way out of it… Mary had a mission to save 
him… We completely agreed about mental hospitals and the 
use of heavy medication.42 
This may be viewed by feminist critics of Laing as him showing a greater level 
of concern for a male individual who was suffering from extreme mental distress, 
as opposed to for the female Barnes. However, I would view this from an 
alternative angle as providing a further example of the way in which female 
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mental distress is viewed as far more significant than male distress by feminist 
critics. Such arguments are insufficiently grounded through the suggestions made 
that women deserve to be seen as special cases, simply because they are female.  
                                                     Barnes’ text additionally supports Laing’s 
suggestions here, with regard to her brother. Mary wanted both herself and her 
brother Peter to ‘…live together in a psychotherapeutic community.’43 Peter 
spent most of his time in mental hospitals, and Mary describes him as being 
suicidal.44 Laing met both of them when Mary was trying to get help with their 
mental distress.45 Mary Barnes originally wanted Anna Freud (Sigmund’s 
daughter) to be her analyst, and was upset when she was rejected by her.46 Mary 
appears to have been unaware of the limitations of psychoanalysis for dealing 
with schizophrenia. Some of Barnes’ text does support Laing’s claim that she 
was a self-publicist. She describes herself as wanting ‘…to be on T.V. or in 
books…’47 However, this consideration should not lessen the fact that she was 
clearly experiencing extreme mental anguish during the time that she was writing 
about. 
         Laing’s fame has attracted some very poor work regarding his life and 
ideas. An article claiming to be an interview with Laing in Vogue from 1969 
operates on a similar level to that of Showalter, but without attempting any 
critique of his work.48 The article is not written from a feminist point of view, but 
shares with Showalter a tendency to make unsubstantiated claims about Laing. 
The first false claim made in the Vogue article is that it is an interview with 
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Laing. However, no actual dialogue with Laing is provided. Instead, Inglis 
merely states that he had met Laing on a few occasions.49 The reading and 
interpretation of Laing’s work contained in the article occurs on a highly 
simplistic and inaccurate level, with Inglis claiming that Laing has ‘…given us a 
glimpse… of the treasure house of the unconscious mind.’50 The article further 
shares with Showalter a tendency to merely describe Laing’s biography and basic 
ideas, and to attribute ideas to him which do not actually originate from Laing 
himself. The Vogue article demonstrates that both critique as character 
assassination, and hagiography (which is essentially what is contained in the 
Vogue piece), as approaches to an author’s work produce irrelevant material. 
However, I remain unsurprised that an article in a fashion magazine failed to 
contain a high level of analysis of Laing’s work. What is remarkable was the 
extent of Laing’s celebrity, which is reflected in the fact that such publications as 
Vogue saw fit to run articles on him. In contemporary times, individuals become 
famous for having made no real contributions to any area of study or life. 
                   To conclude this section, Showalter’s attempted critique of Laing 
contains the least valid criticisms of his work out of any of the critiques that have 
been reviewed so far in this thesis. Even the conservative psychiatric critiques 
make at least the effort to try and engage with Laing’s theories themselves, as 
opposed to his life, even if these attempts are subject to misreadings and 
misinterpretations. Showalter’s critique of Laing, when she does try to deal with 
his theories, simply parrots Mitchell’s criticisms, without offering any new 
perspectives on these views. Showalter’s chapter on Laing contains far too much 
pure description of his biography and concepts, with no substantial or subtle 
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analysis of either. It further contains a great deal of discussion of secondary 
sources, which are only tangentially related to Laing’s work. Her chapter is more 
of a critique of anti-psychiatry and Cooper than Laing himself. Showalter 
assumes that guilt by association is sufficient to indict Laing with the problems 
that she attempts to identify with Cooper and the wider anti-psychiatric 
movement. Very little of her chapter on Laing fully relates to Laing and his work 
itself. The evidence that Showalter makes the effort to utilise is flawed. 
However, speaking as a woman, I find the fact that this is supposed to be a 
feminist critique of Laing to be the worst aspect of all. Showalter is happy to 
deploy stereotyped gender roles in order to try and justify her assumptions 
regarding Laing. Her view that all female patients are therefore helpless, pathetic, 
victims is an example of this. It may be the case that some female patients are 
placed in such positions. Nevertheless, from my perspective, a feminist analysis 
should be precisely questioning these sorts of stereotypes, rather than providing 
them with further reinforcement. The fact that Showalter’s critique operates in 
this manner, and claims to be speaking in women’s name, further illustrates my 
consideration that this is the worst critique of Laing that I have evaluated thus 
far. The next chapter is intended as a necessary corrective to Showalter’s and 
Mitchell’s criticism of Laing as being prejudiced against women. 
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7) Arguments for a Feminist Reading of Laing 
 
This chapter is comprised of my arguments that Laing’s work can be read in such 
a manner that it can be seen as of benefit to women. It identifies aspects of his 
work which either stand in sharp contrast to Mitchell and Showalter’s claims that 
Laing is prejudiced against women in some way (claims which I view as lacking 
in any real textual or other evidence), or which have been poorly developed or 
missed by Mitchell and Showalter. Empirical evidence regarding levels of 
psychosis and the life circumstances (including gender) of individuals who are 
seen as suffering from some form of psychotic distress are additionally reviewed, 
as a means of identifying whether women should be accorded the special 
treatment that Laing’s feminist critics claim is appropriate. 
                                                                                           I have found Mitchell 
and Showalter’s accusations that Laing is extremely sexist to be shocking, as 
these claims have never occurred to me previously. In my over a decade-long 
engagement with Laing’s work, one of the benefits of his ideas for me has been 
precisely the absence of statements that women are inferior to men, or any 
implicit suggestions to that effect. Some of Mitchell’s work, in particular, will be 
revisited in this chapter, since some of her arguments that Laing’s work contains 
insights into the position of women within this culture remain undeveloped and 
unresolved within her own discussions. I feel here that a brief account of my 
point of view and approach to Laing’s work is worth noting. I regard myself as a 
feminist, but I am, however, not willing to defend women simply for being 
women. Neither do I consider myself to be a conventional female individual, as I 
have spent much of my life trying to undo the repressive socialisation to which 
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women are subjected. Therefore, some of my comments are being made from a 
radically different point of view to that typically expected from women. 
However, I view this as a benefit rather than as a complete limitation, as a 
different vantage point can enable an individual to perceive aspects of theories 
which will be missed by more conventional standpoints. I feel that Mitchell, 
particularly, would have aided her critique of Laing by being clearer about her 
assumptions and views, especially in terms of her use of psychoanalytic 
concepts. My brief comments here are intended to introduce some reflexivity into 
my following discussion. 
                                      The question posed by Mitchell that she remains silent 
about in her chapters on Laing concerns whether his work shows ‘…us a way 
forward in understanding the oppression of women as it takes place within the 
family that is supposed to give them both their definition and their rationale?’1 
My answer to this is to respond affirmatively. My discussion in this section will 
serve to highlight this. The first point that I wish to raise has been noted briefly 
in my chapter on Mitchell. Laing’s main overall project that is expressed 
throughout the majority of his work is the project of making what is seen as 
madness intelligible and comprehensible. I wish to argue here that this central 
focus itself is actually of benefit to women, since the latter group tend to receive 
the diagnosis of some form of mental illness in greater numbers than men. This 
aspect that I have identified stands in sharp contrast to the claims made by the 
feminist critics of Laing, who view his work as excluding and discriminating 
against women. I view Laing’s main project as alternatively opening up a space 
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in which the attribution of madness to women can be understood through their 
expected conformity to the family. 
Empirical Evidence of Levels of Mental Illness 
                                                                                               
Recent mental health statistics confirm that women continue to be diagnosed in 
greater numbers than men with some form of classified mental disorder. ‘20 per 
cent of women and 14 per cent of men in England have some form of mental 
illness.’2 Women are diagnosed in greater numbers than men for all forms of 
neurosis, with the exception of panic disorder, which affects both genders 
equally according to reported levels.3 Within the statistics that I have available to 
me, a matter that is of further relevance to Laing’s work regards the levels of 
mental illness within children and young people. In the five to sixteen year-old 
age group, boys have a higher rate of mental illness than girls, with the exception 
of ‘emotional disorders’ such as anxiety or depression, according to statistics 
from 2004.4  
Among 5-10 year olds, 10 per cent of boys and 5 per cent of 
girls had a mental disorder. Among 11-16 year olds, the 
proportions were 13 per cent for boys and 10 per cent for 
girls.5 
However, in the sixteen to nineteen year-old age group, the levels of mental 
illness among young women rise sharply in comparison to the same age group 
for males. ‘6 per cent of boys and 16 per cent of girls aged 16-19 are thought to 
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have some form of mental health problem.’6 Despite the fact that these statistics 
derive from different sources, and from slightly different years, a change in the 
levels of mental illness by gender and age group can be noted.  
                                                                                                  This is of relevance 
to Laing’s work since his case studies tend to concern individuals whose 
‘symptoms’ were alleged to begin in adolescence. Forms of psychosis, including 
schizophrenia, are recognised as first occurring within this latter age group.7 I 
have previously noted that the majority, but by no means all, of Laing’s case 
studies are of female individuals. There are, of course, problems with statistics 
such as those that I have cited above, since many people who are suffering from 
some form of mental distress may not report this to a doctor, and within the 
younger age groups, mental distress could be confused with deviant behaviour. 
However, these statistics are sufficient to provide a general indication of the 
numbers of those diagnosed with a mental illness, and the proportions involved 
by gender, and by age group. The suggestion provided by these statistics that up 
until the age of sixteen, more boys than girls tend to be diagnosed with some 
form of mental illness may lead to the possible explanation that the socialisation 
of girls, and the social expectations placed upon them lead young women to 
display what comes to be regarded as some form of madness. What happens 
around the age of sixteen that may lead to the large rise in mental illness amongst 
adolescent females? 
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                               At this stage, a further view of mine is worth expounding as it 
relates to this particular discussion. I am uneasy with the idea that mental illness 
is an illness in the same manner as diabetes or asthma, for example. I am fully 
aware that neurological abnormalities, or other biological problems could lead to 
an individual displaying what are seen as symptoms of some form of madness. 
However, I am unaware that any definite conclusion as to the biological cause of 
mental illness is currently in existence. My views here are, of course, influenced 
by Laing, and his skill in making what comes to be regarded as madness socially 
intelligible. Therefore, I prefer to view the high prevalence of forms of mental 
illness among the general population of this country8 as indicative of a broader 
malaise, of a general sense that individuals are unhappy with themselves and 
their lives. According to my views, I am reinterpreting the rise in mental illness 
in young women around the age of sixteen as indicative of a substantial level of 
unhappiness and stress amongst this age group. 
                                                                          Nevertheless, a significant problem 
with the empirical evidence that I have reviewed thus far is that no clear division 
is made between forms of neurosis and psychosis in the statistics on children. 
Laing’s work is primarily concerned with comprehending forms of psychosis, 
and schizophrenia in particular. In the statistics on rates of mental illness 
amongst children, forms of psychosis would fall into the category of ‘less 
common disorders’, within which boys still display higher levels than girls.9 Far 
more statistics are available on forms of neurosis than on psychosis itself. This 
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reflects the fact that the numbers of those affected by what is seen as some form 
of psychosis are small in comparison to those affected by some form of neurosis, 
and that the rates of individuals who are suffering from some form of psychosis 
have remained stable over long periods of time.10 I have been unable to access 
any statistics from the 1960s regarding levels of schizophrenia. However, 
research suggests that ‘there was no significant change in the incidence of 
schizophrenia over the 114-year period 1881-1994’,11 despite overall increases 
‘…in both local and national official statistics of psychiatric morbidity…’12 
                                                     Further research has confirmed that little change 
in the incidence of psychosis has occurred over time, although ‘…substance-
induced psychosis has increased…’13 Kirkbride et al’s research suggests that 
rather than any decline occurring within levels of schizophrenia, there has instead 
been a change in the diagnosis allocated to such individuals ‘…away from 
schizophrenia towards other non-affective psychoses.’14 For example, the more 
recent creation of the ‘personality disorders’, which are viewed as highly 
controversial diagnoses, include both ‘schizoid personality disorder’ and 
‘schizotypal personality disorder’.15 It would have been interesting, if he had still 
been alive, to hear Laing’s views on such classifications. The organisation Mind 
are highly critical of the use of ‘personality disorders’ as a form of classification 
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of mental illness, since the categories are very broad.16 ‘Many of these diagnostic 
labels have been used in a way that stigmatises people… It could be that medical 
professionals gave people these labels simply because they were ‘difficult’ in 
some way.’17 The social control implications of designating certain personalities 
as pathological in some manner are clear from my point of view.  
                                                                                                      The above 
research suggests that rates of psychosis and schizophrenia have remained fairly 
constant over long historical periods. The growth in reported levels of forms of 
mental distress has occurred within the neuroses rather than the psychoses. The 
following discussion makes use of the most reliable information that is available 
on psychosis and schizophrenia in this country. However, it is difficult to make 
any full distinction between neurosis and psychosis, since individuals who have 
been diagnosed with the latter may additionally display aspects of the former 
classification. In the most detailed report which is currently available at the time 
of writing on adults in the U.K. who have been diagnosed with some form of 
psychosis,18 the individuals from the sample who also display high levels of 
neurotic symptoms suffer the greatest in terms of being ‘economically 
inactive’,19 of perceiving themselves as having a severe lack of social support,20 
and of reporting having suicidal thoughts.21 This calls into question Mitchell’s 
criticism of Laing as making an insufficient distinction between neurosis and 
psychosis, since this evidence suggests that making such a total distinction is 
highly problematic. 
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                              The prevalence of psychotic forms of distress is typically 
given as affecting one in two hundred individuals at some stage in their lives.22 
Specific information on schizophrenia is difficult to obtain. However, the Office 
for National Statistics suggests that there is a per year prevalence rate for 
schizophrenia of 0.5 % of the population, with a further study suggesting a 
prevalence rate at any stage of life of 0.2 %.23 In contrast, depression is far more 
common, with a prevalence rate of 10 % of the population of the U.K. at any 
time.24 Further analysis of the rates of schizophrenia by gender and age provide 
some interesting information which is of relevance to Laing’s feminist critics. 
While prevalence rates are the same for men and women, age 
and gender together is an important factor: one study shows 
the incidence for men aged 15-24 is twice that for women, 
whereas for those between 24-35, it is higher among women. 
This reflects a common late onset of the illness for women.25 
Prevalence rates refer to ‘…the number of people with a particular diagnosis at a 
given time,’26 whereas rates of incidence refer to ‘…the number of new cases… 
that appear in a given time period.’27 The above evidence, in addition to further 
examples in the Office for National Statistics report on ‘Adults with a Psychotic 
Disorder Living in Private Households’ (2002) (which will shortly be reviewed), 
allied to the greater levels of mental illness amongst boys rather than girls 
strongly suggest that psychosis and schizophrenia are not only ‘female maladies,’ 
to borrow the title of Showalter’s text.  
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                                                            The fact that there is no difference between 
the genders in terms of the prevalence of schizophrenia, and that younger men as 
a group have a higher incidence rate than women of schizophrenia broadly 
indicate that Mitchell and Showalter are wrong to argue that a special case 
should be made for Laing’s female case studies, simply because they are female. 
This is, at least, the case in contemporary British society. Alternatively, more 
attention should be paid to the detailed male case studies ignored by Mitchell and 
Showalter, since they are as representative of a ‘typical’ schizophrenic as Laing’s 
female case studies are. The above report from the Office for National Statistics 
provides evidence that men who suffer from some form of psychotic distress are 
more likely than women to encounter difficult life circumstances. Being male 
increases the likelihood of an individual not being able to work due to illness or 
disability amongst the sample used in the report.28 ‘Twenty-nine per cent of men, 
compared with 15 % of women, were classified as having a severe lack of social 
support…’29 The level of perceived social support that an individual receives was 
gauged through the direct responses of those that took part in the study.30 Men 
were additionally more likely than women to be consuming dangerous levels of 
alcohol.31  
              Therefore, men were more likely than women to be existing on a low 
income due to illness or disability, to be socially isolated, and to self-medicate 
through alcohol consumption. Overall, however, little difference in the social 
circumstances of men and women with some form of psychotic distress was 
                                               
28
 O’Brien, M, Singleton, N, Sparks, J, Meltzer, H, Brugha, T, (2002), Adults with a Psychotic 
Disorder Living in Private Households, 2000, London, TSO (National Statistics Publication), 
p.xi, p.33 
29
 ibid, p.40 
30
 ibid, p.39 
31
 op. cit., p.43 
 193 
identified in the report. Nevertheless, women were more likely than men to turn 
down offers of help or the provision of services.32 ‘The main reasons given for 
not seeking help were that they did not think anyone could help and that they 
were afraid of possible treatment or tests… The type of help most often 
mentioned as offered but refused was counselling.’33 I have previously noted in 
this thesis the limitations of psychoanalysis as a form of therapy for individuals 
who are experiencing what is seen as some form of psychosis. Despite this, the 
largest number of the sample used for the Office for National Statistics report 
were receiving psychotherapy or psychoanalysis as some form of treatment.34 
This was ‘…reported by almost half (49%) of those receiving counselling or 
other psychological therapy.’35 I have found this rather surprising, given that 
psychoanalysis is predicated upon the study of neuroses rather than psychoses. 
No proportions were given for the amount of individuals receiving 
psychoanalysis alone. The next two most common forms of therapy that people 
with some form of psychosis were receiving were counselling (42 %), and 
behavioural or cognitive therapy (14 %).36 Other forms of therapy were much 
less common. 
                    A further issue that I have touched upon in this thesis concerns the 
disputed nature of any causal explanations for psychosis and schizophrenia. I 
view the focus upon genetic and other biological explanations for schizophrenia 
as potentially a result of greater funding for such scientific enterprises, rather 
than as a suggestion that ‘the cause’ for schizophrenia will necessarily be found 
through such research. In contemporary times, mother-blaming has taken on a 
                                               
32
 ibid, p.25, table 2.16 
33
 ibid, p.17 
34
 op. cit., p.15 
35
 ibid 
36
 ibid p.21, table 2.8 
 194 
new biological slant. A recent article suggests that ‘children whose mothers 
suffered severe stress in pregnancy may have an increased risk of developing 
schizophrenia, according to new research.’37 The study was carried out by a 
researcher in the U.K, but was based upon the Danish population. It suggests that 
‘the exposure of expectant mothers to serious life changes in the first three 
months of pregnancy could affect the baby.’38 The research is seen as innovative, 
but not as a reason for major concern ‘…because the absolute risks are small.’39 
                                        In Laing’s later work, he proposes the idea that life 
inside the womb could have an effect on the individual’s later life. Intimations of 
this idea are present in the middle period of Laing’s work, in The Politics of 
Experience, where he suggests that the schizophrenic voyage involves a form of 
rebirth.40 More lengthy discussions of this topic are to be found within The Facts 
of Life, and in Laing’s last published work, The Voice of Experience, which 
constitutes something of a return to form in the critical first four chapters, after 
the vague ramblings contained in much of The Facts of Life. The views 
expounded in these latter texts suggest that life in the womb, and the process of 
birth itself could have an effect on the individual in later life. The detour that 
Laing’s work takes here into a more biological view is something that I am 
uneasy about, given that my interest in Laing was not generated by such 
musings. This is examined later in this thesis. 
                                                                      Nevertheless, in the middle to late 
period of Laing’s work, a further view of his is proposed which is worth drawing 
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in at this stage. He suggests that both the biological and the social areas of 
research into psychosis, and other forms of mental distress, require closely linked 
investigation. In Laing’s 1969 interview with Felix Scorpio, Laing suggests that 
if the funding were made available to him, he would have liked to: 
…have a place where one could get down to discovering what 
the biochemistry of SOCIAL patterns is… If one thinks of the 
social field of a number of people, a family or a group, who 
live together, …the biochemistry is very intimately connected 
with the fluctuations… and positions and movements within 
the social field… If someone was got into the position in the 
social field that was untenable, there would be a 
corresponding biochemical transformation in that person, and 
around him as well.41 
Here Laing is suggesting that simplistic causal explanations for schizophrenia 
cannot provide a full appreciation of the complex interactions between the 
biological and the social. Recent articles have also called for a more subtle 
approach to understanding psychosis. Beveridge (2002) provides a clear account 
of the difficulties involved in the reductive biological approach in psychology 
and psychiatry.42 Laing’s contribution to this debate is acknowledged in the 
article, alongside the wider influence of existentialism upon psychology. 
Beveridge also notes that: 
Contemporary psychiatry has increasingly adopted [the] 
bioscientific approach. This is ironic, coming at a time when 
those in general medicine have been voicing their unease 
about the limitations of the scientific model.43 
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Towards the end of the article, Beveridge suggests that ‘…the great challenge for 
the future is to integrate the neurobiological with the social and psychological.’44 
                                           Laing cites an example from his own experience, 
which is given in both the above interview with Scorpio, and in The Facts of 
Life, which provides a good illustration of this matter. Laing discusses the 
introduction of tranquillisers for use in the clinical context. One of the nurses that 
he worked with asked whether these particular drugs had any effect on height, 
since a ‘…somewhat wild woman…’45 had appeared to diminish in height since 
she had been on tranquillisers.46 Laing provides the following comments. 
There’s nothing that affects our chemistry more intimately 
than other people… In the case of the wild woman, a chemical 
agent had modified her behaviour, and there was a reportable, 
measurable change in another person’s perception, so that 
person experienced her as smaller.47 
The consideration may be posed that purely biochemical findings that 
schizophrenics, for example, have a different blood chemistry to other 
individuals may alternatively be a product of extreme unhappiness. An individual 
who is experiencing considerable distress may well have a different blood 
chemistry to an individual who is happy. The isolation of biological research into 
forms of mental distress from social research produces forms of knowledge 
which have only a limited validity in their given domain. 
                                                                                         Investigations into the 
alterations involved in the bio-chemistry of individuals who are distressed 
compared to individuals who are not suffering in some manner could form a 
                                               
44
 ibid, p.103 
45
 The Facts of Life, p.112 
46
 ibid 
47
 op. cit. 
 197 
control group for comparison with people who are alleged to be suffering from a 
mental illness. A further problematic issue concerns the manner in which 
research is structured in such a reductive manner. Why, given the complexity of 
human experience, do we seek ‘the cause’ of mental distress? The assumption 
that one perspective can provide such an answer appears to me to be a key factor 
that is involved here. However, it is becoming clear that a less simplistic 
approach is required in order to match the complicated nature of the human 
individual within her or his social networks. Laing’s idea (as expounded by 
Mitchell) that there should be a homology between what is being studied and the 
method used to study it is of considerable relevance here. 
                                                                                         Much of the research that 
I have reviewed for this section suggests that severe traumatic and stressful life 
events are now seen as playing a part in the generation of psychotic experiences.  
There is now a considerable body of evidence that points to a 
link between traumatic life events and the development of 
psychosis. For too long this sort of research has been 
discouraged by an overemphasis on neurons and genes. Fear 
of “family blaming” has also contributed to decades of silence 
on this issue.48 
A chapter of the Office for National Statistics report on adults with some form of 
psychosis is devoted to ‘stressful life events, suicidal thoughts and behaviours’.49 
It supports to some extent the idea that traumatic events in the lives of 
individuals are linked to forms of psychotic distress.  
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The proportion of people reporting experiencing stressful life 
events was far higher in this sample of people with psychotic 
illness than in the general household population aged 16 to 74. 
Almost everyone in the sample (97%) had experienced one of 
the events in the group concerning relationship problems, 
illness and bereavement.50 
                                                     When these statistics were further analysed in 
terms of gender, men were more likely than women to report stressful 
experiences relating to employment and financial difficulties, and to having had a 
problem with the police and an appearance in court.51 A high proportion of the 
individuals in the sample also reported being victimised in some way. However, 
women were more likely than men to report the specific experiences of ‘violence 
in the home’ (as it is termed in the report), and sexual abuse.52 The report also 
cites research which suggests that ‘…the number of stressful life events was a 
more important predictor of suicidal thoughts and behaviours than the individual 
events experienced.’53 In the sample used for this report, 57% had experienced 
six or more stressful life events, and 17% reported ten or more of them.54 The 
indication that severely stressful and traumatic life events are linked to 
experiencing psychosis is of relevance to Laing’s work, and his case studies in 
particular, since many of the individuals that he investigates have had such 
experiences. This will be further reviewed in the next section.  
                                                                                                  In Rethinking 
Psychiatry (1988), Kleinman makes use of an extensive range of epidemiological 
evidence relating to mental illness. I will look at some of his comments on the 
family, and the social situation of women before I conclude this section. With 
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regard to the family, Kleinman notes that: ‘family expressions of hostile, 
negative, and overinvolved emotional response to schizophrenic members have 
been found to be valid predictors of relapse and worsening course.’55 This is 
highly relevant to Laing’s work since many of the families of schizophrenics that 
he investigated can be seen as hostile, negative and unable to separate 
emotionally from their children. Kleinman additionally suggests that the genetic 
theory of schizophrenia is ‘controversial’.56 With regard to the social situation of 
women, Kleinman suggests that: ‘worldwide, women in most studies bear higher 
rates of mental illness than men, and research points to the importance of their 
relative powerlessness…’57 Earlier in his text, Kleinman cites one such study 
which bears out the point above. 
In a classic study, Brown and Harris (1978) convincingly 
demonstrated that among working-class women in England, 
relative powerlessness, absence of affective support, and the 
social pressures of child rearing and no job outside the home 
significantly increased their vulnerability to serious life event 
stressors,… those with marginal self-esteem were pushed over 
the edge…58 
However, the research that Kleinman cites relates to forms of depression, as 
opposed to psychosis. Nevertheless, the contribution played by the lack of 
relative social power on behalf of women is an issue that I wish to raise in 
positing my arguments for a feminist reading of Laing in the next section.  
                                                                       I wish to conclude this section by 
summarising my key findings from the empirical data that I have reviewed. The 
contemporary statistics from the U.K. that I have investigated in terms of those 
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individuals suffering from some form of psychotic distress, and the proportions 
of those affected by gender, and by life circumstances, serve to debunk certain 
received ideas and common assumptions, particularly those of Laing’s feminist 
critics. Rates of mental illness are higher for male children who are under the age 
of sixteen than they are for the same age group for girls. There is no difference 
between the genders, however, in terms of the prevalence of schizophrenia. In 
the detailed Office for National Statistics report on psychosis, the evidence 
presented suggests that men suffer more than women in some respects in terms 
of living with such a diagnosis. The material that I have reviewed in terms of the 
possible ‘causation’ of psychosis and schizophrenia indicates that severe trauma 
and stress have at least as strong a role to play in the generation of this form of 
distress as biological factors. This supports my theory, which is influenced by my 
reading of Laing, that forms of mental distress are the product of unbearable life 
experiences which lead the individual to ‘crack up’, and that this is particularly 
the case if the person concerned is already operating on what Laing would term a 
low basic level of their sense of security. The evidence from this section is 
intended to support the arguments in the following one.  
Arguments for a Feminist Reading of Laing 
 
In this section, I will mostly be presenting arguments in relation to Laing’s case 
studies. However, other material from Laing’s work will be drawn upon, where it 
is necessary. A great deal of my discussion will be focussed upon Sanity, 
Madness and the Family, but not to the exclusion of other relevant examples 
from Laing’s texts. My basic premise for this section, which I have alluded to 
previously, is that Laing’s overall main project of making madness socially 
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intelligible is of benefit to women, since we tend to be diagnosed with forms of 
mental distress in greater numbers than men. This is, however, problematised 
somewhat by the indication in the empirical evidence regarding schizophrenia 
that it affects men and women equally. Nevertheless, I do feel that Laing’s work 
contains insights into the social position of women, which remain undeveloped 
within Mitchell, although traces of such arguments can be found within her work 
on Laing. My intention is not to suggest that there should be a higher incidence 
of psychosis among women, but to argue against Mitchell and Showalter’s 
interpretations of Laing’s work. Neither do I wish to suggest that all women will 
be crushed by the factors that I examine within this section. It is possible to 
survive the experience of repressive socialisation, and life within a 
claustrophobic family environment. 
                                                       The first matter with regard to the eleven case 
studies in Sanity, Madness and the Family that I wish to deal with is the fact that 
they are all of female individuals.59 Mitchell suggests that this is a chance 
occurrence,60 rather than an indication of Laing’s alleged sexism. Here I would 
like to add that there were strict criteria that patients had to meet in order to take 
part in the studies written up in Sanity, Madness and the Family. For example, a 
minimum and maximum quantity for electro-shocks received by the patient was 
stated,61 and the patients had to not have been subject to ‘…any organic 
condition… that might have affected those functions regarded as disturbed in 
schizophrenia…’62 However, within these criteria, it is stated that Laing and 
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Esterson did want to investigate the families of women specifically.63 
Nevertheless, I do not wish to fall into the same trap as Laing’s feminist critics in 
terms of taking this as more significant than it possibly is. From my perspective, 
the focus upon families of female individuals enables the insights that I wish to 
discuss in this section. I also would like to re-state my earlier consideration in my 
section on Showalter that psychiatric wards in Laing’s time were single-sex, and 
that this may have played a part in the selection of individuals for study. 
                                                                      The main way in which Laing’s work 
offers a view into the social situation of women is through the way in which 
socialisation is gendered, and through the examples of this which are largely 
implicit within Sanity, Madness and the Family. In other words, in the latter text, 
such examples do not receive explicit commentary from Laing and Esterson, but 
have become apparent to me through my reading of it. However, comments on 
the socialisation of female individuals are found in other texts by Laing, 
particularly in The Politics of Experience. Nevertheless, I wish to first provide an 
instance from The Facts of Life, where Laing defends women. In the latter text, 
Laing notes that he spent a great deal of his early time as a psychiatrist in a 
mental hospital in Glasgow in a specifically female ward.64 He provides an 
account of what is sometimes referred to as the ‘Rumpus Room’, where, 
following Laing’s observations of the female ward that he was allocated to, he 
enabled a room to be set aside for ‘the twelve most hopeless patients…’65 The 
room was set out like a normal room, as opposed to a ward, and two nurses were 
assigned to look after the patients there.  
                                               
63
 ibid 
64
 The Facts of Life, p.113 
65
 ibid, p.115 
 203 
On the first day, the twelve ‘completely withdrawn’ patients 
had to be shepherded from the ward across to the day room. 
The second day… I had one of the most moving experiences 
of my life on that ward. There they all were clustered around 
the locked door, just waiting to get… over there… So much 
for being ‘completely withdrawn’.66 
                                                           Laing notes that these twelve patients all left 
hospital after eighteen months from when the project began, but after a year, they 
all returned to hospital again.67 Following this discussion, Laing provides one of 
his most explicit criticisms of the male-dominated psychiatric establishment, and 
the impact of this upon women. ‘The statistics for the number of women to men 
whose brains have been cut up in America are 3 to 1, all by men.’68 Laing then 
proceeds to (somewhat unclearly) suggest that large numbers of the female 
European population were dragged away from their homes in the middle of the 
night, ‘…and then trundled off into the inquisitorial European dungeons,’69 in the 
past history of this continent. The lack of clarity is a result of Laing not 
specifying exactly what historical events he is referring to. However, he draws a 
parallel between these events and what happens with psychiatry. ‘It’s done so 
neatly today that most people don’t know it’s happening.’70 The point that I wish 
to illustrate with this example from The Facts of Life, and with the following one 
from The Politics of Experience, is that Laing cannot be considered to be 
prejudiced against women in the manner that his feminist critics claim. 
                                                       He would not bother to include the above 
remarks if that was the case, nor would he provide the criticism of the 
socialisation of girls that is found in Chapter Three of the latter text, entitled ‘The 
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Mystification of Experience’. Laing cites the example of a school class where the 
girls had to bake a cake and the boys were to judge which was the best. He 
provides these comments. 
1. The school is here inducting children into sex-linked roles 
of a very specific kind. 
2. Personally, I find it obscene that girls should be taught 
that their status depends on the taste they can produce in 
boys’ mouths.71 
These are the most explicit comments by Laing on the subjugation of women that 
I am aware of in his work. My following discussion will highlight aspects which 
do not receive such a full commentary, but which serve as a critical tool for 
highlighting certain aspects of the socialisation of women within Sanity, 
Madness and the Family. I disagree with Laing’s feminist critics’ notion that the 
absence of an explicit comment on the situation of women is therefore evidence 
of Laing’s sexism in the latter text.  
                                                       A comparison of the differing treatment of the 
daughters of the families featured in Sanity, Madness and the Family as opposed 
to the sons provides some revealing material. This aspect is highly apparent in 
two of the families in the text: ‘Family Four – The Danzigs’, and ‘Family Seven 
– The Golds’. In my earlier chapter on Mitchell, I noted that the Danzig family 
expected complete compliance from their daughter Sarah, in accordance with her 
father’s wishes.72 Her brother John, however, receives different treatment from 
the family to that of Sarah. He was permitted, unlike his sister, to criticise his 
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father, ‘…but not in public.’73 John was also allowed to misbehave, without 
receiving the severe criticism that his sister did for the same actions.74 It is 
suggested by Laing and Esterson that John did support his sister in earlier times, 
but when that fell apart, he engaged in a collusive alliance with their mother.75 It 
is additionally indicated that the mother of the Danzig family may have been 
responsible for encouraging this split between John and Sarah, and of using John 
against his father for her own ends.76 
This family therefore functioned largely through a series of 
alliances… Sarah was left out… These alliances offered 
protection against impossible ideals. Sarah, with no ally, was 
expected to conform with no let-up to the rules that the others 
all managed to break.77 
                                                      Sarah, unlike John, was permitted no room for 
manoeuvre by her family. Her parents thought that it was ‘…necessary…’ for her 
brother to live by the same double standards as the father, but in Sarah’s case, 
‘…they insisted that she adopt their point of view without reservation.’78 The 
parents of the Danzig family also saw Sarah’s time spent thinking, and putting 
efforts into reading the Bible as clear illustrations of her mental illness, in a 
manner which I find to be, at best, highly unusual.79 Again, the different 
treatment accorded to the different genders of the child is apparent. No 
incidences of John being accused of thinking are put forward by the parents, 
despite Sarah claiming that he (like many typical individuals) also thinks.80 
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‘Reading the Bible was also a very doubtful activity, especially for a girl.’81 
Laing and Esterson’s paraphrasing of the Danzig parents’ views on their 
daughter’s religious studies provides one of their most forthright comments on 
gendered parental expectations. It is a shame that the Danzig family did not 
permit their youngest daughter, Ruth, to be included in the interviews,82 as her 
participation may have shed further light on whether their prescriptions for total 
conformity with the father’s views applied to the female children of the family 
alone. The Danzig family provide an interesting counterpoint to Mitchell’s 
claims that most of the interviews were with the daughter and mother, since the 
father was present for the majority of the interviews, as opposed to the mother 
alone.83 
            The differing treatment of male and female children is also apparent in 
the study of ‘Family Seven – The Golds’, in terms of the alterations in the 
parents’ views of Ruth Gold’s artistic leanings compared to those of her brother. 
Her brother realized, as he put it, that his parents were very 
‘limited people’… They had accommodated themselves to 
some extent to his ‘artistic’ pursuits, but they could not see 
any validity whatever in Ruth’s propensities in that 
direction.84 
Once again, total compliance with the parents’ views was expected from the 
daughter, rather than the son. It is a recurring theme of Sanity, Madness and the 
Family that the families described therein will not let their daughters go, or be 
their own individuals, even to the extent that the daughters are traumatised by 
this treatment. The psychiatric system itself is used as a means of enforcing the 
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parents’ domination of their daughters. In many of the case studies, disagreement 
with the parents (a fairly normal occurrence, especially for teenagers), is taken as 
a sign of schizophrenia. Ruth Gold expresses this herself at the end of the chapter 
on her family. 
INTERVIEWER: But do you feel you have to agree with 
what most of the people round you believe? 
RUTH: Well if I don’t I usually land up in hospital.85 
                                                                                                In the chapter on 
‘Family Three – The Churches’, it is mentioned that Claire Church’s younger 
brother had had an episode of schizophrenia himself. Laing and Esterson were 
not, however, permitted to interview him. 
We have not been able to form a picture of this family from 
every angle because no one in the family wished… Michael… 
to be interviewed. He had had a schizophrenic breakdown 
when he was sixteen, but is said to be quite well now. Many 
things point to this not being the case.86 
The latter comment provided by Laing and Esterson is rather ominous, but they 
do not expand on this. From my perspective, it is a shame that Michael was not 
permitted to be interviewed, since his views may have shed further light on both 
Claire’s treatment by her family, and upon his own predicament. In this chapter, 
it is noted that Claire was seen as insane because she ‘…lacked normal feelings 
of affection for her parents and others,’87 and because she was said ‘…to lack 
warmth…’88 Given the differing cultural prescriptions which are placed upon the 
genders in terms of expected behaviours, here I wish to put forward the 
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consideration that lacking warmth and affection may be seen as more of an issue 
for girls and women, since we tend to be expected to behave in such a manner. 
                                                           The Church family provide a good example 
of a further recurring theme of Sanity, Madness and the Family, which I have 
referred to previously in this thesis – the way in which displays of autonomy on 
behalf of the female children are taken as signs of schizophrenia by the families 
and most of the psychiatrists. The daughters are not allowed to live their own 
lives. If they do try to, then they are seen as insane. Whilst these aspects may 
receive little explicit comment from Laing and Esterson, it is to their credit that 
they come across in the text. Sanity, Madness and the Family is a book which is 
concerned with the phenomenology of families in which one member has been 
diagnosed as schizophrenic. Given their restricted aims for the study, the lack of 
such commentary is not a matter for critique. However, the presentation of the 
material lends itself to the tracing of recurring themes in the text, some of which 
I have identified here. It can be argued that women are given a more restricted 
identity in the first place, through their socialisation, than men. If a woman does 
not conform, then the social disapproval seems to be far greater than that for 
men. The latter group are permitted to rebel, whereas the female identity in this 
culture seems to me to consist of little other than blind, docile obedience to 
others. These issues are highly relevant in today’s culture, which from my 
perspective, constitutes a new misogyny,89 with women reduced to their 
ornamental value and little else. I have always viewed myself as a person first, 
and as a gender secondly, which has enabled me to ignore most of the 
Procrustean socialisation of women.  
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                                                      What is apparent to me within the case studies 
in Sanity, Madness and the Family is the exploitation by their families of 
relatively powerless female children. From my point of view, to identify and 
analyse this, as I have been attempting to do, constitutes more of a feminist 
analysis than Mitchell and Showalter’s accusations that Laing blames the 
mothers, and is therefore prejudiced against women. My assertion here is 
problematic to some extent, since the mothers featured in this text have probably 
not had the easiest of lives themselves. However, the daughters featured in these 
families have arguably even less social power than their mothers. For me, an 
analysis of their situation is valuable in terms of contributing to a feminist 
reading of Laing. At this stage, I wish to draw upon some of the empirical 
evidence that I have reviewed in the previous section. 
                                                                                    Kleinman’s arguments that 
hostile, negative families tend to worsen the condition of schizophrenic family 
members, and his citing of studies which have linked a lack of relative social 
power to an increased chance of experiencing mental distress are highly relevant 
to Laing’s work, and Sanity, Madness and the Family in particular. Kleinman 
provides evidence which backs up my hypothesis with regard to the relative 
powerlessness of female children in relation to their parents, and the way in 
which this seems to aggravate the mental distress that they have experienced. 
The daughters that are featured in Sanity, Madness and the Family are placed in 
an extreme double-bind situation – to try and be autonomous, but then be seen as 
insane and treated accordingly, or to conform to their families’ demands and 
therefore suffer existential death. The evidence which links traumatic life events 
to an increased chance of experiencing what is seen as psychosis is additionally 
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relevant to this text. I feel that I am fairly safe in arguing that living with a family 
which does not recognise you as a person, which sees you as ill if you do not do 
as they wish, and in the more extreme case studies cited in Sanity, Madness and 
the Family, tie up their children or give them forced attempted abortions, would 
be traumatic for an individual. Such trauma-inducing families are a feature of 
Laing’s work, and he appears to have been ahead of the times in terms of 
recognising this. Most of the research that I am aware of that links traumatic life 
events with psychosis is fairly recent. 
                                                         The conformity to the family which is 
expected of the female children featured in Sanity, Madness and the Family can 
be further analysed by examining Laing’s summary of Sartre’s Critique of 
Dialectical Reason in Reason and Violence. Chapter Four of The Politics of 
Experience, entitled ‘Us and Them’ is used by Laing to further some of these 
Sartrean concepts. Laing himself notes that the latter chapter is heavily 
influenced by Sartre’s text.90 Sanity, Madness and the Family additionally 
deploys concepts which are derived from Sartre’s Critique..., so I therefore 
consider an analysis of some of these concepts to be of value in terms of 
identifying certain aspects of the families which are featured in this text. These 
sections of Laing’s work represent some of his most significant applications of 
Sartre’s theory to the social field. I have referred earlier in this thesis to the study 
of groups and group formations which Laing explains in Reason and Violence, in 
my chapter on Deleuze and Guattari. Sartre puts forward the idea that human 
groups are essentially our own inventions. 
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In the last and crucial resort, even the most apparently 
permanent institutionally preserved human group is ultimately 
maintained by the concerted invention of its being.91 
The nuclear family itself can be seen as an invented group formation, which is 
specific to advanced capitalist societies. Sartre further suggests that groups seek 
to create a sense of cohesion, and permanence, through what he calls ‘the 
pledge’.92 Families can be seen as examples of such pledged groups. In the 
example of the case studies within Sanity, Madness and the Family, the pledge 
that these families expect their daughters to follow is that of obedience to the 
family. 
Every individual who is born into a pledged group finds 
himself in a situation where pledges have already been given 
on his behalf. He is pledged by proxy, as it were, ahead of 
himself.93 
                                The daughters in Sanity, Madness and the Family have been 
pledged ahead of themselves. They were expected to behave in such a manner as 
though they had freely accepted their families’ demands, when it appears not to 
have been the case. Laing and Sartre note that the pledge can be used to try and 
enforce group conformity and obedience.94 It is a means of ensuring the ‘…inert 
permanence…’95 of a particular group, such as the family. The concept of the 
pledge is directly related to the family within the chapter of The Politics of 
Experience that I have referred to earlier. The dark side of pledged groups is 
made apparent in this chapter. 
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In the nexal family the unity of the group is achieved through 
the experience by each of the group, and the danger to each 
person is the dissolution or dispersal of ‘the family’… A 
united ‘family’ exists only as long as each person acts in 
terms of its existence.96 
In Sanity, Madness and the Family, the lack of recognition of the parents as a 
positive force in their lives by the daughters threatens the family with such 
dissolution. The pledge of family loyalty weighs heavily upon the female 
children. Their unwillingness to bear this burden appears to be the main reason 
that their family view them as insane. Their brothers are allowed to ignore the 
pledge, or conform to it if they wish, but the daughters are not permitted that 
luxury. 
           Tradition itself is, for me, a key part of the pledge that binds families 
together. The family should, in the traditional view, reproduce itself in the same 
form throughout the generations. However, processes of detraditionalisation are 
at work in contemporary society, and I take hope in these forces. The fact that 
two incomes are now needed in order for a family to survive may eventually 
undermine the traditional nuclear family structure. However, the requirements of 
child care remain set up in such a manner that women tend to still have to stay at 
home to look after younger children. Paternity leave continues to be of a lesser 
proportion to that of maternity leave. Given that having and raising a child 
requires no prior qualifications, I almost feel as though I would be of a lesser 
status were I to stay at home with children. The family serves as a means of 
reinforcing the subjugation of women. Gender roles loosened somewhat in the 
1990s, but as I have already alluded to, mainstream society and the media’s 
portrayal of increasingly unclothed women, serve as regressive forces. I consider 
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many traditional ways of life to be of little use to women who would like to live 
emancipated lives. The family needs to be transcended in its current patriarchal 
form. 
        Laing’s explanation of Sartre’s thought in Reason and Violence proposes 
that the pledge itself is insufficient to maintain the unity of a group. A threat (real 
or invented) is needed in order to keep the group together.  
In the pledged group,… nothing material binds the members, 
the danger is not real, it is only possible. The origin of the 
pledge is anxiety… The danger to the permanence of the 
group is from dispersion and seriality… Fear must be 
reinvented.97 
In Sanity, Madness and the Family and The Politics of Experience, the threat 
examined by Laing which is used to maintain group unity is the threat of creating 
a scandal concerning the family. I will examine Laing’s comments on this idea in 
The Politics of Experience first, in his chapter examining the creation of ‘Us and 
Them’. 
Gossip and scandal are always and everywhere elsewhere. 
Each person is the other to the others. The members of a 
scandal network may be unified by ideas to which no one will 
admit in his [or her] own person.98 
Here Laing suggests that what are seen as scandalous behaviours are not the 
product of a rational process with a definite origin, but are driven instead by 
irrational anxieties. ‘There is conformity to a presence that is everywhere 
elsewhere.’99 Laing’s discussions of the functions of scandal in terms of 
                                               
97
 Reason and Violence, p.136. Seriality refers to the lack of a true group unity. 
98
 The Politics of Experience, p.68 
99
 ibid, p.71 
 214 
maintaining group cohesion are somewhat ironic, given that he was himself the 
subject of more than one scandal during his life. 
                                                                           Laing illustrates the ‘scandal 
network’ in this chapter by utilising an ‘…inverted Romeo and Juliet 
situation’,100 which he has, presumably, concocted himself. However, there are 
instances in Sanity, Madness and the Family, which I consider to be better 
exemplars of this issue. Laing and Esterson themselves note that ‘…the spectres 
of scandal and gossip…’101 are features of all of the families examined within 
that text. I have already referred to many of these families within this thesis. I 
wish to begin by first examining ‘Family Two: The Blairs’. The reader may 
recall that Lucie Blair’s father was a highly unpleasant individual who told his 
daughter that she would be raped or murdered if she so much as ventured outside 
of the house alone.102 Within this case study, both parents appear to be 
excessively concerned about what other people outside the family think of them.  
The others outside the family, the ‘Them’ who were the 
concern of Mr Blair, were all alike for him. None could be 
trusted.103 
The concept of ‘the They’ is a feature of Heidegger’s thought in Being and Time 
(1927). I wish to restrict myself to some brief comments on this theoretical link, 
since a full examination of the relation between Laing and Heidegger’s thought 
would require another thesis in itself. However, I wish to note that Laing was 
aware of Heidegger’s work, and that frequent references to the ‘they’ are made in 
Laing’s chapter in The Politics of Experience that I am here discussing. 
                                               
100
 ibid, p.69 
101
 Sanity, Madness and the Family, p.133 
102
 ibid, p.55 
103
 op. cit., pp.66-67 
 215 
                                                               Governing one’s behaviour according to 
what ‘they’ think is a form of lived inauthenticity, according to Heidegger. 
In so far as I refuse or fail to consider certain options for the 
reason that ‘they’, ‘one’, or ‘we’ do not do such things, my 
condition is one of ‘inauthenticity’ rather than ‘authenticity’, 
and I have ceded my decision to ‘others’ or rather to the 
anonymous ‘they’.104 
A key feature of the scandalisation of their daughters’ behaviour by these 
families is the fear of what ‘they’ will think and gossip about. This is used as an 
attempt to regulate the daughters’ actions, but serves to mystify them further. It is 
a most curious feature of human relations that they should be conducted in such a 
manner. Why bother oneself about what no specific, actual individual thinks? 
The anxiety of social disapproval appears to be great enough in these families to 
not require a definite origin. As Laing suggests in his theoretical considerations 
on this matter that I have cited above from The Politics of Experience, the 
disparaging ‘they’ are everywhere and nowhere at once. To an individual such as 
myself, to live one’s life in such a manner is insane. Such thoughts could be 
considered as psychotic, since they do not correspond to lived reality. Social 
norms have been internalised by such parents to the extent that reality fails to 
temper these considerations. 
                                            Mr Blair’s ridiculous views on what would happen to 
a woman were she to venture out alone, and his distrust of others, were shared by 
his spouse, albeit in a slightly different way. 
[Mrs Blair’s] view of the world was no less fantastical, but her 
fantastical ‘others’ were women. She lived in a world of 
scandal and gossip. Everyone else knew everyone else’s 
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business, or wanted to. ‘They’ were, once more, all alike. It 
was best to keep oneself to oneself and never tell anyone 
‘your business’.105 
Laing and Esterson make it apparent that with Lucie languishing within this 
prison of a family, cut off from others, she was left unable to make any sense of 
social relations.106 Laing and Esterson additionally note that her parents lived in 
‘…what in clinical terms would be regarded as a typically paranoid world…’107 
The attempt to maintain family group cohesion destroys the daughter’s 
possibilities of sanity. The parents treat an invented reality as though it was real.  
                                    In the chapter on ‘Family Three: The Churches’, the 
mother fails to see her daughter as an individual who is separate and distinct 
from herself. Here Laing and Esterson argue that: ‘Spontaneity… is the very 
heart of subversion to institutional mores, to pre-set role-taking and assigning.’108 
The parents of the Church family were threatened by such spontaneous actions. 
Once again their family appears to provide little other than a prison-like 
environment for their daughter. They also live in a world formed of their own 
constructions, rather than any approximation to reality. Laing and Esterson 
additionally make it clear in this case study, as with the Blair parents, that both 
parents were involved in this shared fantasy, as opposed to simply the mother. 
The total family structure reinforces the invented world of the family. 
Almost totally lacking in spontaneity, Mr and Mrs Church 
were particularly fearful of gossip and scandal. Another 
aspect of this was their fear of what they called ‘a crowd’… 
One aspect of a crowd is that it is a collection of people not 
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bound together by… organizational or institutional 
safeguards.109 
With these families, fairly commonplace elements of life are elevated to highly 
anxiety-producing dangers.110 The fear of gossip and scandal serves to produce 
and amplify these anxieties. This lack of spontaneity is something which is noted 
by Laing in his summary of Sartre’s late theory as a feature of the pledged group. 
With the pledge, reciprocity is centrifugal. It is a bond 
sustained in the absence of the others, not only lived in their 
presence. Each in his [or her] solitude has guarantees and 
imperatives, rights and obligations. No more is there a 
spontaneous living invention of relatedness, but a reciprocal 
inertia.111 
The family as an inert, unchanging form of social grouping does characterise the 
series of families that feature in Sanity, Madness and the Family. The idealised 
version of the family appears to be as important to these individuals as their 
actual family members in their unique reality. However, the rights accorded to 
each member of the pledged group are not distributed equally. 
                                                                                                Given that, as I have 
previously discussed, the male children of these families appear to be permitted 
to leave the family prison, these case studies illustrate that it is gossip and 
scandal about the female children that these families are so terrified of. It remains 
doubtful if this is intended to try and help the daughters. It may be more the case 
that the fear of scorn being poured upon the whole family is the origin of the 
anxiety. However, Laing and Esterson problematise my idea here, by suggesting 
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that in this case study, the family have failed to see their daughter as a person 
who is subject to real potential dangers. 
…The ‘Claire’ who was the object of Mrs Church’s concern 
was much more an object of her fantasy than a real person in 
her own right in a real world. Actual real dangers in the real 
world hardly seemed to concern Mrs Church at all… Claire as 
a little girl was allowed to work in the top storey of a house, at 
the height of air-raids in one of the heaviest bombed 
areas…112 
That this family are more concerned about their imagined version of their 
daughter than her actual self is indeed disturbing. The family has become so 
engrossed in their fantasy world that they lack in any proper caring 
responsibilities for their daughter. That the daughter is then expected to share in 
this lunacy or be seen as insane becomes the nail in the coffin. 
                                                                                                    The parents 
featured in ‘Family Four: The Danzigs’ ‘…regarded Sarah’s madness as a 
calamity visited on the family.’113 The mother utters a similarly bizarre statement 
to that contained in worrying about what ‘they’ will think: the idea that such 
things only happen to other people.114 Frequently when terrible things happen, 
individuals say that such things do not happen to people like them. This begs the 
question of precisely why people see themselves as so different to others? Sarah 
Danzig’s parents were full of ‘…shame and fear of scandal… They regarded her 
as a ‘breaker of the family front’.’115 They perceived Sarah as a breaker of the 
pledge that attempted to keep the family together. However, in this case study the 
gossip and scandal referred to real events, as opposed to the abstract anxiety of 
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what ‘they’ will think. Sarah went to work at the same place where her father 
was the boss, and it leaked out that she had had a ‘breakdown’.116 However, 
Sarah remained in a position of mystification because the unpleasant gossip 
occurred behind her back. ‘Sarah felt their hostility without being able to get the 
feeling confirmed by anyone.’117 
                                              Some of the ‘scandals’ featured in Sanity, Madness 
and the Family are to do with the daughters becoming pregnant. Such 
pregnancies outside of marriage were, during that historical period, more of an 
occasion for controversy than they arguably are now. This was the case with one 
of the families that I have already examined: ‘Family Two: The Blairs’. With 
regard to Lucie Blair: 
…a pregnancy had been terminated and she had been 
sterilized. She had never married, but had had a baby girl 
during the war, who was adopted.118 
I have already referred to ‘Family Five: The Edens’’ response to Ruby’s 
pregnancy – to give her a forced attempted abortion, which resulted in a 
miscarriage.119  
The whole family was choked with its sense of shame and 
scandal. While emphasizing this to Ruby again and again, 
they told her that she was only imagining things when she 
thought that people were talking about her.120 
It is to Laing and Esterson’s credit that the perceptive reader can see how the 
patient’s ‘delusions’ mirror those actually held by their bizarre and suffocating 
family environment. Whilst her relations were attempting to abort Ruby’s 
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pregnancy, they told her ‘…pityingly and vindictively at once, what a fool she 
was, what a slut she was…’121 Ruby ‘…complained of… voices outside her head 
calling her ‘slut’, ‘dirty’, ‘prostitute’… [She] had given birth to a rat after she 
was admitted to hospital…’122 The ‘rat’ that Ruby was referring to may have 
been the miscarriage. The voices that she heard corresponded to her family’s 
opinions of her. In this case study, the relations’ sense of scandal and gossip have 
become internalised by Ruby. In order to believe their denials that they held 
these views, she has then attributed these accusatory voices to some other, non-
existent presence. The role of mystification in leaving Ruby with no means of 
orienting herself through such confusing messages has rendered her as having to 
project out certain aspects of her relations’ disgust, and to internalising others.  
                                                      The final family that I wish to examine in this 
section is ‘Family Eight: The Heads’. This particular case study contains some of 
Laing and Esterson’s most explicit commentary on the chasm between ‘average’ 
social beliefs and the strict codes held by the families featured in Sanity, 
Madness and the Family. The patient featured in this case study, Jean, is 
described by Laing and Esterson in the following way. ‘…[Her] prevailing 
manner was that of a puzzled child doing her best to meet the demands of adults. 
There was a puppet doll-like quality about her…’123 Women are conventionally 
assumed to be more other-directed than men. I would view this as the product of 
socialisation, as opposed to any innate tendency in this direction on behalf of 
women. Other than the obvious biological differences between the genders, I 
view the social differences between the two as largely the product of the 
consequences of socialisation. In my next section, I will analyse such a focus 
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upon the other on behalf of women, by drawing upon other aspects of Laing’s 
theory. However, worrying about what ‘they’ will think and say is not 
exclusively the preserve of women. 
                                                      Both Jean’s biological family (the Jones) and 
her husband’s (the Heads) are noted as ‘…fervent Non-conformist Christians of 
fundamentalist leanings.’124 It is in their discussion of the tensions between the 
attempt to live one’s life according to such a doctrine, and the ‘typical’ views of 
‘everyday’ society that Laing and Esterson demonstrate considerable skill.  
…Every family in this series presents its own peculiar 
difficulties… In this case, much of the difficulty arises from 
the fact that none of them… even think, much less express, 
any unchristian thoughts.125 
Jean’s elder brother managed to escape the family, and he helped Jean as much 
as he could until he left home.126 He ‘…described vividly his own technique of 
developing his own life…’127 Jean’s brother (Ian) was adopted ‘…to give him a 
good Christian home.’128 He appears to not have been treated in any substantially 
better way as a child than Jean was. 
…He bit his nails ‘down to the bone’, for which his arms and 
hands were put in bags and strapped to his body by attached 
cords tied behind his back. 
                                         […] Jean’s parents and husband 
show a notable inability to see the other person’s point of 
view, and are completely unaware of this inability.129 
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The main difference between Jean and her adopted brother may be that he was 
allowed to eventually leave the family, both physically and socially, whereas 
Jean’s separation from her parents ‘…was at the price of becoming equally 
attached to her husband.’130 She never managed to achieve a full sense of her 
own autonomy. 
                      This case study is the only one in which both genders of child 
receive an equal treatment from the family. With reference to Jean, Laing and 
Esterson summarise well the double-bind situation that characterises these 
families.  
…They implicitly set her an ideal, deny that they have set it, 
then put the onus on her for taking too much out of herself in 
trying to live up to it, and thus breaking down.131 
The idea of the family as a pledged group has been one that I have examined in 
this section. The pledge that binds Jean’s family and husband is that of their 
religious beliefs. The pledge can take a more abstract form, when it requires 
adherence to social and moral codes which are not commonly shared among the 
wider population. Social conformity is taken to a paranoid extreme in these 
families that live in terror of what ‘they’ will think and say. 
                                                                                             Freud notes in his 
essay Civilization and its Discontents (1929) that there are: ‘…two main types of 
pathogenic methods of upbringing – over-strictness and spoiling…’132 This 
comment becomes rather lost in Freud’s discussions of the impact of this upon 
the ego and super-ego. However, the initial point is of relevance to my 
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discussions here. The series of families which are featured in Sanity, Madness 
and the Family all exhibit tendencies towards over-strictness with regard to their 
female children. From my reading of the text, these case studies are examples of 
the psychological abuse and neglect of these young women by their families. It is 
a credit to Laing and Esterson that the reader is enabled to perceive this, given 
that these families behave and communicate in a way which is best described as 
highly confusing. This clearing away of the levels of mystification that shroud 
these women’s lives constitutes a defence of relatively helpless and abused 
female children. Laing’s phenomenological approach, with its unbiased view of 
the wider social network that comprises the family is a key element that enables 
this to occur. 
                   From my standpoint, with regard to the women featured in Sanity, 
Madness and the Family, it would arguably aid their recovery from the mental 
distress that they are experiencing to be permitted some time away from their 
family environment, if not to attempt to separate from their families altogether. 
In Laing’s development of Sartre’s theory in the chapter ‘Us and Them’ from 
The Politics of Experience which I have been using in this section, he posits the 
following argument. 
Some families live in perpetual anxiety of what, to them, is an 
external persecuting world. The members of the family live in 
a family ghetto, as it were.133 
Examples from Sanity, Madness and the Family have been utilised in this section 
in order to provide illustrations of this excessive anxiety about the world outside 
of the family. This irrational fear may then be used as a way of controlling the 
rest of the family group. However, Laing notes that leaving the group is made as 
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difficult as possible for the person who may want to leave the ‘family ghetto’. 
One feature of a ghetto is that no one wishes to remain there, but it is virtually 
impossible to leave.  
                              The individual is also expected not to want to leave. ‘…The 
simplest and perennial threat to all groups comes from the simple defection of its 
members.’134 This problem is additionally discussed in Reason and Violence. 
Being-in-the-group, in its interiority, is manifested by a 
double failure to which each has given his [or her] consent: 
powerlessness to leave, and powerlessness to be integrated: 
powerlessness to dissolve the group in oneself or to be 
dissolved in it.135 
However, the females that have been traumatised by their families which feature 
in Sanity, Madness and the Family have not been given a choice or a voice over 
the abstract rules which govern the behaviour of their family group. There is 
something of an absence with regard to this matter in Reason and Violence. 
These women have been pledged ahead of themselves, which I have referred to 
earlier. Their consent to being treated in such a manner is assumed, rather than 
explicitly given. 
                        Nevertheless, it is noted that staying in the group can actually 
harm the individual.136 Sartre suggests that forms of reciprocity are shaped by the 
structure of the groups that such relations are embedded within.  
There are no longer any unmediated reciprocities, but 
reciprocities that have been formed and deformed ‘by the 
group’. Group work has been done on them.137 
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Gender relations do not feature as a matter for critique in Reason and 
Violence.138 I would like to add to the analysis offered in that text, and developed 
by Laing, that the different genders are treated differently, both in terms of their 
place in the family group, and in terms of the level of reciprocity that is expected 
from them. The fact that many of the women featured in Sanity, Madness and the 
Family are seen as mad because they lack the ‘correct’ level of reciprocity 
towards their family is illuminating. Men are allowed to leave the family, and 
lead their own lives, but women are expected to lead a life of perpetual 
obedience to their family, however insane that family may be. Throughout this 
section, I hope to have demonstrated that Laing’s work can be read in such a way 
that it can be seen as illuminating with regard to the gendering of socialisation, in 
contrast to Mitchell and Showalter’s claims that Laing’s work discriminates 
against women. 
Laing’s Reinterpretation of Past Clinical Descriptions 
 
In this section, I will be examining two instances where Laing defends women. 
The first occurs in The Politics of Experience, where Laing re-evaluates a clinical 
examination of a young woman by the early psychiatrist Kraepelin.139 The 
second is taken from Laing’s last published work, The Voice of Experience. In 
this text, Laing provides a resounding critique of Binswanger’s existential 
analysis of ‘Ellen West’ (1958).140 I am including these examples in order to 
further reinforce the fact that there is no textual evidence to suggest that Laing 
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was in some way a misogynist, and to demonstrate additional examples of his 
defence of relatively powerless, exploited women.  
                                                                              Laing’s reinterpretation of 
Kraepelin’s account of a ‘clinical examination’141 of a ‘…servant girl, aged 
twenty-four…’ uses Kraepelin’s own words. However, Laing places Kraepelin’s 
actions (the things that he does to the woman) in italics. Kraepelin’s actions 
include stopping the girl from moving, taking hold of her, attempting to force a 
piece of bread from her hand, and (most horrifyingly) pricking her in the 
forehead with a needle.142 Given that this all occurs in front of an audience, the 
account becomes even more chilling. It constitutes little other than an exercise in 
dehumanisation and degradation. The point that Laing is making by italicising 
Kraepelin’s actions is that if they are taken ‘…out of the context as experienced 
and defined by him, how extraordinary they are!’143 Laing uses this account in 
order to demonstrate the disjunction between who is seen as sane and who is seen 
as insane, and to show that these lines are drawn in a somewhat arbitrary manner.  
A feature of the interplay between psychiatrist and patient is 
that if the patient’s part is taken out of context, as is done in 
the clinical description, it might seem very odd. The 
psychiatrist’s part, however, is taken as the very touchstone 
for our common-sense view of normality.144 
This point made by Laing links to my discussions in my previous section, since a 
disjunction occurs where the families in Sanity, Madness and the Family are seen 
as sane, whereas the daughters are seen as insane because the family claim that 
they are. Conventional psychiatry appears to reinforce women’s subjugation, by 
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claiming that a woman is insane if she does not submit to her lot in life. The 
relevance of looking at the wider social context in order to comprehend a 
person’s behaviour is demonstrated both within Laing’s theory and in his case 
studies. 
           Kraepelin also features in Binswanger’s study of ‘Ellen West’, since he 
was one of the many psychiatrists that she saw.145 The name Ellen West is a 
pseudonym.146  
Existential analysis… seems to offer a way to understand a 
human situation in human terms. 
…Binswanger’s existential analysis of Ellen West (1958) is 
generally taken to be a standard work in its field, an 
exemplary model of its kind.147 
Throughout his section on this study, Laing proceeds to demonstrate the poverty 
of Binswanger’s attempted existential study. This critique additionally 
constitutes one of Laing’s most resolute defences of an utterly powerless (within 
her social context) woman. Binswanger did not know this individual before she 
was admitted to the hospital where he worked, during the first part of the 
1900s.148 He interviewed her only occasionally during her stay in hospital.149 ‘He 
states that he regards his lack of first-hand personal or clinical knowledge of 
Ellen West as an advantage for the purposes of existential analysis.’150 
Binswanger’s account is not of Ellen West herself, but of ‘…the existential 
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Gestalt that is Ellen West…’151 His study is not based on evidence which was 
taken from the individual herself directly, 
…but from various written documents: poems, diary entries, 
letters, and a report by her husband on her recollection of her 
life, elicited by him under hypnosis at Binswanger’s 
instigation.152 
                                    At this stage, before Laing moves on to assess these 
accounts of West’s life, methodological problems can already be perceived, 
particularly in the light of this study’s claim to be an existential analysis. 
Binswanger’s methods divert considerably away from the principles of a 
Laingian approach. They could indeed be seen as the polar opposite of a social 
phenomenological methodology. Binswanger spent very little time with Ellen 
West. Laing, on the contrary, spent as much time as possible with the individuals 
that featured in his case studies. Binswanger’s study of Ellen West is based on 
second- and third-hand material. Laing attempted as far as possible to use the 
patient’s own accounts of their life. Issues of reliability and validity are of 
concern here, since material from others regarding another person may well be 
biased. After various sessions with psychiatrists and admissions to hospital, Ellen 
West committed suicide.153 Laing argues that Binswanger ‘…is dissecting a dead 
butterfly of his fancy, not depicting the pathetic life of a defeated person.’154  
                                       This problem of Binswanger’s reliance on accounts of 
West’s life which are taken from individuals other than herself lead Laing to 
frequently criticise Binswanger’s study for failing to consider what the events in 
West’s life actually meant to her as a person. West was a woman whose life was 
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entirely controlled by others – by her family, by others, and by the psychiatrists 
that were supposed to help her. West had an ‘infatuation’ at the age of sixteen.155 
Laing questions the fact that Binswanger presents this in this manner without 
enquiring what this ‘infatuation’ actually meant to West.156 Later, when she was 
twenty, 
…she had become engaged to a romantic foreigner, but broke 
off the engagement, at her father’s instigation… We are left 
forever to guess what it meant to her to have to give up the 
man she loved. At any rate, this emotional catastrophe may 
possibly have some remote connection with her losing her 
appetite, going on hunger strike, or whatever.157 
This issue of eating or not came to be a prominent one in her life. I am aware that 
eating disorders can be a measure that individuals utilise in order to achieve 
some degree of control over their lives, since other aspects are beyond their 
control.  
            West had some form of psychological crisis when she was twenty-three, 
‘…about the time “she has an unpleasant love affair with a riding teacher”.’158 
Laing again demonstrates that this value judgement is not one made by West 
herself. He suggests that this love affair may have been described as unpleasant 
because the material came from West when she was under hypnosis which was 
conducted by her husband.159 Therefore, this may be a construction placed upon 
West’s experience by her husband, rather than it being an authentic description 
as such. It is possible for a person under hypnosis to have false memories 
implanted or to be made suggestible to other ways of construing events. Laing 
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sees the absences and inaccuracies in Binswanger’s account as at least, if not 
more, significant than what is directly told to the reader. 
However, whatever it may have meant to Ellen, like those 
other relations of hers which may have been as important and 
significant to her as they were trivial and meaningless to those 
in whose control she was, and in whose control she remained 
until she died,…we hear no more about it.160 
Laing’s re-evaluation of Binswanger’s study of Ellen West presents the reader 
with some of his most forthright comments on the domination of a woman by the 
(mostly male) others around her. 
                                                   In a parallel to the case study of Jean Head in 
Sanity, Madness and the Family, Ellen West went from being under the control 
of her family to being under the control of her husband. Binswanger notes that 
her husband had a good ‘rapport’ with West, but in terms of a ‘hypnotic rapport’, 
rather than a good relationship in the customary meaning of the term.161 
Binswanger himself notes, rather ominously, that: ‘the use of the term at this 
point may be taken to indicate the extent of the husband’s influence over 
Ellen.’162 West underwent two periods of psychoanalysis.163 During the second 
session of analysis ‘…her husband leaves her, at the request of the analyst but 
against his own wishes.’164 Laing argues that: ‘what wishes she had in the matter 
are not part of the discourse.’165 He also suggests that: ‘the list of recorded 
enforced separations is quite impressive.’166 None of these separations were 
directly the result of West’s own will. The list of different attempts at therapy, 
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different diagnoses and differing psychiatrists is also notable. It is not stated with 
whom the first two periods of psychoanalysis were with.  
…Kraepelin diagnosed melancholia, and shortly thereafter 
another doctor advises that her analysis should be terminated, 
and she was admitted to Kreuzlingen, where Binswanger 
comes into the picture for the first time.167 
                                                                             West’s first analyst thought that 
she was suffering from hysteria,168 her second thought that she ‘…was a severe 
obsessional neurotic with manic-depressive oscillations.’169 However, 
Binswanger diagnosed her as having schizophrenia, as did the man who invented 
the ‘disease’ itself, Bleuler.170  
Only Binswanger and Bleuler with their master vision could 
see the truth her Gestalt revealed: schizophrenia. 
For Bleuler, the final authority on the diagnosis he had 
himself invented, the diagnosis was indubitable.171 
Binswanger and Bleuler decided to discharge West from hospital, in accordance 
with her wishes, since she was ‘…virtually a hopeless case anyway…’172 West 
said that she intended to kill herself. She did so, after eating normally for the first 
time in many years, by taking poison.173 Some of Laing’s most sarcastic venom 
that is expressed in any of his texts is directed at Binswanger’s account of the 
tragedy of this woman’s life. However, it is worth recalling that it is not an 
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account of a person, but of her ‘existential Gestalt’.174 ‘Binswanger assures us on 
no less than seventeen occasions… that her suicide was “authentic”.’175 What 
Binswanger would have been referring to by an inauthentic suicide is not made 
clear. Nevertheless, this remains a highly distasteful comment, which may have 
been intended to shore up Binswanger’s attempt at an existential analysis rather 
than being an illuminating comment on this individual’s death. 
                                                                                                   It should be clear 
to the reader that Binswanger’s study of Ellen West does not constitute an 
existential analysis. At no stage does Binswanger enter into West’s world itself, 
nor does he view her as a totality. West, as a person, is not examined in personal 
terms. Laing’s anger at the treatment of this woman is matched by his disgust at 
this study’s claims to be an existentialist one.  
…In this attempt at an existential analysis, we see psychiatric 
diagnostics carried to… the extreme of absurdity…It is a 
tragi-comical paradox that Binswanger’s account is… a 
perfect example of just what he is striving,…not self-
reflectively and self-ironically enough, to eschew, and leave 
behind.176 
Laing perceives Binswanger’s attempted existential analysis as scarcely an 
improvement on psychoanalysis, in terms of the lack of engagement with the 
actual individual herself.  
[Binswanger’s] ‘existential’ look turns out to be a further 
sophistication of the very institutionalized depersonalized-
depersonalizing objectivizing psychiatric diagnostic look, 
from which he is trying to disencumber himself.177 
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I am unaware of any other instances where Laing attacks the methodology of 
supposedly existentialist approaches, other than his brief critique of Jaspers’ 
account of the voyage which is given in The Politics of Experience.  
                                                                                                          This re-
evaluation of the case study of Ellen West is illuminating in terms of the ways in 
which the problems that she faced do appear to be ones that are, by and large, 
encountered by women. Her difficulties with eating, or not eating, are explained 
by Laing in terms of her experience of the world and the degree of others’ 
control that she was subject to. The Voice of Experience was published some 
years after Mitchell’s Psychoanalysis and Feminism.178 I am not aware of any 
evidence to suggest that Laing was influenced by, or conscious of, the feminist 
critiques of his work, other than his criticism of Showalter’s comments in Mad to 
be Normal.  However, this may have been the case. Nevertheless, Mitchell’s and 
Showalter’s claims that Laing is prejudiced against women are thrown into 
further doubt by Laing’s defence of women within these reinterpreted case 
studies. Showalter’s chapter on Laing occurs after the publication of The Voice of 
Experience. The latter text remains largely ignored within the study and critique 
of Laing, but moves closer to a ‘classic’ Laingian text, particularly in the first 
part of the book. 
Additional Comments 
 
Ariel Levy’s Female Chauvinist Pigs: Women and the Rise of Raunch Culture 
(2005) constitutes, in my view, one of the best pieces of feminism that has been 
produced in recent years. It is a realist critique of the way in which pornographic 
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‘culture’ has infected mainstream culture, and how this has impacted upon 
women and our perception of ourselves. I wish to examine this text, and relate it 
to some of Laing’s theory in order to demonstrate how the latter may be used to 
advance a feminist analysis. Throughout Female Chauvinist Pigs, Levy teases 
out well the contradictions involved in the sale of a mass-market ‘raunch culture’ 
to women who are supposed to view this as some form of empowerment. 
‘Female chauvinist pigs’ are defined as ‘…women who make sex objects of other 
women and of ourselves.’179 The aspect of this text that I wish to examine is a 
chapter that focuses on teenage girls, and the impact of commercialised ‘raunch 
culture’ upon them. However, I wish first to turn to the strands of Laingian 
theory that I will be drawing upon in order to make this analysis. 
                                                                                                      The focus upon 
one’s appearance that is expected of women in this culture, for no substantial 
reason, involves a focus upon the outer self to the exclusion of the inner self. 
Laing’s theory does include an examination of the ways in which our culture 
draws such lines between the inner world and the outer world. 
Our culture, while allowing certain marginal licence, comes 
down very sharply on people who do not draw the inner / 
outer, real / unreal,… private / public lines where it is thought 
to be healthy, right, and normal to do so.180 
Laing is referring to the experience of people who are seen as schizophrenic, 
people whose perception of the world can differ radically from the ‘norm’. 
However, is our culturally-specific sense of the differentiation between the inner 
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and outer spheres of experience necessarily healthy in itself? I wish to argue that 
our culture’s encouragement of women to focus on their outer appearance serves 
to deny women more substantial, and possibly lasting forms of satisfaction in 
life. In The Politics of Experience, Laing’s analysis of the drawing of such 
boundaries takes a more culturally critical turn. He notes that ‘this identity-
anchored, space-and-time-bound experience…’181 is specific to a particular 
historical and social organisation. Laing then proceeds to suggest that: 
Our time has been distinguished, more than by anything else, 
by a drive to control the external world, and by an almost total 
forgetfulness of the internal world.182 
                                                                       In Levy’s chapter where she 
interviews American teenage girls about how they perceive themselves, the focus 
on outer appearance that is expected of women is a recurring theme. One girl 
(Anne) ‘…seemed to have only one truly engrossing passion: her looks.’183 This 
is in sharp contrast to a teenage boy that Levy had interviewed, whose plans for 
his later life, and wider interests, formed his topics of conversation.184 Levy is 
highly critical of the other-directedness that is involved in women’s focus upon 
their appearance. She suggests that it is directed more towards what men want to 
see, rather than what women would like. In what I find to be a shocking moment 
in the text,185 Anne says the following. ‘I definitely feel like because I’ve put so 
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much consciousness into my appearance in the past, now I get scared of having a 
relationship that’s based on what’s inside of me…’186 Levy comments that: 
If her looks were a kind of hobby – if dressing and 
grooming…were things she did for pleasure – then the 
process would be its own reward. But she spoke of her pursuit 
as a kind of Sisyphean duty… 
[Such] girls seem more focused on what is expected of them 
than on what they want…187 
                                                   In schizophrenia, the individual loses contact 
with the outside world, and takes refuge in the attempted shelter of their own 
inner world. I here would like to postulate on another form of harmful 
experience, where the individual loses all contact with their own inner world. To 
be starved of self-knowledge through focusing upon one’s appearance can only 
be seen in a negative light. Is Anne suffering from some sort of reverse 
schizophrenia, where the self becomes little other than its outer display? Laing’s 
female case studies demonstrate this expectation placed upon women to be more 
focused on what is expected of them, rather than on what they themselves would 
like from life. If conformity to these social expectations is lacking, then the 
woman is seen as insane. At this stage, I would like to put forward the argument 
that Western societies, in this manner, do not encourage women towards 
psychological ‘health’, but more towards a life of alienation. This may constitute 
an explanation for the overall higher levels of mental illness amongst women as 
opposed to men. My solution to this issue is to avoid living out a gender 
stereotype, and to live one’s life as one sees fit. However, the courage that this 
takes may not be achievable for an individual with a low threshold of 
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psychological security. These comments are intended to demonstrate that Laing’s 
theory can lend itself to a feminist analysis. The absence of any misogynist 
leanings in his work enables such an enquiry to be made. The open-ended nature 
of phenomenology additionally promotes such an analysis because the 
construction of the theory does not have to involve omitting elements that do not 
fit into a dogmatic schema such as that found in psychoanalysis. 
                                                                                                    A further benefit 
of Laing’s theoretical framework is that it maintains a relevance to lived 
experience which may be lost in other perspectives. Laing’s work is of benefit to 
those who may be having difficulties in their familial environment. The 
relevance of theory to lived experience is something that, if lost, could consign 
academia to perpetual irrelevance. Human experience, itself, transcends even 
language and culture at its most extreme. It is the most traumatic and pleasant 
experiences for which we tend to be lost for words. I have experienced 
indescribable pain when I have been ill in the past. There are no words to match 
the experience that I underwent. Experiences which are not culturally validated 
tend to be seen as insane or mystical, as Laing argues in The Politics of 
Experience. Any theory which regards human experience as purely bound by 
language dismisses that experience as a quality in itself, and leaves humanity in a 
prison of language, bound forever. I wish to make it clear at this juncture that I 
am not saying that culture and language do not shape experience to a large 
degree. I merely wish to suggest that experience can transcend language and 
culture. 
          It could be considered that some small spaces of new freedom are available 
for women in contemporary society. Processes of detraditionalisation mean that 
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women may be able to leave their families and seek paid employment. However, 
these spaces are subject to the retrograde view of women that appears to largely 
dominate our culture. The idea of the family as an invented group, which derives 
from Reason and Violence, could be used as an argument that we invest too 
much emotionally in what is actually an arbitrary, contingent social formation. 
With regard to Sanity, Madness and the Family, in addition to Laing’s other 
detailed female case studies, Laing resurrects the tragedy of women’s lives in a 
manner which many others may find echoes of their own lives in. One can only 
wonder whether these individuals ever managed to find happiness, or whether 
their despair devoured them for the remainder of their existences. In this chapter, 
I hope to have demonstrated the relevance of Laing’s theory as one which can be 
developed in order to produce a feminist analysis. I wish to emphasise again the 
point made at the beginning of this chapter: my arguments here are not intended 
to be of a causal nature. Not all women will be crushed by processes of 
socialisation. My main intention in this chapter has been to demonstrate the lack 
of textual evidence to suggest that Laing was biased against women, and the lack 
of empirical evidence to support the idea of schizophrenia being a ‘female 
malady.’ The next chapter will examine left-wing critiques of Laing, and those 
by Jacoby and Sedgwick, in particular.
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8) Left-Wing Critiques of Laing 
 
This chapter examines the left-wing critiques of Laing. The first section analyses 
Jacoby’s (1977) critique of Laing which is provided in his text Social Amnesia: A 
Critique of Conformist Psychology from Adler to Laing. This section will 
additionally utilise the wider Frankfurt School critique of existentialism in order 
to draw in the wider theoretical influences that impact upon Jacoby’s criticism of 
Laing. Jacoby was supervised by Marcuse for his thesis, which was eventually 
published as Social Amnesia.1 The next section will appraise Sedgwick’s 
critiques of Laing. This occurs across two separate texts: Sedgwick’s chapter in 
the text edited by Boyers entitled R.D. Laing and Anti-Psychiatry (1974),2 and 
Sedgwick’s chapters on Laing in his text Psycho Politics (1982). 
Jacoby’s Critique of Laing 
 
An initial problem with Jacoby’s critique of Laing is contained within the very 
title of his text. The categorisation of Laing’s work as occurring within the orbit 
of ‘conformist psychology’ is highly problematic. The effort to provide an 
alternative theoretical psychology which is opposed to the prevailing orthodoxies 
of the day can be seen as one of Laing’s main projects. Jacoby does acknowledge 
this issue. He states that it is ‘…unjust to include Laing and Cooper’3 within this 
grouping, since ‘the intent of their psychology is political and critical…’4 
However, residues of this point at issue do remain throughout Jacoby’s critique. 
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Furthermore, the issue of Laing and Cooper’s work being examined together is 
additionally noted as problematic by Jacoby. He suggests that: 
…it should be emphasized that while no distinction is drawn 
here between Laing and Cooper, this does not mean that they 
are identical… The justification for limiting this discussion to 
Laing and Cooper is found in their theoretical closeness…5 
The difficulty contained within appraising Laing and Cooper in such a manner is 
one which I have raised as a recurring problem in the critiques of Laing on more 
than one occasion in this thesis. The above comments by Jacoby appear to serve 
as a damage limitation exercise which is intended to compensate for the 
deficiencies created by his structuration of the material he selects to study. 
                                                    Jacoby’s main criticisms of Laing are closely 
interrelated. Despite this, I am separating out each one in order to closely 
examine each element. The first aspect of Jacoby’s critique that I wish to 
examine is his perception of Laing’s work as lacking in criticism of society, and 
as lacking in a coherent view of society itself. Early on in Jacoby’s chapter, he 
argues that in Laing and Cooper, ‘the critique of society is degraded to externals 
against the inner drift of their own work.’6 Jacoby later presents a quotation from 
Laing which refers to his concept that schizophrenia is a strategy created by 
schizophrenics in order to live in an untenable situation.7 Jacoby critiques this on 
the basis that ‘…the content of this unlivable reality is whittled down to that of 
interpersonal relations, especially of the family…’8 However, are not familial 
relations themselves infected by the kind of culture that they are produced and 
reproduced within? In this respect, Jacoby contradicts other criticisms that he 
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makes by not applying his criticisms of Laing and Cooper to his own remarks, 
particularly Jacoby’s identification of reification within their work. This latter 
aspect will be appraised shortly. 
                                                It would have been arguably one of the most 
significant achievements historically within theory if Laing had managed to 
produce a text which worked from the individual, through mediating groups such 
as the family, through to wider society itself. However, his texts may have then 
been criticised for a loss of focus. The fact that Laing’s sphere of analysis 
remains limited to the inter-personal realm is a necessary component required for 
such an examination to occur. Wider social criticism was not Laing’s main 
project, despite some of his comments in this direction. Therefore critiques on 
this basis fall short in terms of matching Laing’s aims, and proceeding 
appropriately from that origin. The further recurring issue of criticising Laing for 
a lack of inclusion of aspects that the critic would like to have perceived again is 
a problem here.  
                        Jacoby claims that because social criticism is not foregrounded in 
Laing’s work, it is therefore ‘…a front for establishment psychology, [and] 
political passivity…’9 I am aware of no textual evidence from Laing’s work to 
support the first assertion. The latter one is derived from the alleged absence of 
social critique within Laing’s work. Particularly in The Politics of Experience, 
some minor criticism of capitalism and Western culture is provided. However, I 
wish to examine this later in this section, as it provides a good counterpoint to 
other related criticisms made by Jacoby. He claims that 
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While there are sufficient statements designating the family as 
a mediating agency between society and the individual, in the 
main it is accepted as the cause of social oppression and not 
also its victim.10 
This criticism is repeated in slightly different forms on two other occasions 
within Jacoby’s chapter.11 No quotations from either Laing or Cooper are 
provided by Jacoby to support his above statement. The absence of an explicit 
comment upon this matter is taken as indicative of an acceptance of the family as 
the cause of social oppression. I am aware of no evidence in Laing’s work to 
validate Jacoby’s claim. However, Laing was aware that the family was impacted 
upon by wider social relations. I have provided a quotation from Laing’s 
interview with Scorpio in 1969 where Laing states that he views the nuclear 
family as a peculiar form of social grouping that has occurred specifically in a 
certain historical form of society in my chapter on Mitchell.12 This flags up the 
importance of examining interviews with an author as well as their texts, since 
interviews may provide clarifications of their project which may not be so clearly 
articulated within their published works. 
                                                               However, some validity in Jacoby’s 
critique can here be perceived.  
…The family does not exist in a no-man’s land. It is snarled 
in a historical dynamic; it has changed in the past, and it is 
changing now. It is as much victim as victimizer.13 
It may have been beneficial for more comprehensive discussions of how the 
specific historical form of the family impacts upon its members to have been 
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included in Laing’s work. However, the crucial issue is whether this may have 
produced a loss of focus in his work. A class analysis could create the difficulty 
of pre-defining the research in such a manner that it may result in simply 
confirming only what it set out to find. Nevertheless, Laing was aware of the 
problem of the impact of wider society upon the individual and the family as a 
mediation between the two. Some of his most explicit comments upon this matter 
are provided in Laing’s paper entitled The Obvious, which was presented at the 
Dialectics of Liberation conference in 1967.14 Marcuse also presented a paper at 
this event. In The Obvious, Laing argues that: ‘…the intelligibility of social 
events requires that they be always seen in a context that extends both spatially 
and in time. The dilemma is that this is often as impossible as it is necessary.’15  
                                                              Therefore Laing, during the period of his 
work which Jacoby is critiquing, demonstrates that he was himself well aware of 
this issue with his work. 
As we begin from micro-situations and work up to macro-
situations we find that the apparent irrationality of behaviour 
on a small scale takes on a certain form of intelligibility when 
one sees it in context… These larger contexts do not exist out 
there on some periphery of social space: they pervade the 
interstices of all that is comprised by them.16 
The example that Laing provides is that of seeing the behaviour of a person 
diagnosed as psychotic as intelligible within their wider family context. It could 
accordingly be posited that placing individuals within a broader context was one 
of Laing’s aims. Jacoby’s criticisms suggest that this aspect of Laing’s work 
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should have been expanded. One can comprehend Jacoby’s frustrations here, 
despite the limitations that I have noted above. However, Jacoby’s comments can 
be seen as productive criticisms highlighting avenues for extending Laing’s 
work. Laing notes that there is: 
…a theoretical and practical problem of finding the 
mediations between the different levels of contexts… The 
intermediate systems that lie on this range have to be studied 
not only in themselves, but as conditioning and conditioned 
media between the individual parts and the whole.17 
It is surprising that Jacoby’s critique of Laing demonstrates no awareness of The 
Obvious, particularly since Marcuse was one of his tutors. Jacoby restricts his 
criticism to Laing’s main published texts. In The Obvious, Laing argues that 
‘…the context of the individual at first appears as his immediate network, and the 
contexts of that network come into view as larger social frameworks that have 
not by any means been adequately identified.’18 Laing notes that there is a gap 
between theory and empirical research in this respect, since ‘…we can 
theoretically reach farther than our empirical research can go…’19  
                                                                                                 Jacoby is criticising 
Laing from the societal end of the scale. Some of Jacoby’s criticisms relating to 
the position of the family within society contradict themselves within the overall 
flow of his argument. In some instances, Jacoby is claiming that the family is 
influenced by wider social relations, and that Laing takes this insufficiently into 
account.20 At other occasions within his critique of Laing, Jacoby claims that the 
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family cannot form a basis for social criticism.21 Jacoby’s view of the family and 
its role as a social mediator is rendered rather imprecise by his differing accounts 
of it. The family can be a means of oppressing and controlling its members, and 
this may reflect the wider repression at large in society. Jacoby appears to be 
somewhat naïve with regard to families and the destructive influence that they 
can take upon their members’ lives. 
                                                      Jacoby may be labouring the somewhat 
obvious point that powerful wider social forces directly structure the lives of 
individuals, and indirectly through the mediating agency of the family. However, 
this hardly constitutes a relevant criticism of Laing, who makes this very point 
himself. Alternatively, Jacoby, who almost drifts into a social determinism, 
might be interpreting Laing’s focus on the family as an indication that Laing has 
reduced social determinism to family determinism. Nevertheless, this would be a 
bizarre criticism since Laing is radically opposed to any kind of determinism. 
This, it is clear, is a major source of Laing’s opposition to positivism in 
psychology, and also to the prescriptive use of psychoanalytic concepts in 
shaping the (mis)diagnosis of individual patients. It is instructive here to note 
that Laing cites John MacMurray’s The Self as Agent (1953) as an important 
influence in the development of his thought.22 Laing is acutely aware that 
however powerful the social forces impinging on the family and the individual, 
the latter retains the capability of exercising agency, however insignificant that 
may be. 
            This reminder of Laing’s unwillingness to embrace determinism in any 
shape or form, in conjunction with the numerous ways in which he highlights the 
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sickness of conformity to self-alienating social norms, does enable a corrective to 
the simplistic positivist tendency in sociology evident in the 1950s and 1960s to 
‘read-off’ the values, beliefs, and attitudes of individuals from their socio-
economic status.23 It is useful to bear this in mind when considering Jacoby’s 
criticism of Laing for ‘…the omission of a class analysis of mental illness’24 
within his work. It can be additionally argued that this was not a feature of 
Laing’s main project. However, particularly in Sanity, Madness and the Family, 
and in Laing’s other substantial case studies, one would have appreciated even 
some brief detailing of the occupational and class backgrounds of the featured 
families and individuals. I feel that this may have enabled a more comprehensive 
perception for the reader of the wider family context, and, for example, whether 
financial pressures were aspects of their lives or not.  
                                                                                  Nevertheless, information 
regarding these families was included in a confidential manner in the above 
text,25 so there would have been an issue with presenting the class backgrounds 
of the families in respect of this. Laing’s most direct statement on such a matter 
occurs in The Divided Self. 
The socio-economic factors of the larger community of which 
the patient’s family is an integral part are not directly relevant 
to the subject matter that is our concern. This is not to say that 
such factors do not profoundly influence the nature of the 
family and hence of the patient.26 
One can appreciate that structuring a psychobiography in such a manner as to 
include a class analysis and to fully do this justice could slant the material away 
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from a study of interpersonal relations on that level itself. However, it has been 
noted in research on psychiatric diagnoses that ‘psychiatric disorders and suicidal 
attempts were more likely to occur in people facing socio-economic 
disadvantage…’27 Nevertheless, one is here arguing with the benefit of the 
empirical research that has been conducted between Laing’s time of writing and 
contemporary times. As Laing states in the quotation from The Obvious that I 
have utilised earlier, there is a gap between what can be theorised and what can 
be supported by empirical evidence. Such a consideration could be useful for 
tempering some of Jacoby’s criticisms. 
                                                              Jacoby’s criticism that ‘…society is 
shuffled out…’28 in Laing’s work relates closely to one of his other main strands 
of criticism of Laing’s theory – that reification is present within it. This criticism 
is additionally levelled at Sartre and Heidegger’s versions of existentialism by 
Marcuse and Adorno respectively.29 I will be drawing upon these wider 
theoretical influences on Jacoby’s critique of Laing as I proceed. I will 
additionally utilise some of Laing’s comments in The Politics of Experience in 
order to provide responses to Jacoby’s claims. Jacoby notes that Laing’s thought 
is influenced by both social psychology and the sociology of groups, alongside 
continental existentialism.30 ‘Both, however, ultimately work to eat away the 
social context of these human relations; they reduce social relations to immediate 
human ones.’31 Jacoby suggests that ‘…the concept of society disappears to 
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make way for endless empirical observations on group dynamics.’32 However, 
this latter criticism appears to be targeted more at the study of group dynamics 
itself, as opposed to Laing’s work directly. Nevertheless, Jacoby proceeds to 
apply this criticism to Laing’s work. I would like to restate my earlier comment 
that to maintain focus in a piece that moved from individuals and groups through 
to the wider society would be extremely difficult. Jacoby’s irritation here is 
understandable, if unfounded as a valid criticism. The fact that Laing’s work has 
served to contextualise the individual within wider human networks could lend 
itself to a wider analysis of such networks. Jacoby critiques Laing for not taking 
this aspect further.  
                             Later in his chapter, Jacoby compares the critique of 
Feuerbach’s work by Marx and Engels to the critique of Laing. ‘The human 
community shrinks to the immediacy of the I / You encounter, and this is 
abstracted from the historical and social reality.’33 Jacoby additionally suggests 
that Laing’s work is lacking in ‘…the conception of man as activity, as praxis.’34 
Jacoby’s first criticism can be countered by reference to my previous comments 
that this aspect of his critique addresses aspects that lie outside of the realm of 
Laing’s main project. Jacoby’s second criticism has even less validity attached to 
it. He appears to have simply transposed Marx, Engels and Marcuse’s criticisms 
of Feuerbach onto Laing (and Cooper’s) work. The concept of praxis is as 
foregrounded in Cooper’s work as it is in Laing’s, particularly in Sanity, 
Madness and the Family. Cooper argues that ‘the free action (or praxis) of a 
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person can destroy the freedom of another or at least paralyze it by 
mystification.’35 
                        Praxis is an idea that receives considerable commentary in the 
methodological introduction to Sanity, Madness and the Family. Certain wider 
cultural criticisms are provided by Laing in The Politics of Experience. Jacoby 
does not support his above criticisms by reference to actual quotations from 
Laing. He instead utilises the theoretical tradition that he is operating in in order 
to attempt to bolster his claims. Jacoby appears to be guilty of a further academic 
crime that is committed in the poor critiques of Laing – that of selective reading 
and identification of aspects of an author’s work. Those that do not fit are 
ignored (the Procrustean critique). The concept of praxis is used in Sanity, 
Madness and the Family as a means of rendering group behaviour intelligible. 
‘…What happens in a group will be intelligible if one can retrace the steps from 
what is going on (process) to who is doing what (praxis).’36 The objection could 
here be raised that Laing’s use of the term praxis differs to Jacoby’s deployment 
of it. However, Jacoby does state that it is human praxis as action, and the impact 
of this in shaping the wider environment that he is referring to.37 In The Politics 
of Experience, Laing suggests that: 
The inertia of human groups… which appear as the very 
negation of praxis, is in fact the product of praxis and nothing 
else.38 
                         Therefore, Jacoby’s criticism that Laing ignores praxis is 
somewhat rather baffling. As I have argued in my previous chapters, a Laingian 
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analysis of groups can lend itself to wider social criticism, and to enabling a 
defence of individuals who are more or less powerless within their social context. 
It could be argued that certain aspects of Laing’s work have been ignored by 
Jacoby, in order for the chapter to fit into the overall theme of the text – Social 
Amnesia. It appears that Jacoby is over-stating the lack of social engagement in 
Laing’s work in order to portray Laing as more societally blind than his work 
truly is. I will provide some examples of Laing’s social criticism shortly, after 
examining Marcuse and Adorno’s critique of existentialism. I wish to examine 
whether Jacoby is transposing their criticism of existentialism onto Laing’s 
theory, without adapting it suitably. Marcuse’s essay on Sartre’s Existentialism 
(1948) has as its main locus of critique of existentialism the notion that it is a 
reified philosophy.  
In so far as Existentialism is a philosophical doctrine, it 
remains an idealistic doctrine: it hypostatizes specific 
historical conditions of human existence into ontological and 
metaphysical characteristics. Existentialism thus becomes part 
of the very ideology which it attacks, and its radicalism is 
illusory.39 
Marcuse’s criticism above runs very close to that made by Jacoby with regard to 
Laing’s work, which I have cited previously. The idea of hypostatization refers to 
treating something conceptual as though it were something real. Any theory 
could encounter this danger.  
                                              Jacoby notes that: 
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…in general the Sartrean existentialism as filtered through 
Laing and Cooper does not contain its original weaknesses – 
some of which Marcuse has indicated.40 
Nevertheless, Jacoby appears to replicate Marcuse’s critique in his chapter on 
Laing, without utilising sufficient textual evidence to support his claims. Jacoby 
additionally claims that Laing’s radicalism is illusory by suggesting that Laing 
confuses mere therapy with social change.  
What Laing and Cooper tend to forget is that if family and 
extrafamily therapy is progress over clinical therapy and 
analysis, this is progress in therapy, not in social theory or 
praxis.41 
Towards the end of his chapter, Jacoby argues that: ‘the writings of Laing and 
Cooper more and more suggest the confusion of psychic first aid with 
liberation.’42 Precisely which aspects of Laing’s work Jacoby is here referring to 
are not stated. I am aware of no instances in Laing’s work where he asserts that 
progress in therapy and social liberation are one and the same. Indeed, Laing’s 
work contains few prescriptions as to how the practice of psychotherapy should 
be conducted. Instead, Laing provides a methodology for the approach to the 
study of humans and our groupings. The argument that therapy has revolutionary 
potential is entirely Cooper’s and not Laing’s.43 
                                                                           Jacoby’s view of Laing as 
confusing therapy with liberation is produced through his grouping together of 
Laing and Cooper without taking sufficiently into account the distinctions 
between these authors. 
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[Laing and Cooper] tend to equate individual psychoses and 
madness with social liberation… Hence, the noticeable 
glorification of schizophrenia, especially in Politics of 
Experience, as a “natural healing process,” and “existential 
rebirth.”44 
I have already spent some time dispelling the hoary myth that The Politics of 
Experience contains little other than the above idea in this thesis. It is a shame, 
given the academic nature of Jacoby’s chapter, that he could not have engaged 
with some of the more concrete theories proffered in that text. He instead resorts 
to criticising a myth, as opposed to an actual theory. However, the above strand 
of critique enables Jacoby’s claims that therapy is seen as tantamount to 
emancipation within Laing’s work.  
                                                       The affinity between Jacoby’s critique of 
Laing and Marcuse’s critique of Sartre is also evident in the following quotation 
from Marcuse. 
…Against this proclamation of the absolute freedom of man, 
the objection arises immediately that man is in reality 
determined by his specific socio-historical situation, which in 
turn determines the scope and content of his liberty and the 
range of his ‘choice’.45 
This argument has a similarity with Jacoby’s claims that Laing’s work lacks in a 
coherent conception of society, which I have reviewed earlier in this chapter. 
Adorno’s critique of existentialism in The Jargon of Authenticity (1973) 
additionally displays similar criticisms of existentialism. Adorno’s critique is 
referred to by Jacoby in his chapter on Laing. The Jargon of Authenticity, by and 
large, criticises Heidegger’s work. However, Marcuse notes that Sartre’s Being 
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and Nothingness ‘…is in large parts a restatement of… Heidegger’s Sein und 
Zeit.’46 Again, Adorno’s critique of existentialism focuses on reification as a 
problem with this philosophy. Whilst problematising the concepts of authenticity 
and inauthenticity, Adorno argues the following. 
The subject, the concept of which was once created in contrast 
to reification, thus becomes reified… Such a philosophy need 
no longer be concerned with how far society and psychology 
allow a man to be himself or become himself, or whether in 
the concept of such selfness the old evil is concentrated one 
more time.47 
                                    The Frankfurt School’s critique of existentialism has as its 
context the affiliation of Heidegger with the Nazi party during the Second World 
War.48 This would seem to give Adorno’s critique an extra edge. I wish to make 
no comment upon whether this affiliation of Heidegger’s was a matter of 
expediency, or altogether more darker. My intention with this comment is to 
permit the reader to be aware of this historical context to the Frankfurt School 
critique of existentialism. Adorno’s other main line of critique of existentialism 
is that it is based upon the use of impenetrable language or jargon – hence the 
title of his text. Adorno argues that ‘by means of the magic formula of existence, 
one disregards society, and the psychology of real individuals which is dependent 
on that society.’49 Jacoby’s critique of Laing shows a further similarity with this 
work of Adorno. Therefore, it does appear that Jacoby has simply transposed the 
Frankfurt School’s critique of existentialism on to Laing’s work, with little 
change or adaptation. 
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                               Jacoby’s criticism of Laing as presenting a reified theory are 
somewhat ironic given that Laing devotes a considerable amount of The Politics 
of Experience to the critique of reification itself. A substantial amount of social 
criticism is additionally present within this text. Jacoby’s chapter demonstrates 
no awareness of these elements. Laing’s critique of reification is largely directed 
at psychoanalysis.  
Few now find central the issues of conscious and unconscious 
as conceived by the early psychoanalysts – as two reified 
systems, both split from the totality of the person,… and both 
exclusively intrapersonal. 
It is the relation between persons that is central in theory, and 
in practice.50 
Jacoby claims that ‘the drift of [Laing’s] analysis is not distinct from that of the 
neo- and post-Freudians; it ignores the psychic depths and the past for the present 
and accessible interhuman dynamics.’51 Jacoby does appear, within this chapter, 
to be operating from a psychoanalytic perspective, that he clearly believes is 
faithful to Freud.  His very criticism in the above quotation is suggestive of this, 
since Jacoby claims that Laing ignores the past and deeper psychic realms, which 
are both features of Freud’s theory.  
                                                       That Jacoby is himself operating from within a 
psychoanalytic perspective is further supported by the ease with which he uses 
Freudian language to (mis)represent Laing. 
The ego, frightened over its own fragility, seeks endless 
confirmations it can neither give nor receive… Multiple 
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reflections are the opium for the multiple wounds the ego has 
suffered.52 
In this instance, Jacoby’s criticism of Laing is rather incoherent. He appears to be 
claiming that the confirmation of one person by another, who perceives that 
individual as more or less who they are, is nothing but a placebo for mitigating 
against the psychological destruction of the self that can be occasioned within 
Western society. This illustrates a tendency by Jacoby to either misinterpret or 
misunderstand Laing’s work. It additionally demonstrates an ignorance by 
Jacoby of the fact that he is criticising elements that Laing himself criticises. This 
is the case with reification, as I have already examined. ‘Why do almost all 
theories about depersonalization, reification, splitting, denial, tend themselves to 
exhibit the symptoms they attempt to describe?’53 Again, Jacoby appears to be 
oblivious to the fact that reification is critiqued by Laing. Given the prominence 
of Laing’s critique in The Divided Self, Self and Others and The Politics of 
Experience, it is extremely difficult to confer any credibility on Jacoby’s 
‘criticism’. 
                 This is additionally the case with regard to Jacoby’s criticism that 
Laing omits the idea that interpersonal relations take the form of alienated ones 
within contemporary society.54 In order to make this criticism, Jacoby has to 
ignore the central strand of Laing’s argument in The Politics of Experience, 
which consists precisely of the idea that alienation pervades all of human life to 
some degree, within present society. ‘Our alienation goes to the roots. The 
realization of this is the essential springboard for any serious reflection on any 
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aspect of present inter-human life.’55 The Politics of Experience contains some of 
Laing’s most strident social criticism, and for this reason is arguably my 
favourite of Laing’s texts. The agencies that mediate between the individual and 
larger social groupings, such as the family and the education system, come in for 
some hefty critique from Laing as reproducing alienated social relations. ‘In a 
world where the normal condition is one of alienation, most personal action must 
be destructive both of one’s own experience and of that of the other.’56 Chapter 
Three – ‘The Mystification of Experience’ – contains some blistering criticism of 
socialisation processes as constituting little other than forms of alienation. Jacoby 
may have perceived the fact that Laing’s analysis remains at the level of 
critiquing such mediating agencies as reinforcing his criticism that wider social 
relations are ignored within Laing’s work. However, I view The Politics of 
Experience as presenting a shift of emphasis within Laing’s work to a wider 
social engagement. However, this strand within Laing’s work does go into 
decline after the publication of The Politics of the Family, which in itself is 
essentially about alienated social relationships.  
                                                                         The mimicking of Marcuse and 
Adorno’s critiques of existentialism continues with Jacoby’s claims that Laing’s 
work represents a bourgeois perspective, and serves to justify capitalist society.  
…Laing and Cooper… make the elementary bourgeois error: 
they mistake the phenomenon specific to one historical era as 
universal and invariant. In brief, they take the human relations 
that prevail in late bourgeois society as human relations as 
such.57 
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The reader should be able to perceive here that this is indeed a similar criticism 
to that of reification being present within Laing’s work. The accusation that 
Laing’s work is bourgeois in such a manner is one that I find almost as 
outrageous as Laing’s feminist critics’ claims that he was a misogynist. It is 
precisely the lack of such an elitist outlook that one finds to be of merit within 
Laing’s oeuvre. Jacoby appears to be taking the absence of explicit statements 
against the present social organisation as evidence of support for it. The notion of 
existentialism as a bourgeois philosophy is criticised by Adorno in The Jargon of 
Authenticity.58 In Marcuse’s essay on Sartre’s Existentialism similar claims are 
made regarding Sartre’s philosophy, albeit with a greater level of validity than is 
found in Jacoby’s critique of Laing. However, this essay does not take into 
account Sartre’s late work, in which he himself criticises his earlier ideas. 
Marcuse is highly critical of Sartre’s notion of freedom within Being and 
Nothingness, which he sees as legitimising domination. 
…These philosophical concepts have declined to the level of a 
mere ideology, an ideology which offers itself as a most 
handy justification for the persecutors… Behind the nihilistic 
language of Existentialism lurks the ideology of free 
competition, free initiative, and equal opportunity.59 
                                                    Further residues of Marcuse’s critique of Sartre 
are present within Jacoby’s chapter on Laing. Jacoby suggests that Laing’s 
theory of self-identity, a combination of how an individual sees themselves and 
how others see them, is little other than ‘…the theory of the spectacle; the 
passivity of the consumer is elevated into a theory of human identity.’60 No 
explanation of how Laing’s theory of self-identity precisely relates to ‘the 
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passivity of the consumer’ is elaborated. As Jacoby’s critique proceeds, it 
becomes less clearly related to the actual material that it is alleging to criticise. 
Marcuse’s critique of Sartre takes much more care not to withdraw excessively 
from the orbit of what is being criticised. At this point, it is worth noting that in 
Wiggershaus’ (1994) lengthy text on the Frankfurt School it is suggested that 
Marcuse and Sartre eventually moved closer towards a similar position. 
With his essay on tolerance, however, Marcuse took sides 
with Sartre, who in 1961 had written an introduction to Frantz 
Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth expressing unreserved 
solidarity with it…61 
Wiggershaus notes that the conclusions reached by both authors were very 
similar in terms of their comprehension of violence on behalf of the oppressed as 
of a legitimate nature.62 I am including this consideration because I do not want 
to create the impression in the reader that the work of the Frankfurt School and 
existentialism itself present diametrically opposed theories. I prefer to view them 
as paradigms which have large tensions between them, but from which a fruitful 
intellectual dialogue has been produced. Indeed, one could argue that Sartre’s 
Critique of Dialectical Reason was influenced by such a dialogue. 
                                                                                                        Arguably 
Jacoby’s most valid criticism regards the notion that mysticism can become a 
form of privatism and social withdrawal. However, this occurs more at the level 
of a general observation than a full criticism of the mystical elements of Laing’s 
work. The latter element does form a strand that runs through the majority of 
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Laing’s work, but which receives its full expression in the closing chapters of 
The Politics of Experience.  
If “our time has been distinguished… by an almost total 
forgetfulness of the internal world,” to follow Laing, it is not 
to be called to life by forgetting the outer world that forgot the 
inner one. […] 
Mystical politics produces mysticism without politics. The 
very recent interviews with Laing suggest this progression.63 
This last remark on behalf of Jacoby is not referenced. The vast majority of the 
interviews with Laing that I have been able to obtain occur after the publication 
of Social Amnesia. Therefore, I cannot verify Jacoby’s comment. From one 
perspective, I agree with Jacoby’s notion that forms of meditation and spirituality 
can involve a withdrawal from wider social engagement. They could become a 
privatistic pursuit. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily have to be the case. 
Spirituality could form the basis of a belief system which is opposed to Western 
materialism. Laing’s mysticism, from my reading of the latter chapters of The 
Politics of Experience, is not intended as a prescription for social retreat, but as a 
corrective to an ego-centric culture, where shallow greed takes precedence over 
lasting relationships. Self-knowledge and political engagement are not mutually 
exclusive. 
               The problem with Jacoby’s above criticism is that it occurs at a juncture 
in his argument that follows a profound misinterpretation of Laing’s mystical 
turn. This is not to say that some level of misunderstanding is present within 
Jacoby’s previous criticism. Jacoby argues that: ‘the assumption that 
mystification is a response to alienation, “inner” space to the lack of “outer” 
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space, was advanced long ago and has gained nothing in the interim.’64 Jacoby is 
here confusing spirituality and mysticism with mystification proper. Again, one 
can perceive a level of validity in his argument, since a preoccupation with 
mystical theories could lead an individual to conceive of the world in unusual 
ways. However, Jacoby considers that his assumption here is self-validating. He 
does not unpick further his linking of mysticism and mystification. He again uses 
Marcuse and Adorno’s work to attempt to shore up his critique, but again does 
not tie this concretely to Laing (or Cooper’s) work. Jacoby demonstrates no 
awareness that a substantial theme in Laing’s work involves the critique of 
mystification, both within theory and as socially produced. At no stage in Laing’s 
work is mystification proposed as a solution to alienation. Where Jacoby’s line of 
critique is derived from here (other than from the Frankfurt School) is itself 
mystifying. Sedgwick produces a similar line of criticism of Laing’s ‘mystical’ 
comments, which is evaluated in the next section. 
                                                                             Further misinterpretations on 
behalf of Jacoby regarding Laing’s work involve the limits of psychotherapy and 
the extent to which it can produce real change to an individual’s life. Jacoby 
claims that Laing suggests that therapy is tantamount to emancipation, which I 
have briefly referred to earlier. 
…There can be talk of therapy, but therapy as therapy – not as 
radical therapy or social change… In this way therapy 
becomes self-conscious, adequate to its own notion; it does 
not mystify itself as radical cure or liberation while it 
responds to the emergency of the individual victim.65 
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Later in his chapter, Jacoby suggests that ‘inasmuch as the limitations of family 
therapy are not acknowledged, the therapy begins to confuse itself with social 
change.’66 I am aware of no instances where Laing asserts that therapy can be 
equated with social change. The first criticism is targeted at both Laing and 
Cooper. It must be emphasised that the idea that therapy could have such 
potential is entirely Cooper’s, as I have stated earlier in this chapter. However, 
the second quotation features in a discussion of Sanity, Madness and the Family. 
This latter text is certainly not a work devoted to prescriptions for the practice of 
family therapy. It is instead a study, with limited aims, of certain families where 
one female child has been diagnosed as schizophrenic. However, Jacoby 
continues his rather irritating tendency of mixing in poor criticism with good 
quality critical observations on the matter that he is discussing. I would have 
been surprised if Laing had argued against Jacoby’s notion that therapy is a 
limited pursuit. 
…The therapy, conceiving itself as dealing with the real 
context, inches out to include more and more people in this 
context and finally is damned to impotence, confronted by 
more people than any therapy could hope to “treat”.67 
                                          In an insane society, all of the population may require 
psychotherapy. With regard to the limits of therapy, some of Smail’s discussions 
in Taking Care: An Alternative to Therapy (1987) are worth briefly noting. 
Smail, for whom Laing is inspirational,68 conceives of therapy as having a very 
limited scope. He views one of its best possible outcomes as demystifying the 
individual about the wider influences that shape their existence. 
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…Though their stated profession and unstated interest may be 
to offer cure, most therapists of good will also play an 
inadvertently subversive role within the society which 
damages us so profoundly… This almost inevitably means 
that patients begin to criticize aspects of a social ‘reality’ 
which before they had always taken for granted…69 
It may have been interesting to see if Jacoby would have additionally levelled 
accusations at Smail that his conception of society is inadequate, in the same 
manner that he has done with Laing. In a chapter entitled ‘Change: The Limits of 
Therapy’, Smail problematises arguments regarding the efficacy of therapy. 
‘…The actual suffering caused by the injustices and inequalities of our society 
cannot easily be concealed under a blanket of therapy.’70 Jacoby is correct in 
arguing that the only adequate response to a sick society is social change itself. 
Jacoby views therapy as yet another form of mystification, in some ways. Smail 
suggests that: 
The actual possible achievements of therapy may thus be 
summarized very briefly as establishing what is the case 
(‘demystification’), and providing courage and 
encouragement.71 
I view Smail’s contribution in terms of arguing for a political purpose for therapy 
as an agent of social demystification, albeit with limited aims, as a significant 
one, and one that is compatible with Laing’s work. 
                                                                              Prior to my conclusion of this 
section, I wish to examine another of Jacoby’s mystifying criticisms of Laing – 
that the approach in his work constitutes a positivist one in some instances. 
Jacoby suggests that Laing and Cooper’s work ‘…finally dribbles into blind 
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therapy and positivism, pop existentialism and mysticism.’72 This criticism is 
additionally repeated towards the end of Jacoby’s chapter.73 I have already dealt 
with Jacoby’s accusations of Laing’s work consisting of ‘blind therapy’ and 
‘mysticism’ previously in this section. No substantial analysis of whether ‘pop 
existentialism’ is a factor in Laing’s work is offered within Jacoby’s piece. One 
wonders whether because Laing’s work was popular in its day, and it operates 
from an existential perspective, if Jacoby has conflated the two elements. Jacoby 
does, however, attempt to flesh out further his claims that Laing’s work contains 
positivist elements. Jacoby identifies the other intellectual tradition that Laing’s 
work operates within as ‘…a neo-positivist social psychology and sociology 
focused on the group and group dynamics…’74 Jacoby’s error here is to assume 
that this constitutes one homogenous perspective, whereas Laing’s 
phenomenological approach differs radically from standard methodologies. 
                                                             Jacoby argues that Laing’s work on the 
family consists of: 
…endless empirical observations on group dynamics. These 
empirical observations skirt the antagonistic relationship that 
is outside the laboratory – the individual and society – in 
favor of the safe, sound, and verifiable one of individual and 
individual.75 
It is stated in the preface to Sanity, Madness and the Family that the majority of 
the interviews for that text were conducted in psychiatric hospitals.76 I have 
already referred to Laing’s dissatisfaction with how the interviews were carried 
out for the above text in my chapter on Mitchell. He was also unhappy with the 
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fact that ‘…the majority of these interviews were conducted in our own 
consulting rooms, and not in the family homes…’77 However, even a hospital 
consulting room is not the same environment as a laboratory, despite it still 
constituting an ‘unnatural’ environment. Jacoby’s comment suggests that Laing 
was a conventional scientist, which was not the case. Jacoby’s above criticism 
provides a further example of his parroting of Frankfurt School critiques, without 
adapting the material appropriately, since Adorno and Horkheimer are referenced 
by Jacoby as criticising group studies in the same vein.78 Jacoby additionally 
appears to be confusing an element of positivism – empiricism – with positivism 
itself. He continues to ignore aspects of Laing’s work that do not fit into his 
argument, such as Laing’s substantial criticism of positivism as an approach to 
the study of humans and groups. Later in his chapter, Jacoby criticises Laing’s 
use of mapping within his work, which he sees as forming a ‘…move from 
existentialism to positivism…’79 Mitchell additionally criticises this aspect of 
Laing’s work. I will briefly summarise my earlier comments from that chapter. 
Whilst I can perceive the value of having a system of noting the differing 
viewpoints of individuals in a group, I do find this strand of Laing’s work to be 
somewhat alienating. This element receives a more comprehensive commentary 
in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
                                              I wish to conclude this section by noting that Jacoby 
does praise some aspects of Laing’s work, before rounding up the main problems 
with his critique of Laing. Jacoby notes that Laing and Cooper’s work: 
…seeks to indict, not absolve, a maddening society. Their 
work seethes with discontent. In this as well as in their serious 
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philosophical interests they radically diverge from the 
conformist psychologies.80 
However, this comment occurs in the first paragraph of Jacoby’s chapter. The 
content of the above quotation becomes lost as the piece proceeds. Jacoby 
additionally claims, in the introduction to the chapter, that: ‘the intention of the 
following is neither to sum up nor write off Laing and Cooper, but, hopefully, to 
be suggestive.’81 Nevertheless, given the strong way in which many of Jacoby’s 
criticisms are asserted, this qualification becomes further diluted as the chapter 
proceeds. Towards the end of the chapter, Jacoby emphasises ‘…the strength of 
the writing of Laing and Cooper.’82 This again appears to have been included in 
an effort to counterbalance an over-emphasis upon certain problematic issues 
within Laing’s work. 
                                In conclusion, it is a shame that one of the benefits of 
Jacoby’s critique – its deployment of Frankfurt School theory – is additionally its 
downfall, since the latter’s critiques of existentialism are insufficiently modified 
by Jacoby to be relevant to Laing’s work. However, it must be emphasised that 
Marcuse’s criticism of Sartre neglects Sartre’s late work. This may provide the 
basis for some of Jacoby’s misinterpretations. Jacoby’s critique is extremely 
repetitive in terms of the aspects that it identifies. The criticisms that Jacoby 
makes appear to be produced more by his squeezing of Laing’s material into the 
orbit of a theory that is suffering from ‘social amnesia’, as opposed to being 
genuine deficiencies with the texts themselves. It is additionally disappointing 
that Jacoby’s critique replicates the majority of the errors with the other critiques 
of Laing that have been reviewed thus far. Certain limited aspects of Jacoby’s 
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critique do have some validity. However, these tend to occur at the level of 
general observations on a topic, as opposed to being concretely tied to Laing’s 
work itself.                                    
Sedgwick’s Critique of Laing 
 
Peter Sedgwick is described as Laing’s ‘chief critic’83 by Mullan in his text of 
conversations with Laing. Sedgwick’s critique occurs within two different texts – 
a chapter within the unfortunately titled R.D. Laing and Anti-Psychiatry (1974), 
edited by Boyers, and within Sedgwick’s book Psycho Politics (1982). The first 
of the two chapters within the latter text that are devoted to Laing, entitled ‘R.D. 
Laing: The Radical Trip’, is, for the most part, identical to Sedgwick’s paper 
R.D. Laing: Self, Symptom, and Society, which occurs in the text edited by 
Boyers. This replication is not noted by Sedgwick in the customary fashion in 
Psycho Politics. However, some differences are present between the two 
versions, in the form of editing, corrections, and additions. Sedgwick’s critique 
has been utilised and quoted by other critics of Laing, such as Reznek and 
Mitchell. Both of these instances have been referred to in the relevant chapters of 
this thesis. Sedgwick proposes to offer a ‘…scientific and logical evaluation of 
Laingian concepts of psychosis and its treatment.’84 I shall argue that Sedgwick’s 
critique of Laing is highly problematic. Furthermore, I shall attempt to show that 
tensions and contradictions within the structure of Sedgwick’s argument itself 
serve to undermine the clarity of his critique of Laing. These issues will be 
highlighted as this section proceeds.  
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                                                          First, it will be useful to provide a little 
background in order to attempt to make better sense of Sedgwick’s stance 
towards Laing. Sedgwick claims to be operating from a left-wing perspective, 
despite very little of his critique displaying any evidence of this. The main left-
wing criticism of Laing – that he does not engage to a sufficient degree with 
wider social forces – is put forward by Sedgwick, in a similar vein to Deleuze 
and Guattari and Jacoby. Jacoby’s critique is directly referred to by Sedgwick 
within Psycho Politics.85 He notes that he is ‘particularly indebted’86 to Jacoby’s 
critique of Laing, within a footnote. Indeed, certain of Sedgwick’s criticisms of 
Laing are virtually identical to those produced by Jacoby. Sedgwick claims that 
Laing’s ‘…radicalism was less an implication than an obscure insinuation.’87 He 
further suggests that Laing’s knowledge of any social groups comprising a larger 
unit than the family is limited.88 I have already evaluated such criticisms 
previously in this thesis. Sedgwick appears to be keen to align himself with the 
main orthodoxies of the left-wing critiques of Laing. Sedgwick additionally 
criticises Laing for not maintaining the ‘correct’ left-wing line. ‘Laing’s retreat 
from socialism is tragic for his left-wing admirers.’89 The precise content of this 
‘retreat’ appears to be the product of Sedgwick’s framing of Laing’s career as 
constituting a ‘radical trip’ and a ‘return to psychiatry’ within the respective titles 
of his chapters on Laing in Psycho Politics. The evidence provided to support 
this by Sedgwick is flimsy at best, and ignores Laing’s critiques of psychiatry 
within his later texts. 
                                               
85ibid, p.111 
86
 ibid, p.267 
87
 ibid, p.103 
88
 op. cit., p.104 
89
 ibid, p.103 
 268 
                                Sedgwick is keen to portray Laing as being a Marxist at the 
height of his fame, but claims that Laing later reneged upon this. I have not seen 
any other claims of this nature within the literature on Laing that I have 
reviewed. These claims that Laing was a Marxist feature in the altered text in 
Psycho Politics, but are not present within the earlier version. Sedgwick provides 
a second-hand account from an individual claiming that Laing ‘…declared 
himself as a marxist’,90 during a private lecture. Sedgwick also suggests that 
Laing put his name to ‘…the May Day Manifesto,… a militant and developed 
anti-capitalist statement…’91 in 1967. In his second chapter on Laing in Psycho 
Politics, Sedgwick states that Laing eventually denied ‘…ever having been a 
marxist in the political sense.’92 The footnote to this specific comment is 
illuminating. Sedgwick alleges that he confronted Laing on this issue. ‘When I 
reminded him that he had signed the New Left May Day Manifesto, he said: 
“Which one was that?”’93 A fair amount of discussion of Sedgwick’s criticism of 
Laing is provided in Mad to be Normal. He was clearly a source of some 
irritation to Laing, who states that he ‘…never met Peter Sedgwick except 
glancingly in the early ‘70s after he had contributed to Laing and Anti-
Psychiatry.’94 The fact that Sedgwick uses second-hand sources, and upholds 
them as ‘the truth’ clearly does not add to the production of an incisive critique. 
Gossip and textual evidence are treated as one and the same. The fact that Laing 
suggests that he did not really know Sedgwick leads one to believe that the above 
confrontation may never have actually occurred. 
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                                                                            Mullan perceives Sedgwick’s 
criticism as indicative that the basis of it was that Laing was not following what 
Sedgwick considered to be ‘…a “correct Marxist” line…’95 Laing responds in 
the following quotation. 
I thought that Peter Sedgwick in particular, his absolute 
impertinence, to accuse me of not following a correct Marxist 
line where as far as I’m concerned Marx is an important 
intellectual… that I respect. But I never would have regarded 
myself as committed to following a correct Marxist 
line…What the fucking hell is a correct Marxist line?96 
Laing notes that he did read Marx whilst he was at university,97 and that he had 
friends who were members of the Glasgow Communist Party during that stage of 
his life.98 In these discussions, Laing demonstrates that he was well aware of this 
perspective. In his response to this aspect of Sedgwick’s critique, Laing states 
that: 
…I never could see how you could extrapolate Marxist 
apocalyptic revolutionary writings of the 19th century to the 
present-day world…I had a contempt for these ideological 
amateurs who’d get a few juicy phrases and think they turn 
around the world. [sic]99 
Laing’s discussions on this topic are of a more sophisticated nature than 
Sedgwick’s criticism in this vein. Laing had genuine, well-considered issues with 
‘champagne socialists’, and the application of Marx to that era. Therefore, like 
any intelligent individual, he was not going to conform to any orthodoxy of the 
Left. One considers thinking for oneself to be more of a left-wing value than 
blind acceptance and docility.  
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                                             This consideration of Laing as a breaker of the left-
wing front is additionally present within Sedgwick’s criticism of Laing’s travels 
in 1971 to Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) and India, to ‘…further his long-standing 
interest in yoga and certain Buddhist meditations.’100 No explicit criticism of this 
episode of Laing’s life is present within the main text of Psycho Politics, but is 
instead put forward within a footnote. Sedgwick notes that Laing mentioned in 
an interview that genocide was occurring within Sri Lanka during the time that 
Laing was there.101  
We can observe Laing’s extraordinary state of dissociation 
from the left which enabled him to sit meditating in a 
monastery which was part of Sri Lanka’s landowning 
Establishment while peasants, students and trade unionists 
were being slaughtered and rounded up by the government’s 
forces of repression.102 
One finds it unusual for such a criticism to be presented within a footnote. The 
wider context of the left’s views on this specific situation at this time is not 
stated, which leaves the reader somewhat devoid of a means of orientation with 
regard to this matter. It is disturbing that history has repeated itself in Sri Lanka 
in contemporary times, with the Tamil Tigers having been largely eradicated by 
means of military violence. Nevertheless, the issue of how to relate these 
situations to the theoretical content of Laing’s work is problematic. Sedgwick 
makes no distinction in his critique of Laing between such ad hominem attacks, 
and between criticism of Laing’s work. It is difficult for me to assess the validity 
of Sedgwick’s claims, since I am unaware of whether there was substantial left-
wing opposition to the events in Sri Lanka at that time. It would be of benefit if 
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Sedgwick were to state his precise problem here. Is he arguing that Laing should 
not have gone at all, due to the situation in Sri Lanka? Alternatively, is he 
claiming that Laing would not have made this trip if he was truly left-wing? It 
would be consistent with Sedgwick’s utterings to suggest that he was adopting a 
‘lefter than thou’ form of moralising that produced a type of political correctness. 
                                                              Laing responds to this element of 
Sedgwick’s criticism in Mad to be Normal. Mullan argues that Sedgwick is being 
extremely cynical with regard to this episode in Laing’s life.103 Laing’s main 
retort is that Sedgwick’s criticism is based on an insufficient knowledge of the 
political context of the situation in Sri Lanka at that time.104  
This had to do with very complex issues about people 
struggling for opportunities and advantage between Asian 
merchants and families and politicians and lawyers. It had 
nothing to do with this simplistic thought that Sedgwick 
referred to.105 
Laing’s discussion of this matter enables a greater comprehension of the situation 
than Sedgwick’s footnote. According to Laing, Sri Lanka was (and presumably 
still is) split between the powerful Singhalese and the Tamil minority. The crux 
of Laing’s response to this element of Sedgwick’s criticism is that Sedgwick had 
reduced the situation to a simplistic scenario. Laing recounts a story told to him 
by a monk where Tamils were rounded up, tied up, and then killed by a steam 
roller. This occurred ‘…while they sold coca cola and the kids and everyone 
turned out to cheer them being squashed into the ground… Every so often the 
Singhalese do this to their next-door neighbours.’106 This shows that Laing was 
                                               
103
 Mad to be Normal, p.228 
104
 ibid, p.244 
105
 ibid, p.245 
106
 op. cit. 
 272 
well aware of the problems in Sri Lanka at the time, and so were the monks with 
whom he studied. If Sedgwick’s criticism in this vein had occurred within a 
mature discussion both of the context within Sri Lanka at the time, and of the 
Left’s views on this, it may have acquired a greater level of validity. However, 
since it is relegated to a footnote which is part of only a brief description of this 
episode in Laing’s life, I consider this to be little other than a passing shot. 
                                               Sedgwick’s critique displays an additional 
similarity with that of Jacoby in terms of the critique of the mystical elements 
within Laing’s work. Nevertheless, this aspect of Sedgwick’s critique is present 
within the earlier text Self, Symptom and Society, and was therefore produced 
prior to Sedgwick’s incorporation of Jacoby’s critique. Sedgwick does attempt to 
trace the lines of development of certain concepts within Laing’s thought. 
However, some of these attempts are erroneous, particularly within Self, 
Symptom and Society, and Mitchell provides a more coherent account of the 
developments within Laing’s work. Sedgwick argues that The Politics of 
Experience represents a radical alteration within Laing’s thought. ‘Why did the 
switch in Laing’s theory take place, and why in the two directions of social 
radicalism and personal mysticism? It was not a necessary consequence of any of 
his previous doctrines.’107 I consider this to be less of a substantial break in 
Laing’s thought than Sedgwick claims it to be. I have argued previously in this 
thesis that elements within Laing’s earliest texts do hint at the content of The 
Politics of Experience, particularly within my chapter on Deleuze and Guattari. 
Sedgwick’s vague criticism of Laing’s mysticism is closely related to his critique 
of the voyage. It also relates to Sedgwick’s criticism of Laing’s travels to Sri 
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Lanka and India. One wonders if Laing had made such a journey for purposes 
other than engaging in the practice of meditation, whether such criticism would 
have arisen.  
                   An example of Sedgwick’s poor attempt at tracing the developments 
in Laing’s work is provided in the following quotation. 
Up to his psychedelic phase, Laing accepted the typical 
medical and psychoanalytic descriptions of [schizophrenic] 
states of being… But if the schizophrenic experience was to 
become completely validated,… ego-loss and de-realization 
had to become positive virtues…108 
The first sentence of the above quotation can only be applied to The Divided Self. 
Even then, it omits Laing’s scathing criticism of psychoanalysis itself and the 
positivist, medical view of the individual which is present within that text. The 
remainder of the quotation is based upon a complete misreading and 
misunderstanding of Laing’s comments in The Politics of Experience. Laing does 
not state that ego-loss is a ‘positive virtue’, but that it may form a part of the 
experience of the voyage. Laing actually describes the voyage as something that 
may leave the individual ‘…lost and terrified…’109  
                                                                                In the next paragraph, 
Sedgwick then proclaims: 
I do not believe that Laing’s mysticism can run very deep. He 
himself, after all, must utilise ‘the egoic mode’ very 
frequently, in seeing patients… and so on.110 
Laing’s mysticism and the voyage become conflated within Sedgwick’s 
argument. The voyage is not promoted by Laing as a continuous mode of being, 
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nor as some sort of lifestyle choice. Sedgwick is criticising his 
(mis)interpretation of Laing’s comments. With these unclear gripes about the 
mystical elements in Laing’s work (which I have no problems with), any 
similarity with the other left-wing critiques of Laing’s work finishes completely. 
Sedgwick’s critique, instead, has far more in common with the conservative 
psychiatric critiques of Laing than it does with those produced by Jacoby and 
Deleuze and Guattari. Indeed, Sedgwick has produced a template for the critique 
of Laing which is replicated and praised by Reznek and Clare. The more 
‘scientific’ criticisms of Laing which are produced by Sedgwick will be 
discussed shortly. Since the vast majority of these elements of his critique have 
been replicated by others, and have already been evaluated in this thesis, they 
will receive only a brief treatment. 
                                                      In Self, Symptom and Society, Sedgwick claims 
that Laing’s texts prior to The Politics of Experience refrain ‘…from any 
celebration of a super-sanity achieved by the psychotic in his voyage into inner 
space.’111 The usage of ‘his’ for all individuals suffering from mental distress 
within this former text of Sedgwick’s appears to be highly inappropriate, 
particularly when he is referring to female individuals such as Julie, from the last 
chapter of The Divided Self.112 This problem is corrected within Psycho Politics. 
Sedgwick appear to be one of the first of Laing’s critics to have produced the line 
of critique that Laing celebrates and glorifies schizophrenia. In the incoherent, 
rambling, first chapter of Psycho Politics,113 Sedgwick suggests that he was 
‘…very, very sceptical as to the value of Laing’s inferences on the supposedly 
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normal and life-enhancing qualities of the schizophrenic frenzy…’114 As I have 
argued previously,115 this involves criticising a misinterpretation, as opposed to 
Laing’s actual statements on this matter, which are much more cautious than they 
are portrayed to be. 
                              Sedgwick has further aided the production of a standardised 
critique of Laing with his comments regarding Laing’s allegedly ‘romantic 
conception’116 of psychosis. This misreading and misinterpretation of Laing’s 
work has additionally been parroted by Clare, who is featured in the list of 
acknowledgements in Psycho Politics. The acceptance and promotion of 
Sedgwick’s critique of Laing as valid and unproblematic is something that one 
considers to have been highly damaging to the study of Laing. A simple 
comparison of Sedgwick’s claims with the actual textual evidence contained in 
Laing’s work demonstrates, through the effort to not read aspects into a text that 
are not present, that the vast majority of Sedgwick’s criticisms are unfounded or 
invalid. Laing noted that he ‘…thought of writing to him and saying you’re 
putting some sort of ideological map in front of you, in terms of which you see 
me, but it doesn’t correspond… Meditation isn’t a betrayal of the cause.’117 
Laing additionally highlights Sedgwick’s profound misreading of his work with 
regard to the voyage, in Mad to be Normal. 
…What I thought was important that led me to write the thing 
was being lost by this misunderstanding criticism which was 
impervious in its tone really. It was belligerent and polemical. 
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It wasn’t the tone that you could answer in a quiet tone of 
voice.118 
Laing argues that this element of his work was taken to be more substantial than 
it really is, since it comprises only one chapter and a small section of The Politics 
of Experience.119 
                           This issue with critiques of the voyage is additionally noted by 
Kotowicz in his text on Laing. 
The intensity of the reaction to this part of Laing’s work was 
quite out of proportion to what Laing seemed to be stating. 
Views that he never held were attributed to him, views that he 
did hold were exaggerated, taken out of context and given a 
new meaning. He was, and is, said to be romanticizing 
madness.120 
In sharp contrast to Sedgwick’s claims to be producing a ‘logical’ critique of 
Laing, his criticism is more suggestive of someone who has become ‘carried 
away’ by their own (mis)reading of the texts, and then proceeds to criticise Laing 
on that basis, as opposed to using any real textual evidence. The fact that 
Sedgwick’s criticisms are replicated unthinkingly by others is an error. It is even 
more of an error to replicate the same methodological problem of not criticising 
Laing’s actual work. Kotowicz further argues (as I have done) that Laing is not 
promoting psychosis in The Politics of Experience, and is, in fact, rather more 
hesitant about this notion than his critics seem to be aware of.121 
                                                                                                       Laing himself 
points out that the idea of the voyage has precedents in his earlier work. He refers 
to the chapter entitled ‘The Coldness of Death’, which comprises the fifth 
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chapter of Self and Others.122 I have referred to this chapter in my earlier section 
on Deleuze and Guattari, since Laing makes use of a woman’s experience in 
order to illustrate the irrelevance of clinical psychiatric and psychoanalytic 
jargon and concepts for making sense of this individual’s voyage. This particular 
woman’s experience involved feeling ‘the coldness of death’ without ever 
actually thinking that she had died.123 She experienced her body as dying, and 
her perceptions were related to various experiences of illness within her family 
members.124 In this account, Laing states that he has ‘…alluded elsewhere to the 
possibility that what we call psychosis may be sometimes a natural process of 
healing (a view for which I claim no priority).’125 In Mad to be Normal, Laing 
notes that this particular example of the voyage in his work has been totally 
ignored.126 
…People treated it as some sort of salon fashionable idea and 
never related it to Jesse Watkins… This had been a hell of an 
experience for him that he had come through… And no one 
seemed to be interested that this referred to actual people and 
that I wasn’t glorifying madness or anything.127 
                                                                                          It is of interest that, with 
regard to the voyage, Laing is keen to highlight the fact that his brief 
engagements with this notion are derived from the actual experiences of 
individuals. In the light of this, Sedgwick’s claim that ‘…the “nature” of the 
Laingian psychosis is, in part, that of an elaborately staged artefact’,128 is rather 
offensive. Equally displeasing is the fact that Sedgwick fails to base this 
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allegation on anything from Laing’s actual texts, but instead on Clancy Sigal’s 
Zone of the Interior (a fictional account of Sigal’s brief association with Laing), 
and on Mary Barnes’ published text.129 Sedgwick shows no awareness that Laing 
was not her therapist. Sedgwick also appears to be labouring under the illusion 
that the voyage was suddenly discovered by Laing magically, out of nowhere.130 
‘…What can explain Laing’s sudden discovery of the authentic illuminations that 
are conferred on fortunate schizophrenics by their delusions?’131 This particular 
discussion in Self, Symptom and Society is edited out of the version that appears 
in Psycho Politics. This may be because Sedgwick realised that he was wrong to 
make this assertion. Nevertheless, much of his discussion of the voyage is framed 
around this assumption. Laing clearly became sick of the scandal surrounding 
such misinterpretations of the voyage in general. 
I sometimes wished I’d never written those few pages because 
they were picked up with such excessive dust around them, it 
was obscuring the whole sober, non-acid, non-trippy, 
ordinariness of, and misery of, a lot of that sort of thing. The 
idea that I was glorifying it, or recommending it was 
ridiculous.132 
                                   However, Sedgwick does make one criticism of the voyage 
which has a somewhat greater level of validity than his others, which is not 
blindly repeated by other critics. Sedgwick suggests that the form of 
schizophrenia that Laing describes is not the typical one that individuals usually 
experience.  
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The course of schizophrenia as described by Laing for those 
patients who have been treated by his methods resembles only 
one type of schizophrenic career: the case of the acute 
psychotic episode,…which clears up after its first appearance 
without any further sequel in the patient’s life.133 
There is some evidence to support Sedgwick’s argument here. In one of the 
Mental Health Foundation’s booklets on schizophrenia, it is noted that: ‘About a 
third of people who experience an episode of this sort never have another, while 
others may have continuing problems and repeated episodes.’134 Therefore, a 
proportion of around a third of individuals who experience what is seen as 
schizophrenia only have one episode. However, Sedgwick’s use of empirical 
evidence, only a few pages before the above comments, rather contradicts his 
own argument. He cites a number of studies which showed favourable results 
when medication was not given to psychotic patients.135 Sedgwick then claims 
that: 
…the model of a condition that will terminate itself if left to 
run its natural limits, and will only be worsened if the 
physician meddles with it, is an ancient but reputable concept 
in medicine…136 
                                             It could be argued here that Sedgwick is referring to 
different aspects of schizophrenia, so he is therefore not directly contradicting 
himself. However, it is the lack of consistency of argument which is troubling, 
alongside the fact that Sedgwick appears to be wholly unaware of these tensions. 
I will expose further of these examples of tensions and contradictions later in this 
section. There are a number of problems with the quotation from Sedgwick that I 
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have used, which raises the idea that schizophrenia does not typically take the 
form of only one episode. Firstly, he refers to patients that have been treated by 
Laing’s methods. At no stage in Laing’s work does he prescribe methods of 
treatment, so these methods are assumed or inferred by Sedgwick. Secondly, 
Sedgwick does not direct the reader to any specific instances within Laing’s texts 
where Laing states that schizophrenia occurs only within one episode. Since I am 
unaware of any such examples, this is a further inference or assumption. The 
comments that this criticism is couched in serve to further undermine what is an 
interesting point, even if it is one that is unfounded within its relation to Laing’s 
actual work. Sedgwick presents Laing as someone who is intentionally lying 
about this matter, and as someone who does not have a sufficient knowledge of 
schizophrenia to be making such comments. 
For anyone with a knowledge of severe mental illness and the 
fate of its victims, the only possible conclusion can be that 
Laing is talking about a ‘schizophrenia’ quite different from 
the range of the disorders encountered under that label by 
other practitioners… For the counsellor or befriender of the 
schizophrenic with a recurring state of illness, Laing’s work 
appears as either misleading or irrelevant.137 
                                                                                 The very notion that 
schizophrenia is real is an assumption that underpins much of Sedgwick’s 
criticism of Laing. This strand influences Sedgwick’s ‘scientific’ criticism of 
Laing, which is replicated by other critics, and which will be briefly discussed 
shortly. The idea that schizophrenia is real is one that Sedgwick attempts to 
reinforce by emotional appeals to the reader, as opposed to through well-
considered argument. The above quotation is an example of such an appeal. In 
the poor first chapter of Psycho Politics, Sedgwick makes use of a story about 
                                               
137
 ibid, p.122 
 281 
‘…two parents of schizophrenic children…’138 and himself giving a talk to a 
group of trainee social workers, who appeared to have absorbed the critique of 
psychiatry, and were, as a result, very critical of Sedgwick and the parents’ 
claims that schizophrenia is a real illness. According to Sedgwick, the situation 
became very hostile. Rather than working through the nature of the hostility, 
Sedgwick simply dismisses it by using a quotation from one of the parents. 
‘…Only a few years ago, I read Laing and accepted his story completely – before 
we had any knowledge at home of what these things were really like.’139 
Precisely what ‘story’ of Laing’s the parent was referring to is not stated. It is 
impossible to ascertain what the differences between Laing’s work, or the 
assumptions made about it, and the experiences of the parent were. This is only 
one of numerous instances of poor scholarship within Sedgwick’s work on 
Laing. 
         The reason for Sedgwick’s over-emotional approach to Laing’s work, 
which does severely cloud his judgement, is hinted at in Psycho Politics. He 
notes that a close relative of his was admitted into hospital in a psychotic state, 
and that she died not long after in the ward.140 Laing notes in Mad to be Normal 
that ‘someone said that he [i.e. Sedgwick] had a sister who had been diagnosed 
as schizophrenic.’141 This is included in a discussion where Laing notes the lack 
of real textual engagement with his actual (as opposed to assumed) ideas which 
is present within Sedgwick’s attempted critique. I am aware that I am running the 
risk of being very harsh, and I am conscious that such an event would influence 
an individual’s view of mental illness, nevertheless, this does not excuse the 
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poverty of Sedgwick’s critique. It is a blind polemic, as opposed to a considered 
intellectual engagement with Laing’s work. 
                                                                    The idea that schizophrenia is real 
links with Sedgwick’s ‘scientific’ criticisms of Laing, which are parroted by 
others, particularly the conservative psychiatric critics. Since these criticisms 
have been dealt with previously,142 they will receive only a brief treatment. 
However, it is worth noting that Sedgwick is the origin of much of this line of 
critique. The same comments are found within both Self, Symptom and Society, 
and Psycho Politics, although there are minor rearrangements and edits of the 
material. Sedgwick criticises the fact that the study of ‘normal’ families (what 
would have been Volume Two of Sanity, Madness and the Family, the ‘control’ 
group) was never produced.143 From this, he argues that: 
…the descriptions of the girls’ families in the 1964 study 
contain remarkably little that might be specifically 
schizogenic… The theoretical framework outlined in the 
introduction is again non-specific to schizophrenia…144 
I would like to remind the reader that neither of these criticisms fully address the 
actual stated aims of Sanity, Madness and the Family. The main aim of the study 
is to investigate whether what is seen as schizophrenia is more socially 
intelligible than has previously been supposed. This provides an explanation for 
the tangential nature of Sedgwick’s second criticism in the above quotation. The 
theoretical framework of Sanity, Madness and the Family is centred around the 
social intelligibility of behaviour and experience, not schizophrenia itself. I 
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disagree considerably with Sedgwick’s first comment, and have argued against 
this type of claim in my chapter which provides a feminist reading of Laing. 
                                                Sedgwick’s criticism here is focussed around his 
desire to look for the cause of schizophrenia.145 He notes that Sanity, Madness 
and the Family has other aims than this, but does not permit this awareness to 
temper his critique.146 This form of critique has little other substance than that 
Laing did not create the sort of study that Sedgwick would have liked to view. 
Sedgwick states that he studied in the area of the ‘psychological sciences’147 in 
Psycho Politics, so he is somewhat influenced by a ‘scientific’ perspective. 
However, with regard to Sedgwick’s claims to be a more authentic left-wing 
representative than Laing, one can perceive little other than a conservative 
psychiatric stance within these criticisms. 
                                                                  At this juncture, I want to provide some 
comments that I have not previously raised. I find the very idea of the scientific 
nature of mental ‘illness’ to be itself a highly unscientific concept.148 Science can 
take the form of producing a hypothesis, regarding which the attempt should then 
be made to disprove that hypothesis as rigorously as possible. Where has the 
effort been made to disprove the hypothesis of the existence of mental illness? 
Attempts to find a biological basis for schizophrenia have been, thus far, 
inconclusive. As I have stated in an earlier chapter,149 current research is moving 
more towards traumatic life experiences as influences in the psychotic 
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experience. Other than Laing, and Szasz (from a right-wing approach), little 
effort has been made to disprove what remain hypothetical constructs. From this 
perspective, Sanity, Madness and the Family is much more scientific than its 
critics claim. It contributes to a ‘science of persons’ as opposed to an alienated 
science which treats humans as mere objects. Laing provides a similar comment 
to my above discussion in The Politics of Experience. 
Many people are prepared to have faith in the sense of 
scientifically indefensible belief in an untested hypothesis. 
Few have trust enough to test it.150 
                                                                   Sedgwick’s ‘scientific’ criticisms sit 
very badly with his attempts at criticising the positivist approach to psychology, 
which he notes in his poorly-crafted first chapter of Psycho Politics. This is one 
example of the unresolved tensions within Sedgwick’s chapters on Laing, which 
greatly undermine the coherence of his arguments. With regard to the variation in 
diagnoses that an individual may receive, Sedgwick notes that such 
classifications can be seen as ‘…hypothetical constructs of our own 
devising…’151 Such considerations are not brought to bear upon Sedgwick’s 
claims that schizophrenia is real, and that Laing can be criticised on this basis. In 
his second specific chapter on Laing, Sedgwick suggests the following. 
…The battle against clinical positivism remains as urgent as 
ever… Laing’s capacity to entertain and dramatise alternative 
models of psychic deviancy remains a valuable resource, the 
weapon of the sceptic against categories which tend to 
congeal in the hands of the classifiers with vast social, 
chemical and even surgical powers over those classified.152 
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Despite the validity of Sedgwick’s praise for Laing in the above quotation, his 
criticisms which I have previously discussed are of a positivist nature, and do 
rely upon accepting the classification of schizophrenia as being a correct entity. 
At the end of  Self, Symptom and Society, Sedgwick suggests that ‘any critique of 
Laing cannot possibly answer him by brandishing the latest piece of blotting 
paper on which the chemical juices of a hospitalised schizophrenic have been 
analysed.’153 Nevertheless, Sedgwick does attempt to criticise Laing on such a 
pseudo-scientific basis, so he ends up negating his own criticism. 
                                                                                                     Sedgwick simply 
cannot form a consistent line of argument with regard to whether mental distress 
is a real illness, or whether it is simply a social construction. He oscillates 
between the two in an alarmingly casual fashion. This forms the basis for my 
dissatisfaction with the quality of his work – it is poorly organised and structured 
in terms of failing to address the tensions present within the argument. Sedgwick 
claims that the schizophrenic is really ‘…a disabled victim…’,154 but fails to 
clarify what he is referring to exactly by this. Earlier in his discussion, he asserts 
that ‘mental illness is a social construction…’155 However, much of his criticism 
of Laing is predicated upon the assumption that mental illness, and schizophrenia 
in particular, is really in existence. Therefore, much of his criticism is cancelled 
out by the tangles, tensions and contradictions within Sedgwick’s own argument. 
The first chapter of Psycho Politics contains a spectacularly feeble effort at 
discussing the nature of illness, in which every possible means of conceiving of 
illness is thrown in, with no coherent thread of argument contained therein.156 In 
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this section, he goes so far as to assert that all illnesses are social constructions, 
and claims that schizophrenia itself is virtually a useless label.157 
                                                                                                      The other main 
problem with Sedgwick’s criticism of Laing is that it is clustered around the 
assumption that anti-psychiatry is an adequate label for Laing’s work, and that it 
is an unproblematic one. The first chapter of Psycho Politics, within which a fair 
amount of discussion of Laing is contained, is entitled ‘Anti-Psychiatry, Illness 
and the Mentally Ill’. This is a matter which has already been dealt with in this 
thesis, since it is a recurring problem in the critiques of Laing.158 Sedgwick labels 
Laing as an anti-psychiatrist despite the fact that he notes that Laing himself 
denied being of that order.159 Indeed, Sedgwick’s first text on Laing (Self, 
Symptom and Society) occurs within the collection of essays on Laing called R.D. 
Laing and Anti-Psychiatry. This text is discussed by Laing and Mullan in Mad to 
be Normal, in one of the sections where Sedgwick’s ‘contribution’ is debated. 
Laing was not happy about the publication of that text. He criticises the literary 
agent and publisher, who, according to Laing, were admirers and friends of 
Cooper,160 because he was done ‘…a publishing disservice by encouraging [his] 
alleged association with anti-psychiatry.’161 Laing suggests that many journalists 
were blinded by this label, and failed to correctly report his actual statements in 
interviews ‘…because they were determined to have this mythological storyline 
of anti-psychiatry and an anti-psychiatric movement that never existed in the way 
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that they said.’162 According to Laing, Cooper encouraged it to intentionally 
confuse people.163 
                          Sedgwick’s writings on Laing certainly do refer to Laing and his 
colleagues as more or less one coherent movement. However, he does state that 
Laing and Cooper’s work were not identical.164 Nevertheless, he conflates the 
two when he proclaims the existence of a Laingian ‘movement’ or ‘school’. Both 
are referred to as part of the ‘Laing School’165 within Sedgwick’s rambling 
discussions in the first chapter of Psycho Politics. A few pages later Sedgwick 
proceeds to contradict himself again by suggesting that it would be wrong to 
think of one anti-psychiatric school of thought, 166 despite the fact that he is 
happy to lump very different theorists such as Goffman and Szasz together 
earlier in the chapter. Sedgwick refers to the ‘anti-psychiatry movement’167 in his 
first chapter on Laing. 
The movement for a critical psychiatry had… its leaders,… 
who became prophets and sages… It was R.D Laing who 
dominated the scene longest, as arch-seer and prophet-in-
chief.168 
I am aware that Laing’s work was very popular. Nevertheless, Sedgwick’s above 
comments seem rather excessive. In his second chapter, Sedgwick refers to ‘the 
Laingians’169 in a section discussing Kingsley Hall and Cooper’s alternative 
therapeutic community. He clearly was more than happy to contribute to the 
mythology of anti-psychiatry. 
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                                             Sedgwick makes some rather sweeping criticisms of 
what he perceives to be the anti-psychiatric movement (i.e. any theorist that 
broadly falls under this orbit). For example, ‘…the anti-psychiatric critics 
themselves are wrong when they imagine physical illness to be essentially 
different in its logic from psychiatry.’170 No reference to any specific author is 
made with regard to this claim. It certainly could not be applied to Laing, 
because he argues, in many of his texts, that the principles of physical medicine 
are transferred over to psychiatry in an inappropriate manner. Psychiatry is a 
division of medicine, after all. Sedgwick even goes so far as to claim that critical 
psychologists have helped to reinforce the under-funding of mental health 
provision. He claims that their work: 
…chimes in with the cautious, restrictive tones of the cheese-
paring politician who is out to deny the priority of resource 
allocation for the public psychiatric services… Public 
psychiatry, as the result of the onslaughts of Szasz, Goffman, 
and Laing… has become thoroughly unpopular with the 
general reading public.171 
On the one hand, Sedgwick’s plea for greater help for those in mental distress is 
laudable. Laing may have agreed with this. On the other hand, however, he 
provides no evidence to support his argument, and, again fails to draw from any 
of these specific authors’ work in relation to this claim. 
                                                                                        Even worse than 
Sedgwick creating the false impression of a Laingian school (it is worth recalling 
that Laing, Cooper and Esterson had all fallen out with each other by the 
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1970s172), Sedgwick goes so far as to allege that Laing’s work served as a means 
of indoctrinating readers, and that it became a form of orthodoxy. This is highly 
ironic given that Sedgwick criticises Laing for not following the ‘correct’ left-
wing line.  
…Virtually the entire left and an enormous proportion of 
the… reading public was convinced that R.D. Laing and his 
band of colleagues had produced… essentially accurate 
renderings of what psychotic experience truly signified. […]  
            The thrust of Laingian theorising accords so well with 
loose romanticism and libertarianism implicit in a number of 
contemporary creeds and moods that it can easily generate 
support and acquire plausibility.173 
One finds this to be very insulting towards Laing’s readers, and additionally an 
underestimation of the quality of Laing’s work itself. This jibe appears to have 
little other foundation than that individuals were unwilling to listen to 
Sedgwick’s criticism of Laing at the time. (He notes this before the above 
quotation. The story of Sedgwick and the parents of schizophrenics gaining a 
hostile reception from an audience of trainee social workers appears after this 
quotation.) Sedgwick claims that his criticism of Laing was produced in order to 
combat ‘…the potential tenacity of Laing’s influence upon future generations of 
the credulous…’174 Additionally, one finds this to be offensive. In this respect, 
Sedgwick’s aim of his critique fails completely, since it is of such a poor quality. 
Any reasonable intellectual with a knowledge of Laing’s actual work, which has 
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been read accurately, will be capable of noting the severe errors in Sedgwick’s 
criticism. 
              In conclusion, this evaluation of Sedgwick’s critique has somewhat 
taken this thesis in a full circle, since Sedgwick provides the template for much 
of the erroneous criticism of Laing. It is ironic that an allegedly left-wing author 
has produced the standardised line of critique which is replicated by the 
conservative psychiatric critics. What is most alarming is not just that 
Sedgwick’s criticism is unthinkingly reproduced by others, but that the same 
sloppy approach to Laing’s work is also reproduced. There is little real textual 
engagement in Sedgwick’s work. It is more a critique of what he perceives to 
have been the zeitgeist. Gossip is taken as seriously as actual textual evidence. 
Sedgwick seeks to create a scandal around Laing’s work, as opposed to engaging 
with it on its own terms. Sedgwick’s critique is dangerously misleading, in a 
similar vein to Showalter’s attempt at criticising Laing. It is certainly not what 
Sedgwick claims it to be – a scientific and logical evaluation of Laing’s work. In 
the next chapter, I will be providing some of my own criticism of certain aspects 
of Laing’s work, and drawing upon an excellent critique taken from an interview 
with Laing. 
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9) Further Sources of Critique 
 
This chapter will provide some of my own criticism of Laing with regard to 
certain aspects of his work. In particular, I will be examining Laing’s use of 
mapping and its notational representation within his work. I will additionally be 
evaluating Laing’s comments on the nature of birth within his later texts. These 
aspects of his work receive only a brief treatment from Laing’s other critics, 
which will be drawn upon at the relevant junctures. They fall outside of the main 
standard criticism of Laing’s work. Both mapping and Laing’s comments on 
birth are elements of his work that one finds to be the least engaging. To an 
extent, they do not contribute to what I read Laing for. The more critical aspects 
of Laing’s texts are the most engaging from my perspective. However, I wish to 
avoid producing criticism that replicates the same errors as those that I have 
already identified previously in this thesis. Therefore, I will be looking at the 
lines of development of these ideas within the chronological order of the texts 
that they feature in, and then seek to check my comments against the way that 
these concepts are embedded within those texts. There is a need to refer criticism 
back to the texts themselves, because I wish to avoid the problem of abstracting 
these elements from the texts. 
Mapping 
 
In order for the reader to be clear with regard to precisely which element of 
Laing’s work is being referred to by mapping, and Laing’s use of notational sets, 
I am providing the below quotation as an example. It is taken from the appendix 
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of Self and Others, entitled ‘A Notation for Dyadic Perspectives’. It is used as a 
means of noting the different perspectives of individuals in relation to each other. 
The following is a short ‘exercise’ in this area, using a simple 
notation. 
the own person, p 
the way the own person sees himself, p→p 
the way the own person sees the other, p→o 
 
Similarly, 
the other person, o 
the way the other person sees himself, o→o 
the way the other person sees the own person, o→p 
the way the own person, p, views the other’s, o’s, view of himself, 
p→(o→o) 
the way the own person, p, sees the other’s, o’s view of him, 
p→(o→p)1 
 
 
This is an aspect of Laing’s work that I have found to be very alienating. It is 
very different to his other contributions. However, is this a valid basis for 
critiquing this element of Laing’s work? Other critics are happy to criticise Laing 
because they dislike an aspect of his work, but one does not consider this to be 
the correct methodological approach to producing criticism. An examination of 
the ways in which mapping is utilised within Laing’s work renders it more 
intelligible than it first may seem. I wish to examine this shortly. 
                                                                                                     I have referred to 
my issue with this aspect of Laing’s work briefly in my chapter on Mitchell’s 
critique. She correctly notes that mapping features within Interpersonal 
Perception and The Politics of the Family, but fails to state that the origin of this 
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strand of Laing’s work is within Self and Others itself.2 Mitchell criticises this 
aspect of Laing’s work because she sees it as flawed in terms of Laing’s aim of 
contributing to a science of persons, which addresses individuals and groups 
within personal terms. 
The mathematical formulations… must seem to most people 
to be further removed from an ordinary ‘language of persons’ 
than the ‘defensive’ and depersonalizing way of expressing 
things that Laing originally objected to in Freud.3 
Kotowicz agrees with this line of critique. He sees Laing’s use of mapping as 
‘…going in the opposite direction from the phenomenological descriptions that 
we find in The Divided Self…’4 At first, I did agree with these comments. 
However, after applying my principle of referring my criticism back to the texts 
themselves, my perspective on Laing’s use of mapping, and notational sets as a 
form of representation of this, has changed. It is more intelligible than it first 
appears, and has more of a clear relation to Laing’s aim of creating a science of 
persons than is apparent from the above criticisms. 
                                                                                In the ‘Preface to the Second 
Edition’ of Self and Others, Laing states that: 
Some of the puzzles posed by the concept of unconscious 
phantasy may be resolved by bringing into play the theory of 
mapping… As a function, phantasy can be regarded as an 
operation of mapping, from any domain of experience to any 
range of experience.5 
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The problematic nature of unconscious phantasy forms a substantial amount of 
discussion within the first chapter of this text. Laing uses mapping, within this 
chapter, as a means of examining different ‘modes of experience,’6 such as 
imagination, memory and perception. Through investigating the way in which 
Laing deploys mapping, it becomes clearer that it is used by him as a means of 
noting and analysing these differing modes of experience, along with (in Laing’s 
term) ‘operations’ that are performed upon experience, such as projection. In the 
chapter on ‘Collusion’, Laing inserts notations into a quotation from Buber.7 The 
alternative to using such notations is to state that, for example, Sam thinks that 
Graham thinks that she thinks that he thinks that she does not like him. To state 
this in notational sets is, however, a rather clearer way of stating this. This is 
where some of the value lies in this method of Laing’s – it saves using an endless 
tortuous, confusing, sentence. The use of such notations, within the main text of 
Self and Others, is largely kept to a fairly simple form. Laing states in the 
appendix that different modes of experience are a feature of interpersonal life, 
and that this form of notation could be an aid to creating valid inferences.8 ‘There 
could be no greater mistake than to suppose that these issues are mere 
‘theoretical’ complexities, of little practical relevance.’9 
                                                                                      The way in which the use 
of mapping is embedded within this text does suggest that Laing saw this method 
as contributing, rather than detracting, from a science of persons.10 This is 
additionally the case with regard to its use within Interpersonal Perception. 
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Laing states that the ‘Interpersonal Perception Method’ (which is a more 
sophisticated version of the notations discussed above): 
…takes the fulcrum of understanding away from the 
professionally developed and controlled transference-
countertransference relationship and places it inside the 
dyadic experience and interaction of everyday life, where 
[these] processes commingle [sic] in ways that are only 
beginning to be studied, much less understood.11 
This provides a further example of Laing’s emphasis on the ‘real life’ relevance 
of the use of mapping and notational sets. Sedgwick provides some criticism of 
this text, which I have not discussed in my previous chapter. (Mitchell’s retort, 
however, has been previously noted.) Sedgwick suggests that the assumptions of 
Interpersonal Perception, and the method itself, are largely conservative ones.12 
‘The postulates of the study could hardly be in greater contrast with the rest of 
Laing’s work.’13 Since Sedgwick does not place this text within the wider lines 
of development of this aspect within Laing’s work, he treats it as further removed 
from other texts than it actually is. Confusingly, Sedgwick claims, only a few 
lines later, that: ‘Interpersonal Perception does not, however, represent a break 
or interlude in the development of Laing’s thought.’14 
                                                                                      The latter of Sedgwick’s 
assertions above is valid. However, the theoretical and methodological sections 
of Interpersonal Perception do not sharply contrast with the rest of Laing’s 
oeuvre. Much of the theoretical review is concerned with the critique of 
psychoanalysis and other perspectives, since they insufficiently deal with the 
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interpersonal realm.15 Laing is critical of approaches that assume that each 
person in a nexus only has one perspective on each other, where many levels of 
perspectives could actually be in existence, and each influences the other. ‘The 
failure to see the behaviour of one person as a function of the behaviour of the 
other has led to some extraordinary perceptual and conceptual aberrations that 
are still with us.’16 A key feature of the Interpersonal Perception Method is to not 
abstract the individual from their wider social relations. Laing notes that the 
method aims to overcome difficulties that originate from approaches that split the 
‘inner’ world of experience, and the ‘outer’ world.17 He additionally argues that 
these problems are substantial, since ‘there is no simple isomorphism running 
from the relation of self to self, through person to person, to person and 
society.’18 Therefore, Interpersonal Perception can be seen as a text which has 
more coherence as a feature of Laing’s work than can be perceived by an 
examination of the empirical method (matching various levels of perspectives 
between individuals), and Laing’s use of notations alone.  
                                                                                          Laing’s use of mapping 
is further developed within The Politics of the Family. A substantial amount of 
Part Two of this text makes use of mapping, and contains some of Laing’s most 
explicit comments on this element of his work, particularly in the chapter 
devoted to this. He notes that both projection and introjection are ‘mapping 
operations’19 that can be performed upon experience. Examples of projection are 
discussed earlier in the text, with either sets, or single letters, being used. Many 
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of these examples are to do with projection upon family members, or more 
specifically, the projection of one generation of a family upon younger family 
members.  
Each generation projects onto the next, elements derived from 
a product of at least three factors: what was (1) projected onto 
it by prior generations, (2) induced in it by prior generations, 
and (3) its response to this projection and induction… 
As we say, Johnny is the ‘image’ of his grandfather.20 
In Part Two of The Politics of the Family, Laing resumes his discussion of the 
‘Forms of Interpersonal Action’, which constitute Part Two of Self and Others, 
and are drawn upon in Sanity, Madness and the Family and The Politics of 
Experience. In Self and Others, in the chapter on collusion, Laing notes that he 
uses the term ‘projection’ in a different way to the psychoanalytic use of the 
term. 
The one person does not use the other merely as a hook to 
hang projections on. He strives find in the other, or to induce 
the other to become, the very embodiment of projection. The 
other person’s collusion is required to ‘complement’ the 
identity self feels impelled to sustain.21  
                                                                             The concrete relation of Laing’s 
use of notational sets, and mapping, to lived experience does render it more 
coherent. It highlights well the inter-generational lunacy of perceiving dead 
grandparents in newly-born babies. Laing provides one of his most explicit 
statements on the value of this aspect of his work in the chapter on mapping in 
The Politics of the Family.  
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It is not a question of the ‘scientific’ truth, or value, of such 
mappings. We are however in the true realm of science when 
we study what these mappings are… But they are very 
inadequately studied ‘scientifically’... when it comes to 
‘ourselves’ rather than ‘primitive’ societies.22 
In the above quotation, it is clear that Laing perceived this aspect of his work as 
contributing to a science of persons. There is a further contribution made by this 
aspect of Laing’s work, since it raises the problem of not simply considering 
what effects projecting aspects of others onto others has on the person creating 
the projections, but he also considers the effects on the person being projected 
upon. By induction, Laing is referring to the operation of inducing a person to 
embody the other’s projection.23 ‘We have actually no word for the 
transformation of the other’s experience under such induction.’24 This noting of 
an absence in this area is reminiscent of Laing’s comment in Sanity, Madness 
and the Family that ‘we have clinical terms for disturbed, but not for disturbing 
persons.’25  
                 Prior to researching this section, I was strongly considering critiquing 
Laing’s use of mapping and its notation within his work. However, after 
considering the place that this element of his work takes within his texts, and the 
relation of mapping to discussions of projection, and other operations performed 
upon experience, it is clear to me that this aspect of Laing’s work has a greater 
degree of coherence than I had previously assumed. It contributes to Laing’s aim 
of rendering experience intelligible. Since experience is itself complex and multi-
layered, such notations are of use in terms of setting out these facets of human 
relations. It would have been tempting for me to produce a facile critique based 
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on my dislike of this element, and the fact that, on the surface, it seems not to fit 
with Laing’s overall main projects. Nevertheless, I now find this aspect of 
Laing’s work to be less alienating than I had previously considered, and can 
perceive the relevance of mapping to a science of persons. It is also worth noting 
that Laing’s interpersonal theory that I have drawn upon in this section is an 
aspect of his work that is missed by his critics and other commentators. 
Laing’s Discussions of Birth 
 
Laing’s comments on the relationship of birth and pre-birth to experience may, 
however, provide a more coherent line of critique. This aspect of his work occurs 
within his later texts, The Facts of Life and The Voice of Experience, in 
particular. Nevertheless, the origin of this strand of Laing’s work derives from 
The Politics of Experience. These comments in the latter text are not directly 
concerned with the nature of the experience of being in the womb, and being 
born, but instead discuss the voyage as a form of rebirth. ‘The process of entering 
into the other world from this world, and returning to this world from the other 
world, is as natural as death and giving birth or being born.’26 Later on in the 
text, Laing describes the voyage as a movement ‘…from being outside (post-
birth) back into the womb of all things (pre-birth)…’27 He states that the return 
may involve the transition ‘…from a cosmic foetalization to an existential 
rebirth.’28 The idea of such a rebirth within later stages of life is only briefly 
taken up within Laing’s later texts that I have referred to above.  
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                                                                Chapter Six of The Facts of Life, simply 
entitled ‘Birth’, mentions such rebirthing of adults. Laing refers to an American 
psychotherapist who was in a session with an ‘…incurable psychotic…’29, who 
went into movements that she perceived as akin to trying to be born. ‘…She 
enacted with him his birth, playing the part of the midwife.’30 According to 
Laing, this individual went through many other such ‘birthings’, and had, at the 
time of writing, recovered somewhat from his mental distress. Laing states that 
this psychotherapist (Elizabeth Fehr) came over to London in 1973, and spent a 
fortnight doing such ‘birthing’ sessions ‘…with people in the households and 
network in our scene in London.’31 Laing claims that these sessions brought 
about ‘…remarkable changes…’32 in the people involved. However, he provides 
no further analysis of this matter, and abruptly ends the very short chapter soon 
after the above comments. 
                                         This material from The Facts of Life provides the only 
clear relation between Laing’s earlier comments in The Politics of Experience 
regarding ‘existential rebirth’, and the focus on birth and existence in the womb 
in his later texts. There is no other hint at the substantially different turn that 
Laing’s work takes in its speculative discussions of birth in any of his other texts. 
The main issue is that Laing could be interpreted as claiming that biological 
processes condition later personality and life problems – a problematic birth 
creates an unhappy individual. This provides arguably the facet of Laing’s work 
which may be the most dislocated from his other main contributions, and in 
which the relation between this element of his work and his previous 
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achievements could be seen as a paradoxical one. I wish to provide some 
concrete examples of the difficulties posed by this strand of Laing’s work after 
drawing upon other critiques of this element. Nevertheless, it is worth stating at 
this juncture that, despite the potential problems with Laing’s comments on birth, 
it is not a main feature of the criticism of Laing. 
                                                                           Sedgwick provides some criticism 
of this aspect of Laing’s work. 
A serious discontinuity between this latest approach and the 
whole of Laing’s previous intellectual career is striking; it 
affords no connection with any general social theory… Laing 
will be remembered for more important reasons than his late 
interest in ante-natal and post-natal complications of this 
idiosyncratic sort.33 
In this instance, Sedgwick manages to provide some relatively valid criticism of 
this turn in Laing’s later work. Since the vast majority of the ‘classic’ texts by 
Laing are focussed upon the critique of biological reductionism, it is shocking for 
Laing to have then become what could be read as a proponent of such an 
approach in the relevant sections of The Facts of Life and The Voice of 
Experience. Within both of these texts, most of the material contained therein is 
devoted to experience within the womb and the experience of birth, with more 
critical chapters only featuring as less substantial elements of the texts. Here I 
would like to make it clear that I am not fully ‘writing off’ both of these texts, 
since they do contain some important material that fits with the more typical 
concerns of Laing’s work. For example, The Voice of Experience contains 
Laing’s re-evaluation of Binswanger’s study of ‘Ellen West’, which I have 
examined in my section on Laing’s reinterpretation of past clinical descriptions. 
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The Facts of Life is Laing’s weakest text, since it is a rambling, unfocussed, 
jumble of discussions, some of which are presented as though they were poetry.34 
It contains both autobiographical notes, discussions of birth, and some critical 
material on psychiatry and science. 
                                                       This diversion within Laing’s last published 
theoretical texts is subject to a reasonable critique in an interview with Laing in 
The Times, conducted by Laurie Taylor (then a professor of sociology) in 1983. 
Taylor’s criticism benefits from his desire to avoid the standard approach to 
critiquing Laing. Taylor was glad that he had decided: 
…to ask no questions about [Laing’s] acid trips, or his 
mystical interludes, or his brief affair with the love 
generation. 
    In any case he’d written quite enough since those days to 
deserve some clear space in which to stand. I wanted much 
more to talk about his lifelong concern with “experience”…35  
Taylor additionally notes that he took this approach because he did not ‘…want 
to go backwards in the argument…’36 with regard as to whether Laing had, at 
some stage, been romanticising madness. He states that he was aware that this 
was not the case. Taylor’s criticism is directed towards The Voice of Experience, 
and its concern with experience in the womb, and that of birth. He questions: 
‘Wasn’t this making altogether too much of this intra-uterine period?’37 I agree to 
some extent with Taylor’s raising of this issue. It is fair to consider that 
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experience may begin either in the womb or at birth. However, one considers 
actual post-birth life experiences, and the accumulation of such experiences 
through interaction with the wider environment, to be of a much greater 
significance in terms of shaping personality and the self than birth or existence 
within the womb. I, for example, cannot remember either my birth nor being in 
the womb.38 From my perspective, it is simply ridiculous to even consider that 
such events have had a profound effect upon the individual that I am now. 
                                                                                Laing does not aid his cause by 
providing only vague responses to Taylor’s questions in this area. To Taylor’s 
above question, Laing produces only a tangential response, claiming that he 
could have taken the credit for starting off ‘…a pre-natal genetic account…’39, 
and arguing that it was a burgeoning field at that time. Laing additionally claims 
that many people feel that experiences in the womb ‘…echo and resonate 
throughout life.’40 This latter type of assertion is one that Laing repeats 
frequently in The Facts of Life.41 Rather than providing specific instances and 
using studies in this area, Laing resorts to claiming ‘well, many people agree 
with me’. This is arguably as uncritical as Laing’s work gets. He fails to 
corroborate his speculations by reference to any hard evidence. Taylor is not 
satisfied with Laing’s response either. He states that he was not asking whether 
this area was fashionable, but whether ‘…intra-uterine psychology…42 was 
actually compatible with the rest of Laing’s work. 
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Was he really suggesting that the density of experience could 
somehow be reduced to, or explained by, intra-uterine events 
which occurred well before the advent of the language or the 
possibility of sensory discrimination?43 
                                                                              Laing’s response is again vague 
in some respects. He argues that he was ‘…sceptical of anything causal…’44 but 
fails to connect this with his musings in The Facts of Life and The Voice of 
Experience. It may have been of immense benefit if Laing had clarified his 
comments regarding the notion that mental patterns may reflect the human 
genetic life cycle, and the idea ‘…that all our experience in our life cycle from 
cell one is absorbed and stored from the beginning, perhaps especially in the 
beginning.’45 Given that there are no statements to the contrary, my reading of 
this is that this does appear to be laying a causal pattern upon human life – 
something which is subject to much critique in the ‘classic’ Laingian texts. In the 
interview with Taylor, Laing suggests that the analogies and patterns between 
experience in the womb and that of birth, and later psychological events, formed 
the reason for his interest in this matter.46 Taylor ends up deciding not to pursue 
this further in the interview, but provides some additional critique of this strand 
of Laing’s work. He notes that ‘it seemed the sort of soft Laingian impressionism 
which detracts from the many insights which still run through his work.’47 
                                                 I fully agree with this. Taylor’s comments on this 
aspect of Laing’s work are incisive and valid. He notes at the beginning of the 
interview that he was well aware of the entirety of Laing’s work. This puts him 
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in a good position to make criticisms of the biological diversion in Laing’s later 
texts, and to point out the paradoxical nature of this. 
What Laing’s admirers find… worrying about some of his 
present work is the apparent confusion of levels: the attempt 
to describe the shifting modes of consciousness by biological 
analogy. After all, one of Laing’s great strengths was the 
ability… to locate the forms which madness took within such 
apparently normal cultural settings as the to-and-fro of family 
life…48 
This quotation reinforces my earlier comments on the way that this element of 
Laing’s work sits very uneasily with the rest of his arguments. Taylor 
additionally notes that it could also be seen as a complete withdrawal from any 
engagement with the social world. ‘…Finally the social has disappeared entirely 
as Laing burrows back within the womb for clues to our adult maladjustments.’49 
                               I cannot find fault with Taylor’s critique of this strand of 
Laing’s work. I also agree that ‘it would be a pity… if critics did not hold 
[Laing’s] achievements in more stable regard.’50 There are, however, further 
problems with this matter. Despite Laing’s comments on rebirth in The Politics 
of Experience, the material contained in The Facts of Life and The Voice of 
Experience on birth and pre-natal experience does appear to arise from no 
substantial precedents within Laing’s previous work. However, it could be 
argued that it retains Laing’s central focus within his main debates on the nature 
of human experience. Nevertheless, this strand of Laing’s work does not 
investigate the experience of mental distress, other than reading this as the 
consequence of traumatic events in the womb or during birth. It is fair to claim 
that experience begins at birth, as I have already stated. However, is Laing 
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committing the same error as psychoanalysis in suggesting that very early 
experiences can condition the remainder of life? In The Facts of Life, Laing notes 
that he is not simply suggesting that the past directly influences present 
experience. 
How we now feel about a past that is beyond conscious recall 
does not necessarily tell us anything about the past as it was 
then. It may only tell of our present reactions, of our present 
fantasies of then.51 
The lack of structure of the arguments in The Facts of Life, from my perspective, 
only serve to increase my confusion as to whether Laing is implying a causal 
relation here or not, as does the lack of any substantive relation to his previous 
ideas. The only other linking threads between this element of Laing’s work and 
his former texts, (other than the nature of experience), lie within the idea of 
mapping, (‘…that prenatal patterns may be mapped onto natal and postnatal 
experience’52), and within some criticism of the scientific approach to birth. 
                                                                              The medical terminology that 
these discussions are couched in is extremely alienating. I continue to be 
unaware of what such terms as ‘blastula’,53 ‘zona pellucida’,54 ‘chorionic villi’,55 
and so forth, actually refer to. Laing does not bother to inform the reader as to 
what these are, in ‘layperson’s’ terms. This can be seen as contradicting Laing’s 
principles for a science of persons, where the personal should be addressed in 
personal terms. The use of confusing medical jargon is a feature of both The 
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Facts of Life, and The Voice of Experience.56 However, in the latter text, Laing 
does attempt to relate his discussions to a wider theoretical and anthropological 
context. The problem of the lack of evidence to support Laing’s claims is most 
apparent within the former text, where, as I have mentioned, he tends to resort to 
assertions such as ‘thousands of people in every walk of life… claim to 
remember their birth and before.’57 Laing does not present these discussions 
within case studies of a comparable quality to those in his earlier texts, but within 
very vague statements of others’ experiences.58 
                                                                         Since I am addressing this material 
from a female point of view, it concerns me that it could give credibility to an 
anti-abortion perspective. If the experience of the first cells that eventually come 
to comprise a baby is considered as important as that of a post-birth child and 
adult, it could be used to argue that abortions should not be carried out. I do 
consider some of Laing’s arguments to be dangerous in this way. However, 
Laing’s inclusion of daft statements such as ‘one could remain in love with one’s 
placenta the rest of one’s life’59 should serve as a reminder to the reader that 
Laing’s speculations should not be taken so seriously. Some of Laing’s claims in 
these texts are far more outrageous, and mystical in some respects, than those 
made in the much-maligned last few chapters of The Politics of Experience. For 
example, ‘is it possible that mother and embryo may communicate in some 
telepathic transpersonal way?’60 This comment occurs in a chapter discussing 
‘The Prenatal Bond’, where a woman’s dream of a kitten being trapped inside a 
                                               
56
 See, for example, the use of the term ‘trophoblast’ on p.141 of The Voice of Experience. 
57
 The Facts of Life, p.56 
58
 See, as an example, p.57 of The Facts of Life. 
59
 The Facts of Life, p.63 
60
 The Voice of Experience, p.105 
 308 
box was interpreted as indicating that she was pregnant.61 This example is 
indicative of much of Laing’s material on birth and before, since it is possible, 
and even plausible, but nevertheless raises profound difficulties of validation. 
Nevertheless, Laing sets this discussion within comments on the nature of how 
Western culture excludes the feasibility of such occurrences, and notes that it 
‘…challenges a strategic checkpoint of possibility.’62 Such qualifications do not 
occur within The Facts of Life. The Voice of Experience is the better text for 
including the awareness of the incredible nature of what Laing is discussing. 
                                                    However, some of Laing’s comments within this 
element of his work do link in with his wider criticism of the scientific method. 
Laing criticises the medicalisation of birth in both The Facts of Life and The 
Voice of Experience. 
The preference for unnatural childbirth practices… has led 
birth, in many places, to be a major psychobiological disaster 
zone, in which almost everything is done the exact opposite 
way from how it would happen, if allowed to.63 
I do find this aspect of Laing’s comments on birth to be among the more 
coherent of his claims. However, it is worth recalling that giving birth is amongst 
one of the most dangerous things that a woman can do, and that therefore 
medical intervention may be necessary, as opposed to an arbitrary interference, 
as Laing appears to view it in the above quotation. It could be further suggested 
that such comments appear to be little other than a man speaking for women. The 
blunt, inchoate nature of Laing’s remarks in The Facts of Life could be construed 
in this way. Nevertheless, in The Voice of Experience, Laing notes that the 
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experience of birth for the mother herself is also ignored.64 He also much more 
clearly relates his concern over the medicalisation of childbirth to a wider debate 
of the coldness of science. 
…We do not see childbirth in some obstetric units any more. 
What goes on there no more resembles birth than artificial 
insemination resembles sexual intercourse or a tube feed 
resembles eating. 
             The obliteration of birth takes its place along with the 
obliteration of mind, and death, as footnotes to the scientific 
abolition of our world and ourselves.65 
These comments move closer to the ‘classic’ Laingian critique of the inhumanity 
of science. This aspect of his comments on birth and the possibility of experience 
within the womb form the only aspect of this strand of his work that I can engage 
with to some extent. 
                               Unfortunately the vast majority of this material is, from my 
perspective, simply an exercise in speculation. The paradox between Laing 
having spent much of his career debunking the medical view of mental distress, 
and then apparently claiming in these later works that a traumatic birth may 
produce a traumatised individual in later life is striking. This radical change is 
one that was not properly addressed by Laing in any other instances than the 
Taylor interview that I am aware of. Even then, Laing provides only vague 
responses. It would appear that Laing may have become rather self-indulgent in 
later life with regard to what he saw as fit for publication. Since the vast majority 
of the critiques of Laing that have been reviewed in this thesis were produced 
prior to the publication of The Facts of Life and The Voice of Experience, this 
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highly problematic strand of Laing’s later work has not been subject to criticism, 
other than in this chapter, and by Taylor and Sedgwick.  
                                                                                       However, have I fallen 
into the traps that I have identified with the poor critiques of Laing in my above 
criticisms?66 All of the other texts by Laing that I have examined in this thesis 
are theoretical texts – they seek to explain aspects of the intelligibility of what is 
seen as mental illness, or, in Reason and Violence, to summarise a theory. In this 
section, I have treated The Facts of Life and The Voice of Experience as though 
they were theoretical texts, when this is not actually the case, since these latter 
texts are not seeking principally to explain anything. This may provide a reason 
for the lack of coherence between these later works and their predecessors. It 
may therefore be considered unfair to judge these texts by the same standards as 
the ‘classic’ theoretical texts by Laing. Nevertheless, there is theoretically-
relevant material, if not actual theory itself, within The Facts of Life and The 
Voice of Experience. 
                                As I have noted in this section, the theoretically-relevant 
material within these texts is consistent with Laing’s emphasis upon human 
experience within his work. As a result, my above criticisms do involve picking 
out the speculative elements of these texts for criticism, and abstracting these 
aspects away from the coherence of these texts within Laing’s focus upon 
experience in his wider work. My reading of the material on birth and pre-birth 
experiences as reflecting a form of biological reductionism could be seen as too 
strong, since Laing did state in the interview with Taylor that it was not intended 
to be of a causal nature. I could be potentially taking the absence of statements to 
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the contrary within these texts as more indicative than it may be. I am also 
concerned that I may be taking my dislike of Laing’s material on birth and pre-
birth experiences as more of a valid basis for a critique than it truly is. 
Nevertheless, I remain perplexed by this strand of Laing’s work, and still retain 
the view that it is problematic in some respects. 
 
 312 
10) Conclusion – Principles of Critique 
 
To conclude this thesis, I would first of all like to state that it is shocking and 
surprising how poor the vast majority of the criticism of Laing’s work is. In this 
conclusion, I wish to summarise the key problems involved in the critiques of 
Laing that have been reviewed in this thesis. I would also like to make some 
suggestions as to how these methodological errors could, potentially, be avoided. 
I will additionally be drawing upon some of Lodziak’s work in this area, which 
serves to reinforce the arguments that I will be making. 
                                                                                       The worst approach to the 
production of criticism is that of making ad hominem attacks upon the author 
concerned. This can take the form of a character assassination, or moralising over 
the author’s life. Examples of this have been noted in this thesis within 
Showalter’s, Sedgwick’s and the conservative psychiatric ‘critiques’. It does 
appear to be of relevance that such a poor approach is utilised by critics who 
fundamentally fail to engage with Laing’s work on its own terms, and who lack 
in a real understanding of his work. This may render the critic incapable of 
producing a critique of theoretical material itself. Further problems involve using 
unverified second-hand evidence to create a character assassination, or 
promoting myths about an author’s work. 
                                                                 The main set of problematic approaches 
to the production of criticism occur within issues surrounding the reading, 
interpretation and understanding of theoretical texts. The complications appear to 
arise from an inaccurate or virtually non-existent reading of the text, which 
produces a poor interpretation and understanding of the theory. The majority of 
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the criticism of Laing that has been reviewed in this thesis is subject to this 
particular cluster of methodological problems. All of these issues are closely 
related. Poor reading is demonstrated within critiques when it is apparent that the 
critic has not read all of an author’s work. The latter aspect is important in terms 
of tracing the lines of development of concepts. Poor reading is also 
demonstrated through a lack of textual evidence being deployed within the 
criticism. Some of Laing’s critics appear to have only quickly scanned through 
his work, since no evidence of a thorough reading of any of his texts is apparent 
within the criticism. This can take the form of abstracting quotations away from 
their context within the text that they inhabit, and is shown in a lack of 
engagement with the theory. 
                                            These issues can also be related to interpreting a text 
in such a way that the critic considers it to mean something substantially 
different than the meaning derived from a close reading of the text. Many of 
Laing’s critics, such as the conservative psychiatric critics and Jacoby, appear to 
have approached Laing’s theories with a pre-defined view of what his work 
consists of. Their criticism of his work then becomes little other than a critique of 
their misconceptions. Lodziak, rather worryingly, refers to these problems as 
‘…standard academic practices, which in conjunction with misrepresentation, 
can transform critical discussion into an irrelevance.’1 He identifies these two 
practices in the following quotations. 
The first of these practices involves the articulation of the 
critic’s own position under the guise of criticism of a book or 
theorist. It is normally the case that the ensuing ‘criticism’ 
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reveals more about the critic than about the object of 
criticism.2  
The second standard academic practice that can generate 
irrelevant criticism can be referred to as superfluous academic 
production. Essentially the critic misreads a theorist, for 
example, and then proceeds to criticise the theorist as if the 
misreading is in fact a truthful reading.3 
The misreading of Laing as glorifying the schizophrenic voyage, and therefore 
romanticising ‘madness’, can be seen as an example of the second 
methodological error that Lodziak identifies in the above quotation. 
                                                                                                           A poor 
interpretation of a text can involve an ignorance of the author’s intentions for the 
work concerned. This is the case with much of the criticism of Sanity, Madness 
and the Family, where this text is critiqued for not following standard scientific 
methodologies. Lodziak notes that theoretical texts must be approached in a way 
that takes into account the fact that they are different types of texts to, for 
example, works of fiction. He emphasises that ‘…the specificity of theoretical 
texts is such that their interpretation requires an approach radically different from 
currently fashionable practices in literary criticism.’4 Lodziak argues that 
‘…authorial intent…’5 is key in terms of ‘…understanding theoretical texts.’6  
                                                       A poor understanding of a text can be 
demonstrated within a critique through criticising an author for not doing what 
the critic wanted them to. This occurs within Mitchell’s critique where she 
criticises Laing for not producing psychoanalytic interpretations of the material 
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in his case studies. Many of Laing’s critics approach his work with excessive 
expectations for him to have covered all possible angles of research. This is 
particularly apparent within left-wing critiques of Laing. The problematic 
approach of cutting out aspects of a theory which do not fit into the critic’s 
representation of it is what I have termed the Procrustean critique. From my 
perspective this demonstrates a lack of understanding of a theory, since theories 
are usually constructed in such a way that omitting elements may ignore key 
features of the theory. Mitchell and Jacoby are particularly guilty of this. They 
also share a tendency to engage in using inappropriate means of critique, such as 
using psychoanalysis to criticise Laing’s work, whilst ignoring his criticism of 
this approach. 
                     A further disquieting aspect of the critiques of Laing is the blind 
reproduction of inaccurate criticisms by other critics, and the replication of the 
same poor approach to the production of criticism. Only Mitchell and Deleuze 
and Guattari manage to transcend in some respects the problems that I have 
summarised so far in this conclusion. At this point, I would like to draw upon 
two different conceptions of the best form of critique – the immanent critique. 
Adorno’s conception of this method of critique has already been referred to in 
my chapter on Deleuze and Guattari. I am aware that the following quotation has 
already been used in this thesis. However, I am including it again in order for the 
reader to be clear about the differing views of the immanent critique. 
Our critique of the ontological need brings us to an immanent 
critique of ontology itself. We have no power over the 
philosophy of Being if we reject it generally, from outside, 
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instead of taking it on in its own structure – turning its own 
force against it, in line with Hegel’s desideratum.7 
                                                   Adorno’s conception of the immanent critique 
involves the production of criticism which is not based upon the rejection of a 
theory from outside of its proper domain. The vast majority of the critiques of 
Laing do involve such an outright rejection of Laing’s theories. Lodziak’s 
definition of the immanent critique is slightly different to that offered by Adorno. 
To properly criticise a theorist’s work…, or a particular text, 
is to make judgements about the extent to which the substance 
of the theory fulfills the author’s self-presentation of his/her 
total project. We can refer to this as ‘immanent critique’. In 
practice…, immanent critique necessarily involves criticism 
of the particular (a single text, or an idea, for example) in 
relation to the total project, and as such demands that the critic 
is familiar with the total project.8 
Lodziak suggests that the immanent critique should evaluate a theory in terms of 
its relation to the author’s overall intentions for their work. The above quotation 
emphasises the point that I have raised that knowledge of all of an author’s texts 
is necessary for this to occur. Adorno’s conception of the immanent critique 
involves moving within the same theoretical structure as what is being criticised. 
                                                   In the previous chapter, where I have attempted 
to produce some of my own criticism of Laing, I have endeavoured to make use 
of some of the approaches to the production of criticism noted by Adorno and 
Lodziak. My examination of the lines of development of Laing’s use of mapping 
and its representation in notational sets, and its use within his texts (Laing’s 
intentions for this aspect of his work), rendered it as more coherent than it may 
                                               
7
 Adorno, T.W, (1973), Negative Dialectics, (trans. E.B. Ashton), London, Routledge, p.97 
8
 Lodziak, C, (1985), Notes on Theoretical Discourses in an Era of Expediency, Trent Papers in 
Communication, Vol.3, p.180 
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have been through using a less considered means of critique. These 
methodological principles also enabled me to criticise aspects of my critique. The 
need for such a reflexive analysis (to critique the critique) is lacking within the 
majority of the critiques of Laing, as is the provision of any counter-arguments 
against the criticism. The production of a critique should take a dialectical form, 
as opposed to assuming that any criticism has absolute validity. Mitchell’s aims 
for her critique of Laing are close to Lodziak’s view of the immanent critique. 
She attempts to evaluate Laing’s work through his application of Sartrean 
concepts. This is laudable, despite the fact that the final product is not of the 
expected quality. Deleuze and Guattari also demonstrate a considerable level of 
engagement with Laing’s work. Their criticism of Laing can be related to 
Adorno’s idea of the immanent critique, since they attempt to criticise Laing out 
of the need for his work. No other authors, out of those reviewed in this thesis, 
other than Mitchell and Deleuze and Guattari, develop Laing’s work to any 
extent. Critique should additionally serve this purpose – to attempt to move a 
theory forward. 
                       I wish to summarise some ways in which the production of a poor 
critique may be avoided, before concluding this thesis. It may be assumed that 
reading a text is a simple matter. However, it is apparent that this is not the case, 
given that the poverty of much of the criticism of Laing has bad reading as the 
origin of the problem. The effort must be made to not read meanings into a text 
which are non-existent, or contrary to what the author was most probably 
attempting to say. Standardised lines of criticism can be misleading, as they are 
with claims that Laing romanticises mental distress. The critic must attempt to 
evaluate such lines of critique without assuming that they are correct, unless 
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textual evidence from primary sources is available to support the criticism. The 
critic’s interpretation of the text or theory must be checked against the text itself. 
Close attention must be paid to the lines of development of concepts within the 
author’s work, and to their intentions. This can only be facilitated by reading all 
of the author’s work. As I have already stated, there is a need to critique the 
critique, to not simply assume that any criticism produced is simply correct. I 
would like to make it clear that I am not ‘writing off’ critique as an intellectual 
pursuit, but I wish to emphasise that a more careful approach needs to be 
undertaken than has been apparent within the majority of the criticism of Laing 
that has been reviewed in this thesis. 
                                                         In my final comments, I wish to state that I 
consider my undertakings in this thesis to have been valuable. My review of the 
criticism of Laing has shown that much of it is extremely deficient in terms of 
actually critiquing Laing’s theories. Since no extensive evaluation of these 
critiques is currently in existence, this thesis serves as a guide to the 
methodological errors that can occur in terms of attempting to criticise an 
author’s work. In a negative way, the poverty of the critiques has enabled me to 
present the value of Laing’s contributions to social theory. His phenomenological 
science of persons continues to be his main contribution. I hope to have shown 
within my chapter on arguments for a feminist reading of Laing that his project 
of demystifying mental distress is one which can be developed in the light of 
more recent empirical evidence. Now that the myths surrounding Laing’s work 
have been debunked, one can only hope for more scholarly approaches to his 
work in the future. 
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